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Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978 to amend
Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination to include discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions. More
than thirty-five years after the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, courts have failed to fulfill that act's promise. This failure lies, in part,
in the law's tendency to reduce pregnancy, with all of its social and cultural
meaning, to its "purely" biological elements. For the purposes of the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act, courts ground the legal conception of preg-
nancy in a form of biomedical essentialism that treats pregnancy as a
universal given. Under the PDA, courts have reduced pregnancy discrimi-
nation only to the discrimination that occurs during gestation or because of
gestation-related physiological conditions. This reductive definition of
pregnancy is not only profoundly under-inclusive and unresponsive to the
needs of workers but also contradictory and incoherent. In response, this
article proposes that pregnancy should be reconstructed in law. Judges, ad-
ministrative actors, and advocates should reject reductive forms of bi-
omedical essentialism and embrace possibilities beyond biology.
Pregnancy should not, and indeed cannot, be understood independent of
the social, cultural, and relational interactions that give it meaning. Preg-
nancy is, in fact, pregnant with social and cultural meaning. Reconstructing
pregnancy in this way has the potential to provide much needed clarity to
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and to ensure that pregnancy discrimi-
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INTRODUCTION
ONGRESS passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (the PDA
or the Act) in 1978.1 The PDA was passed in response to the U.S.
Supreme Court's determination that pregnancy discrimination is
not sex discrimination for the purposes of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
1. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) ("An Act
[t]o amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy.").
Reconstructing Pregnancy
Rights Act.2 Drafted as part of Title VII's definition section, the PDA
provides protection for pregnant employees in two ways: First, the PDA
defines sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. 3 Second, the PDA re-
quires employers to treat pregnant employees in the same way as other
employees who are not pregnant but are similarly situated in their ability
or inability to work.4
Although the PDA made explicit what feminists believed and what wo-
men already knew-that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination-
the Act has its limitations. 5 One of the major limitations of the PDA
emerges from the fact that it does not explicitly define pregnancy or pro-
vide guidance for determining the scope of related medical conditions
that the Act addresses. As pregnancy discrimination jurisprudence has
evolved, the scope and meaning of pregnancy, childbirth, and related
medical conditions has become unclear. 6 Furthermore, courts have inter-
preted the PDA in ways that fail entirely to protect women in the work-
place from discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, and
related medical conditions.7
The current pregnancy discrimination jurisprudence emerges from a
fundamentally naive misunderstanding of the nature of pregnancy. At
first blush, most individuals believe they know and understand the nature
of pregnancy. Because pregnancy is such a ubiquitous part of human life,
many individuals have experienced pregnancy either firsthand or as the
partner of a pregnant person. For this reason, pregnancy is believed to be
a commonly accessible experience, widely available to individuals
whether they have been pregnant or not.8 There is also a presumption
that the boundaries of pregnancy are easily understood and can be re-
duced strictly to biology and physiology. 9 In 1999, the Honorable Richard
Posner, a prolific jurist and scholar, made a bold but insightful statement
about the judiciary and its knowledge of sex.10 He claimed that the
processes of educating and selecting judges may create a circumstance
where the judiciary has little knowledge about the nature of sexuality and
the scope of sexual desire.'1 According to Judge Posner, "judges know
2. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
4. According to the PDA, "the terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include,
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability
or inability to work." Id.
5. See id.; see also infra Part I.D.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1996).
8. See infra Part II|.D.i.
9. See infra Part III.A.




next to nothing about the subject."'1 2 This article echoes Judge Posner
with a distinct but similar claim. Judges, while they may be highly edu-
cated, knowledgeable, and worldly in other regards, often may know very
little about pregnancy. Not only do they lack the sophisticated medical
and scientific knowledge that many doctors, maternal nurses, and mid-
wives possess, they also typically lack the experiential, hedonic knowl-
edge of pregnancy that many women possess.' 3
In interpreting the PDA, courts currently limit the scope and meaning
of pregnancy by grounding the concept in biomedical essentialism. 14 Bi-
omedical essentialism is an ideological perspective that reduces the pro-
cess of pregnancy to its biological and physiological facets, obscuring the
important ways in which society and culture shape the meaning of preg-
nancy and structure our experience of it.15 Adherence to a perspective on
pregnancy that embraces biomedical essentialism also entails adopting
the presumption that pregnancy is an ahistorical, natural event that is the
same for all women across all cultures and social contingencies. 16 Such a
perspective fails to provide a nuanced understanding of the nature of
pregnancy; a proper understanding would respond to the diversity among
pregnant women alongside the historically contingent social, cultural,
psychological, and economic aspects of pregnancy. Until the definition of
pregnancy is pushed beyond the presumption that pregnancy can be re-
duced to physiology and biology, courts will consistently fail to protect
women from sex discrimination through the PDA.
This article explores how the federal courts have defined pregnancy for
the purposes of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It reveals how the
PDA fails to protect pregnant workers, in part, because courts fundamen-
tally misunderstand the nature and scope of pregnancy. In passing the
PDA, Congress intended to address many "manifestations" of pregnancy
discrimination beyond those linked to physiology and biology.1 7 Yet,
12. Id.
13. Saru M. Matambanadzo, The Fourth Trimester, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 101, 164
(2014).
14. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974) (noting that "[n]ormal
pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics").
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexu-
ality, in PILEASURE AN) DANGER: ExPi-ORING FEMALE SEXUAL rrY 267-68 (Carol S. Vance
ed., 1992).
17. Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant with Possibility: Reexamining the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 819, 821 (2001).
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from breastfeeding18 to infant care 19 to paid leave,20 even narrow, spe-
cific efforts to clarify and expand the scope of antidiscrimination have
had limited success in the courts. The task of interpreting the PDA in
ways that do not reduce pregnancy to its biological and physiological as-
pects and that succeed in recognizing the importance of social and cul-
tural aspects of pregnancy presents a difficult challenge for courts and
policymakers.21
This article argues that pregnancy should not be reduced to its bi-
omedical elements, and that pregnancy must not be essentialized in ways
that render it neutral, natural, and ahistorical. The article seeks to show
that pregnant bodies in law do not exist as pre-cultural artifacts that lie
outside of social interactions; instead, pregnant bodies are forged through
discourse, experienced through social interactions, and endowed with
meaning by cultural expectations. Pregnancy, even in its material biologi-
cal and physiological aspects, is experienced, mediated, and understood
through culture, discourse, and social relations. For this reason, the so-
called biology or physiology of pregnancy cannot be defined separately
from the cultural and social frameworks of pregnancy. It follows that the
meaning and scope of pregnancy should be reconstructed for the pur-
poses of the PDA in ways that resist the pull of biomedical essentialism.
This intervention offers a counter-narrative to deal with the intractable
notion of nature, resisting the ways in which courts have reduced preg-
nancy to its biological and physiological aspects. As such, this recon-
structed meaning of pregnancy does not represent a totalizing, general
theory of pregnancy or the body, but rather a localized disruption of re-
ceived legal wisdom about pregnancy.22 Furthermore, simultaneously
denaturalizing pregnancy and expanding its scope and meaning through
an emphasis on cultural and social meaning has the potential to foster a
more robust conception of what types of discrimination the law should
prohibit.
Part I reviews the problem of pregnancy discrimination in the work-
place and examines the federal statutory response, highlighting both the
18. Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 932 (4th Cir. 1988); Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., No. 4:11-cv-00359 RP-RAW, at *19 (S.D. Iowa, Oct. 16,2012) (mem. op.), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 947 (2015); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 868 (W.D. Ky. 1990),
aff'd, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991).
19. See, e.g., Fleming v. Ayers & Assocs., 948 F.2d 993, 997 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding
that the PDA does not mandate leave to care for special needs infants); see also Fejes v.
Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1491-93 (D. Colo. 1997) (citing Wallace v. Pyro
Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990), affd, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991)) (stating
that the needs or conditions of a child that require the mother's presence are not within the
purview of the PDA); Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 846 F. Supp. 442,445 (D. Md. 1994).
20. The PDA does not mandate paid leave for employees. See, e.g., Maldonado v. U.S.
Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 767-68 (7th Cir. 1999); Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340,
342 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir. 1996).
21. See Judith G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Legitimating Dis-
crimination Against Pregnant Women in the Workforce, 50 Mi.. L. REV. 225, 231-32 (1998).
22. Mary Jo Frug declared unabashedly in her final article, "I am in favor of local
disruptions. I am against totalizing theory." Mary Jo Frug, A Postmodern Legal Feminist
Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. Riv. 1045, 1046 (1992).
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successes and limitations of the PDA. In Part II, the article reveals how a
reductive, biomedical model of pregnancy underpins the current jurispru-
dence of pregnancy discrimination. It argues that this model of pregnancy
not only has produced inconsistency and uncertainty in how pregnancy
discrimination is understood in federal law, but also has failed to address
the diversity and complexity of pregnancy discrimination in the work-
place. Finally, Part III of the article focuses on rendering pregnancy a
socially constructed, culturally situated concept. It provides a "thick"
description of pregnancy, drawing on interdisciplinary scholarship and a
variety of cultural materials. Drawing on this "thick" description of preg-
nancy, it argues that federal antidiscrimination law, as embodied by the
PDA, should move beyond a reliance on the biomedical model of preg-
nancy. Part III concludes by suggesting some possibilities that might be-
gin to expand the meaning and scope of pregnancy for purposes of the
PDA.
In some ways, this article's underlying argument-that courts interpret-
ing the PDA have adopted the ideology of biomedical essentialism-is
not novel in legal literature. This article is not the first to challenge the
biologically reductionist legal reasoning regarding pregnancy and repro-
duction, 23 or to call for increased attention to the social, cultural, and
economic aspects of pregnancy or reproduction. 24 Scholars have critiqued
the tendency to reduce pregnancy to biology not only in relation to repro-
ductive rights, but also in relation to pregnancy discrimination. 25 This ar-
23. See Kim Shayo Buchanan, The Sex Discount, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1149, 1149 (2010)
(arguing that the Supreme Court frames gender related law as a regulation of illicit sexual
activity in ways that "accepts the biological excuses for gender classifications"); see also
Dan Danielsen, Representing Identities: Legal Treatment of Pregnancy and Homosexuality,
26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1453, 1453 n.3 (1992) (using pregnancy as a "metaphor for the locus
of social, personal and legal relations of and to women's biological sex, gender, reproduc-
tive desires, capacities or conditions" to unpack the meaning of pregnancy without reduc-
ing pregnancy to a woman's reproductive capabilities); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and
Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rwv.
329, 373 (2010) (arguing for a conception of pregnancy that incorporates both physical and
social components); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their
Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 816 (2007) (ex-
amining how equality-based arguments for reproduction require critical engagement with
the social aspects of reproduction).
24. Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction
of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 415, 417-18 (2011) (challenging biological
reductionism in pregnancy discrimination law); Greenberg, supra note 21, at 228-32 (argu-
ing that courts have relied on a biological definition of pregnancy); Lisa C. Ikemoto, The
Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice
of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 Oio ST. L.J. 1205,
1208-09 (1992) (examining how the biomedical ideology of the perfect pregnancy harms
and marginalizes women along lines of race, class, and sexual orientation); Matambanadzo,
supra note 13, at 118 (challenging the impact of biological essentialism by arguing that
antidiscrimination law should be expanded to account for the fourth trimester of
pregnancy).
25. See Hendricks, supra note 23, at 372-73; see also Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection,
44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 265 (1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence
proceeds from a presumption of physiological naturalism, which fails to account for the
ways in which social aspects of gender shape reproduction).
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ticle is also not the first to argue that pregnancy entails important social,26
economic,27 and cultural aspects.28 It does, however, build upon this work
de-centering the biological and physiological aspects of pregnancy by ar-
guing that pregnancy discrimination must be understood in ways that dis-
entangle pregnancy's complexities and also by interrogating pregnancy's
status as "natural." The notion that pregnancy represents a "real" sex
difference reflects a larger "common sense" consensus inside and outside
of the legal community. Answering the call of feminist scholars to resist
essentialism in anti-discrimination law,2 9 this article challenges the nature
and source of pregnancy-related differences. By pushing against this
"common sense" conception of pregnancy, this article opens the possibil-
ity to reconstruct the legal understanding of pregnancy to reflect the di-
verse ways in which society understands and experiences pregnancy. This
article also contributes to the larger body of scholarship that argues that
bodies in law are constructed and shaped through discourse,30 and to the
larger body of literature that challenges the fixed nature of the categories
underpinning antidiscrimination law.31
26. Siegel, supra note 23, at 815 (examining how equality-based arguments for repro-
duction require increasing critical engagement with the social aspects of reproduction).
27. Dinner, supra note 24, at 415; Joan C. Williams & Consuela A. Pinto, Family Re-
sponsibilities Discrimination: Don't Get Caught Off Guard, 22 LAB. LAW. 293, 293-94
(2007).
28. Lindy Fursman, Ideology of Motherhood and Experiences of Work: Pregnant Wo-
men in Management and Professional Career (May 2002) (Ctr. for Working Families, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley, Working Paper No. 34), https://workfamily.sas.upenn.edu/
siteslworkfamily.sas.upenn.edulfiles/importedlnew/berkeley/papers/34.pdf [https://
perma.cc/48PZ-CMTF].
29. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DI3NV. U. L. RrEv.
995, 1101 (2015) (examining how a variety of disparate treatment is justified as a result of
women's "natural" capacities and differences).
30. ALAN Hyoi:, BODmiS OF LAW, 3-4 (1997) (arguing bodies are discursively con-
structed by legal discourse); Peter Halewood, Law's Bodies: Disembodiment and the Struc-
ture of Liberal Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331, 1341 (1996) (starting with the
socially constructed nature of the body to argue that postmodern theory offers a norma-
tively superior framework for analyzing the challenges of commodification).
31. Scholars have challenged these underlying categories along the lines of sex, see,
e.g., Cary Franklin, Inventing the "Traditional Concept" of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV.
L. Riev. 1307 (2012); race, see, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any
Other Name?: On Being "Regarded As" Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if
Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 Wis. L. Ri-v. 1283,1289-90 (2005); D. Wendy Greene,
Categorically Black, White, or Wrong: "Misperception Discrimination" and the State of Title
VII Protection, 47 U. Micii. J.L. REF. 87, 87 (2013); and disability, see, e.g., Craig R. Senn,
Perception Over Reality: Extending the A DA 's Concept of "Regarded As" Protection Under
Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 827 (2009). See also
Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 2 (2015) (arguing that the "new"




I. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS: THE PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION ACT
A. THE PROBLEM OF PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION IN HISTORICAL
AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT
Feminist legal scholars have argued that pregnancy is not merely a con-
dition that some women choose, but is instead the defining feature that
shapes a woman's experience and relationship to law.3 2 Pregnancy, ac-
cording to some feminists, is a crucial aspect of gender difference and, as
such, has implications for how women's lives are shaped. 33 Legal and eco-
nomic institutions, however, are not designed to distribute the costs of
pregnancy evenly between those individuals who benefit from it.34 In-
stead, the majority of costs are borne by women. 35 For this reason, femi-
nist legal commentators have argued that to ensure equality, the costs
must be distributed such that all individuals benefiting from pregnancy
internalize its costs. 36
Although women have performed paid and unpaid work in homes,
farms, and artisan workshops throughout the history of the United States,
during most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the legal system
has presumed that women occupy a sphere of domesticity.37 For women,
this "separate spheres" ideology necessitates an existence that is separate
from the public spheres of markets, politics, and law. 38 For example,
before the "Second Wave" of the women's movement in the United
States, some women were socially relegated to the "separate sphere" of
the home. 39 The separate sphere of the home was the space where wo-
men's social and "biological" roles in reproduction and care were lo-
32. Joan C. Williams, Reconstructive Feminism: Changing the Way We Talk About
Gender and Work Thirty Years After the PDA, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 79, 79-81 (2009)
(arguing that "gender differences, real and imagined, create social disadvantage when wo-
men are measured against unspoken and unacknowledged masculine norms").
33. Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL . L. Ri-v. 1279, 1316,
1324 (1987) (agreeing that differential treatment of biological differences, such as preg-
nancy and breastfeeding, should be accommodated in ways that minimize their impact on
women).
34. MARTHA ALBISRSON FINEMAN, TiE NEUTEREIZD MOTHER, THE, SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTIIEI TwENTIET1H CINTURY TRAGET)Ivs 230-33 (1995).
35. MARTHA AL-3ERTSON FINEMAN, MOTIERS IN LAW FiMINIsr THEORY ANr) TIHIE
LIGMA REGULATION OF MOTIIr RHOOD, at ix-xiii (1995) (noting that even women without
children are treated as though they may become mothers); Dara E. Purvis, The Rules of
Maternity (Sept. 14, 2015) (manuscript at 3-4) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstractid=2660340 [https://perma.cc/9VQ6-34HT] (examining how women bear
the costs of a piecemeal regulatory system that monitors diverse and various aspects of
their pregnancies).
36. See Dinner, supra note 24, at 418.
37. "Separate spheres" was not merely an ideology; it is also a myth. At least some
women have always engaged in work outside of their homes. Saru M. Matambanadzo,
Personifying Bodies and Embodying Persons: A Feminist Perspective on Legal Per-
sonhood 355, 357 (2010) (unpublished Pd.D. dissertation, UCLA) (on file with author).
38. Martha May, The Historical Problem of the Family Wage: The Ford Motor Com-
pany and the Five Dollar Day, 8 FEMINIST STUD. 399, 403 (1982).
39. Courtni E. Molnar, "Has the Millennium Yet Dawned?": A History of Attitudes
Toward Pregnant Workers in America, 12 MICH. J. GE-NDEZR & L. 163, 170-76 (2005).
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cated.40 This separate spheres ideology meant that women often were
disenfranchised legally and excluded politically from the benefits and
privileges of citizenship.41 For women that consistently performed market
work outside of the home, the requirements of their reproductive roles
and the notion that their "place" was in the home justified low wages,
poor working conditions, and outright discrimination. 42 After all, if wo-
men who worked at home, on the farm, or in a factory merely worked for
"pin money," then they did not to earn a wage that would have supported
a family.43 They could conceivably leave employment at any time to re-
turn to their proper sphere in the home.44 This perception was aug-
mented by the myth of the family wage, 45 which further entrenched
notions that men performed the primary market work and brought home
the bulk of family wages.
In the United States, as part of the separate spheres ideology, women
often have been conceptualized and defined by reference to their capac-
ity to become pregnant. 46 In Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Senate con-
firmation hearings, for example, Justice Ginsburg highlighted pregnancy
as the aspect of sex difference that most "conspicuously distinguishes wo-
men from men[.] ' ' 47 The social and economic roles of women have been
shaped by a cultural understanding that women, and not men, can be
conceptualized as "potentially pregnant. '48 Historically, it has been per-
missible for private and public actors to treat women and men differently:
the capacity to become pregnant has defined women as socially, physi-
cally, and psychologically different from men. 49 During the era of wo-
men's exclusion from the workplace, "[aIll women were potentially
pregnant women,. .. [and their] reproductive function needed to be care-
40. Id. at 170-71.
41. Norma Basch, Invisible Women: The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in Nineteenth-
Century America, 5 FEMINIST SruD. 346, 347 (1979).
42. May, supra note 38, at 418; Molnar, supra note 39, at 170-71;
43. May, supra note 38, at 417.
44. Molnar, supra note 39, at 168.
45. May, supra note 38, at 399.
46. FINEMAN, supra note 34, at 230-33 (noting that even when women do not have
children they are treated as though they might become mothers); Cass R. Sunstein, Neu-
trality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surro-
gacy), 92 CoiLuM. L. REV. 1, 35 n.129 (1992) (claiming that, "if men could become
pregnant, they would not be men (indeed no one would be a man as we understand that
term)"). Courts have followed this tendency by defining women by their reproductive ca-
pacity. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908).
47. Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on
Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE- L.J. 771, 771 (2010) (quoting
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
48. SHERRY F. COt B, WHEN SEX COUNS MAKING BABIES AND MAKING LAW at x
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2007) ("[A] woman's identity is... intimately and
inevitably bound up in her potential state of containing another life within her.").
49. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (describing how a woman's destiny is
to be a wife and mother); Brief for the State of Oregon, Defendant in Error, Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107), 1908 WL 27605 ("Brandeis Brief"); Herma Hill




fully guarded and preserved . "...-50 Even for so called "exceptional"
women seeking access to market work, politics, and the public sphere,
courts have limited options because "[t]he paramount destiny and mis-
sion of woman [is] to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother."'51 In many circumstances, childrearing and nurturing have been
regarded as civic duties that women must bear.52 Women faced workplace
discrimination because of the perception that pregnancy and childrearing
should relegate them to their proper place in the home. 53 Although many
feminists have resisted the more reductive aspects of this perspective, 54
50. Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98
Gi'o. L.J. 567, 595 (2010).
51. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). Some scholars have character-
ized the difference between reproductive roles as having a subordinating function whereby
women are not only different from men because of their reproductive capacity, but also
because they occupy an inferior position in the legal hierarchy. See CAFllARINIE A. MAcK-
INNON, TOWARiD A FEMINisr THEORY OF 1THiE STA-rE 215-16 (1989); see also Littleton,
supra note 33, at 1329 (comparing the similarity between the cultural valuation of warriors
and mothers).
52. See Deborah L. Brake, On Not "Having it Both Ways" and Still Losing: Reflections
on Fifty Years of Pregnancy Litigation under Title VII, 95 B.U. L. REV. 995, 1012 (2015)
(arguing that women's citizenship has been conceptualized around caretaking and nurtur-
ing contributions, while men's citizenship has been conceptualized around fighting); see
also Littleton, supra note 33, at 1290.
53. Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 CoLuM. L. REV. 1118, 1129 (1986) (discussing how women's
"biological capacity" for pregnancy was used to justify tfieir exclusion from the public
sphere). Although this is often regarded as historical discrimination, discrimination still
emerges in contemporary contexts from social attitudes and stereotypes about pregnant
women in the workplace. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 718 (2009) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (As "history demonstrates, societal attitudes about pregnancy and
motherhood severely impeded women's employment opportunities."). Even in the twenty-
first century, women face intractable presumptions concerning both capacities and incapac-
ities for work. For example, in the modern workplace, pregnant women are often subject to
what Joanna Grossman calls the "presumption of uninterrupted capacity," which presumes
that an "uncomplicated pregnancy has no meaningful physical effects that bear on a wo-
man's ability to work." See Grossman, supra note 50, at 578. This presumption operates
even when there are very real physical limitations for pregnant women. See id. at 579 (dis-
cussing research indicating that pregnant women perform more poorly on ergonomic tasks
than did other individuals); see also Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in
the Workplace, 25 STEIFSON L. REv. 1, 3-12 (1995) (discussing how physical changes in
pregnant women may impact their capacity to work).
54. Feminists have rightfully argued against the impulse to embrace repronormativity,
which obscures the diverse desires and identities that women hold dear by naturalizing
how reproductive capacity and caretaking play a central role in women's lives. Katherine
M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 CoLUM. L. REV.
181, 185 (2001) (critiquing repronormativity and the presumption that reproduction is nat-
ural, inevitable, and communal in creating obligations); Cynthia Godsoe, Marriage Equal-
ity and the New Maternalism, 6 CAL. L. RiV. CIR. 145, 147 (arguing against a maternalist
philosophy deployed in Obergefell v. Hodges because maternalism brings "dual harms of
limiting all women's roles while ignoring the many women, particularly low-income women
and women of color, who do not fit the ideal mother paradigm"). Many women do not
define themselves through pregnancy or motherhood. Some "[p]ostmodern women, for
whom the optimal lifestyle involves no children, see themselves as childfree rather than
childless. They extoll the virtues of a life unencumbered by diapers, running noses, inces-
sant chatter, and endless anxiety." NEn. GIBERT, A MOTHER'S WORK: How FEMINISM,
THE MARKET, ANI) POLICY SHAPE FAMILY LnFE 40 (2008) (arguing for a social policy that
moves beyond the male model of work). A legal and political framework that permits
repronormativity to shape the lives of women may have a particularly pernicious effect on
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the suspicion that a woman is pregnant-even her capacity merely to be-
come pregnant-can shape the legal, cultural, political, and social reali-
ties of women's lives in important ways.
55
Pregnancy, as a marker of women's difference, challenges the underly-
ing legal norms of "formal equality" that animate the current antidis-
crimination regime in the workplace. In spite of some recent examples of
pregnant men,5 6 many judges, scholars, and movement activists embrace
the notion that, "only women become pregnant. '5 7 If equality means that
likes must be treated alike, then it is permissible for individuals who are
different, as pregnant women are from non-pregnant persons like men, to
be treated differently.5 8 For this reason, part of the challenge of formal
equality as a lens for fighting employment discrimination lies with the
young girls whose educational and economic opportunities are limited by a legal regime
that permits sex discrimination and subordination.
55. Brake, supra note 52, at 1007 ("[S]tereotypes about pregnancy and maternity af-
fect women at all points in their work lives, whether they are mothers, pregnant, or merely
'potentially pregnant."'); Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Work-
place: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2154, 2165 (1994)
("Fertility influences leaving employment[;]... women often leave employment because of
a pregnancy.").
56. One particular pregnant man, Thomas Beatie, has even received legal recognition
of his male sex after giving birth to three children. See Beatie v. Beatie, 333 P.3d 754,
755-56 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (treating Beatie's Hawaiian marriage between a transgender
man who had given birth to a child and an identified woman as a valid marriage between a
man and a woman). Beatie has been quite public about his experience as a pregnant man.
See, e.g., Guy Trebay, He's Pregnant. You're Speechless, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at ST1
(describing Thomas Beatie's pregnancy, particularly his appearance on Oprah Winfrey's
talk show). The experiences of pregnant trans men have also been the subject of memoir
and scholarly inquiry. See, e.g., J. Wallace, The Manly Art of Pregnancy, in GENDER OUr-
LAws: THE NExr GENERATION 188, 189 (Kate Bornstein ed., 2010) (One man noted,
"[b]efore I was pregnant, I feared that pregnancy would make me into a woman or a lady.
But it didn't; it made me more of a dude.... Pregnancy became a manly act."). Some legal
scholars have even made the claim that the legal conception of pregnancy should be recon-
ceptualized apart from the norms of binary biology that associates women with gestation.
See Lara Karaian, Pregnant Men: Repronormativity, Critical Trans Theory and the
Re(conceive)ing of Sex and Pregnancy in Law, 22 Soc. & LEGAL Sruo. 211 (2013); see also
Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV. J.L.
& GEINDER 57, 60 (2012) (arguing that motherhood should be unsexed to attack the
linkage between biological and sexual roles).
57. Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, Pregnant Employees, Working Mothers
and the Workplace-Legislation, Social Change and Where We are Today, 22 J.L. &
HEAurH 197, 198 (2009). Some recent engagements in feminist legal theory have adopted a
masculine approach to discuss the law of pregnancy discrimination. Mirroring the current
flaws of the PDA's male-centered comparator approach, scholars have argued that a more
expansive understanding of pregnancy requires conceptually disentangling pregnancy from
its focus on women. Karaian, supra note 56, at 222. While there can be significant analytic
force in such arguments, see, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex
and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105
YALE L.J. 1, 6-7 (1995) (arguing that feminine women will not receive protection from
discrimination in the workplace until men coded as feminine do), substantial evidence
shows that courts do not adequately consider women's experiences with pregnancy when
analyzing pregnancy discrimination claims. See Grossman, supra note 50, at 607-08, 610
(arguing that current interpretations of the PDA operate under pregnancy blindness); Jes-
sica Carvey Manners, Note, The Search for Mr. Troupe: The Need to Eliminate Compari-
son Groups in Pregnancy Discrimination Act Cases, 66 OIo S-r. L.J. 209, 222 (2005)
(arguing that the comparator requirement in the PDA should be eliminated).
58. Runi COLKER, PREGNANTF MEN: PRAC'ICE, THEORY, AND TI'E LAW 183 (1994).
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perception that men and women are situated differently in terms of their
reproductive roles, specifically pregnancy and care work.59 If equality's
requirement that likes be treated alike presumes that men, along with
male existence and experience, constitute the starting point,60 then a con-
dition like pregnancy that only women experience firsthand will create
challenges and contradictions for equal inclusion and participation.61
Among legal scholars, there is deep disagreement regarding the cause
of pregnancy-related differences and remedies for pregnancy-related dis-
crimination. Many scholars downplay the importance of biology, instead
focusing on the sociocultural impact of pregnancy on women's lives. 62
Others work to highlight the importance of both physiological-biological
aspects and sociocultural aspects while still treating each as a concep-
tually separate problem for law to address. 63 Many argue that it is not the
59. Marcia L. McCormick, Gender, Family, and Work, 30 HOFS'RA LAB. & EME. L.J.
309, 310-11 (2013). Pregnancy discrimination could be regarded as part of the larger work/
care conundrum, which has been the subject of much legal scholarship. See Calloway, supra
note 53, at 2 (arguing that the workplace should accommodate pregnancy to ensure the
health and well-being of children); see also Michelle D. Deardorff, Beyond Pregnancy: Liti-
gating Infertility, Contraception, and Breastfeeding in the Workplace, 32 J. WOMIN, POL. &
Po'Y 52, 52-53 (2011) (examining how statutory interpretation has limited the expansion
of pregnancy discrimination protections); Grossman, supra note 50, at 570 (arguing that
antidiscrimination law's failure to address the realities of pregnancy with accommodations
limits women's access to equal citizenship); Sally J. Kenney, Pregnancy Discrimination:
Toward Substantive Equality, 10 WIs. WOMIEN's L.J. 351, 352 (1995) (arguing that gaps
exist between the potential promises of antidiscrimination law and the perspectives of
judges and employers on accommodating pregnancy); Magid, supra note 17, at 821 (argu-
ing that the courts narrowly interpret the PDA to deny families the protections that Con-
gress intended with the passage of the Act). Pregnancy discrimination also resonates in the
realm of reproductive liberty and privacy. Laws limiting a woman's free choice of whether
to become pregnant implicate concerns related to privacy, equality, and liberty because of
the current social arrangement of pregnancy, childcare, and motherhood. Reva B. Siegel,
Equality and Choice: Sex Equality Perspectives on Reproductive Rights in the Work of Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 63, 63 (2013) (noting that the importance of
sex equality in constitutional protections for reproductive rights and contraception is not
reflected in "doctrines protecting women's access to contraception," even though sex
equality has been implicitly internalized).
60. See Littleton, supra note 33, at 1306 (noting that the structure of work renders
pregnancy a disability); see also MAcKINNON, supra note 51, at 215-16; Robin L. West, The
Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal
Theory, 15 WIS. WOME N'S L.J. 149, 149 (2000) (arguing that "women's subjective, hedonic
lives are different than men's" and that legal subjectivity does not reflect women's exper-
iences of physiological connectedness). Many feminist legal theorists have claimed that
MacKinnon's articulations of women's experiences are overly simplistic and obscure im-
portant aspects of class, race, gender, and sexuality. See, e.g., JANET HALLEY, SiTi DECi-
SIONS: HOW AND W iY TO TAKE A BRAK iEROM FiMiNISM 54, 186 (2006) (arguing that
MacKinnon's views on sexuality and dominance may obscure the existence of many wo-
men who fail to conform to them); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 591-92 (1990) (arguing that MacKinnon's perspective
functions in an essentialist way that renders black women less visible).
61. COLKEIR, supra note 58, at 184. This has led some commentators to argue against
specific accommodations for pregnancy because such "special treatment" has the potential
to undermine equality. See, e.g., Bradley A. Areheart, Accommodating Pregnancy, 67
ALA. L. Riuv. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 55-56) http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/pa-
pers.cfm?abstractid=2534216 [https://perma.cc/5DBT-4BW2].
62. Supra note 24.
63. Hendricks, supra note 23, at 373.
[Vol. 69
Reconstructing Pregnancy
biological aspects that create "problems" for women in the workplace,
but the social and cultural construction of work and workers.64 For exam-
ple, some feminist scholars suggest that, instead of regarding breastfeed-
ing as the "problem" for women, courts and commentators should
understand that employers have made a social choice to accommodate
and include the non-lactating bodies of men, while simultaneously
marginalizing and excluding the lactating bodies of women.65
The so-called biological and physiological differences distinguishing
men from women engender slightly more controversy. 66 Many scholars
have claimed that the inequality between women and men in terms of
their differing reproductive roles is not natural or inevitable, but instead
is shaped by cultural forces that define women's roles in mothering and
gestating children in disadvantaging ways. 67 However, other scholars
claim that the origins of women's differences, and the differential out-
comes they reap in the labor market, are tied to physiological "realities"
of biology. 68 Even feminists committed to reproductive rights are very
willing to acknowledge that the "realities" of biology shape women's
lives. 69 Drawing on the intuitive appeal of this claim, some commentators
rely on common sense regarding the "nature" of reproductive roles for
women and men, arguing that there is a "biological reality that men and
women's bodies differ with regard to reproduction[.] ' '70 They argue that
64. See, e.g., Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law,
Women's Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U.
MicLi. J.L. REF. 371, 436 (2001) (examining the ways in which women's cultural caregiving
is often beyond the reach of antidiscrimination); see also Williams & Pinto, supra note 27,
at 293-94. One of the key problems is the cost of childcare. See Noah D. Zatz, Supporting
Workers by Accounting for Care, 5 HARV. L. & Po'y REV. 45, 46 (2011) (arguing against
current policy provisions that render childcare inaccessible and very costly for poor, low-
wage workers).
65. See, Paige H. Smith, Breastfeeding and Gender Inequality, 34 J. WOMEN, POE1. &
Poiiy 371, 371 (2013).
66. See Kessler, supra note 64, at 436.
67. For example, in feminist legal theory, scholars have revealed how "[m]otherhood
is central to the social and legal definition of woman." FINEMAN, supra note 35, at xii; see
also Kessler, supra note 64, at 372-73.
68. KINGSLEY R. BROWNE, BIOLOGY AT WORK: RETHINKING SEXUAl., EQUAL ITY 68
(2002) (arguing that biology explains the differences in wages and employment outcomes);
Richard A. Epstein, Gender is for Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 998 (1992) (arguing that
biological sex differences explain inequality in the labor market). Even feminists robustly
committed to equality and reproductive rights are willing to acknowledge the "reality" that
biology shapes women's lives. See, e.g., COLKER, supra note 58, at 5 ("Being pregnant...
made me see that there are some genuine, distinctive biological experiences for wo-
men[;] ... feminists... should [not] ignore the biological reality of women's reproductive
capacity."); see also Reva B. Siegel, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act of 1978, 94 YALE. L.J. 929, 930 (1984) ("[P]regnancy discrimination involves the
social valuation of a real sexual difference.").
69. COLKER, supra note 58, at 5; see also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Con-
stitution, 5 U. PENN. L. Rwv. 955, 955 (1984) (arguing that constitutional sex equality law
fails to recognize the "reality" of sex-based physical differences).
70. Erika Bachiochi, Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection Arguments for
Abortion Rights, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 889, 916,940,942 (2011) ("[P]regnancy... is
a natural condition[.] ... It is not sexist to state the facts of female reproductive anatomy
and physiology. It is sexist to despise them.").
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pregnancy and women's reproductive roles emerging from pregnancy can
explain, if not justify, discrimination against women in the workplace. 71
The twentieth century brought the ideological erosion of separate
spheres and the subsequent expansion of women performing paid work in
industry, business, and government.7 2 However, even in the twenty-first
century, pregnancy often imposes significant socioeconomic costs on wo-
men.73 Pregnant women frequently are subjected to an unsubstantiated
and contradictory set of presumptions about their capabilities in the
workplace, particularly during the third trimester of their pregnancies. 74
And after they give birth, their workplace relations may become even
worse. Stories abound in the popular press 75 and academia 76 about wo-
men who, by their own choice or due to mere circumstance, ae relegated
to the "mommy track" in their careers.7 7 In popular representations, wo-
men who find reproduction, care work, and market work too difficult to
balance often choose, if they can, to "opt out" of the workforce in order
to devote themselves to full-time care work in the home.78 In terms of
compensation, researchers have found a wage penalty of approximately
7% per child for mothers in the United States. 79 When low-wage workers
71. Pregnancy has been used to deny women access to the workplace, resulting in what
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has called "subordinate social status" for women. Siegel &
Siegel, supra note 47, at 774-75; see also BROWNE, supra note 68, at 60; Kingsley R.
Browne, Biology, Equality, and the Law: The Legal Significance of Biological Sex Differ-
ences, 38 Sw. L.J. 617, 658 (1984).
72. Barnard & Rapp, supra note 57, at 201-04.
73. Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 55, at 2165; Dinner, supra note 24, at 417-18.
According to Robin West, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), "might have [had] the effect
not only of legitimating the coercive sex that might have led to it, but also of legitimating
the profoundly inadequate social welfare net and hence the excessive economic burdens
placed on poor women and men who decide to parent." Robin West, From Choice to Re-
productive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALI. L.J. 1394, 1409
(2009) (critiquing Roe v. Wade from a pro-choice perspective). In this model, the decision
to parent or to terminate a pregnancy is a matter of choice and consent. Id. at 1410 (charac-
terizing the choice to parent as a consensual, informed market transaction).
74. Grossman, supra note 50, at 579-80.
75. Deborah L. Jacobs, At Law Firms, Mommy Track Still Holds Women Back,
FoinE3s (Aug. 05, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2014/08/05/at-law-
firms-mommy-track-still-holds-women-back/ [https://perma.cc/KB9Q-UWSF]; Olga
Khazan, The Mommy-Track Myth, ATLANlIC (Feb. 04, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2014/02/the-mommy-track-myth/283557/ [https://perma.cc/VM7Q-
RW8H]; The Mommy Track, ECONOMIST (Aug. 25, 2012), http://www.economist.com/
node/21560856 [https://perma.cc/3UKN-66CY].
76. See Nicole B. Porter, Re-Defining Superwoman: An Essay on Overcoming the
"Maternal Wall" in the Legal Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GE NDER L. & PoL'y 55, 65 (2006); see
also Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1559, 1594-95 (1991).
77. See Rebecca Korzec, Working on the "Mommy-Track": Motherhood and Women
Lawyers, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 117,119 (1997).
78. There is some evidence that the women who are "choosing" to opt out of a career
have been making a constrained choice to do so. See PAMELA STONE, OPTING OUT? WHY
WOMEN REALLY QUIT CAREERS AND HEAD HOME 114-15 (2007) (finding evidence that
women leave the workforce because of employer inflexibility and conflicting family
responsibilities).
79. Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM.
Soc. REV. 204, 204-05 (2001). Although approximately one-third of this penalty could be
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face discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or caregiving responsibili-
ties, such discrimination often leads to economic insecurity, exacerbating
poverty.80 As many commentators note, the current failure to provide
workplace accommodations-paid maternity leave and reasonable ac-
commodations for mothers and pregnant women in the United States, for
example-forces female workers and their employers to internalize the
costs of pregnancy and reproduction.81
The PDA and federal courts' interpretations of it embody (in part) the
federal government's legal response to the challenges facing pregnant wo-
men in the workforce.8 2 The next section addresses the PDA, with a focus
on its evolution, passage, and application.
B. BEFORE THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT: EARLY CASES
The roots of the PDA lie in earlier antidiscrimination jurisprudence
derived from the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. 83 The Supreme Court's mid-twentieth century considerations
of pregnancy discrimination occurred in the constitutional context of em-
ployment discrimination law.84
The twentieth century constitutional jurisprudence on pregnancy dis-
crimination begins with Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur.85 This
case involved a constitutional challenge to a school district policy requir-
ing pregnant teachers to take mandatory, unpaid maternity leave five
months before their expected delivery date and forbidding women who
had given birth from returning to work before their infants were three
months old.8 6 The Supreme Court held in its analysis that the school
board's mandatory maternity leave policy and three-month return policy
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 87 Ac-
cording to the Court, the "freedom of personal choice" in decisions re-
lated to marriage, family, and procreation is one of the essential aspects
of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 88 Policies that impact these decisions "must not needlessly, arbi-
trarily, or capriciously impinge upon" these liberties. 89 And while it might
attributed to seniority, past work experience, and job experience, two-thirds remains after
controlling for these aforementioned factors in the experiment. Id. at 219-20.
80. Stephanie Bornstein, Work, Family, and Discrimination at the Bottom of the Lad-
der, 19 GiEo. J. POVERTY L. & Poi'y 1, 16 (2012).
81. Id. at 15.
82. There are other legislative responses to pregnancy discrimination embedded not
only in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), but also in the Family Medical Leave Act
(FMLA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Matambanadzo, supra note 13,
at 131-40.
83. Dinner, supra note 24, at 417.
84. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 486 (1974); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 638 (1974).
85. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 632.
86. Id. at 634-35.
87. Id. at 639-40.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 640.
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be simpler and more efficient for the school board to make determina-
tions about a teachers' capacities to work during the later stages of their
pregnancies, mandatory maternity leave policies that do not consider an
individual's capacity to work violate the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.90 LaFleur clarified the relationship between preg-
nancy and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 91
However, the decision did not resolve the disagreement among the courts
of appeals as to whether mandatory maternity leave policies based on
pregnancy were "classification[s] based on sex" and thus subject to a
heightened scrutiny for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 92
The Supreme Court then addressed pregnancy discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Geduldig
v. Aiello.93 Geduldig addressed California's disability insurance scheme,
which provided coverage for disabilities arising from a variety of illnesses
and injuries, but excluded disabilities arising from pregnancy, related in-
jury, and illness.94 In Justice Stewart's majority opinion, the Court re-
fused to recognize that a California statute's exclusion of pregnancy-
related disabilities from coverage under the state's disability insurance
scheme constituted invidious sex discrimination under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 95 According to the Court, California's justification for ex-
cluding pregnancy from state disability insurance coverage relied upon
reasons related to controlling costs and ensuring the disability insurance
scheme's financial viability. 96 Justice Stewart's majority opinion distin-
guished California's exclusion from those in other sex discrimination
cases, arguing as follows:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant it does not
follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a
sex-based classification .... The program divides potential recipients
into two groups-pregnant women and non-pregnant persons. While
the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of
both sexes. 97
Determining that the statute merely distinguished between pregnant
and non-pregnant persons, the Court refused to link the condition of
pregnancy to gender.98 Lawmakers were permitted to exclude pregnancy
90. Id. at 647, 649-50. Building on La Fleur, the Supreme Court determined that preg-
nant women were guaranteed a right to individual assessment and protection against gen-
eralized presumptions of incapacity in the workplace by Turner v. Department of
Employment Security. 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975) (finding employer could not adopt a policy
presuming incapacity during the last twelve weeks of gestation and the first six weeks after
delivery).
91. 414 U.S. at 648, 650.
92. Kay, supra note 49, at 3.
93. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
94. Id. at 486-89.
95. Id. at 494.
96. Id. at 495-97.




from the coverage of legislation without violating the Equal Protection
Clause so long as pregnancy was not shown to be a pretext designed to
discriminate against women.99
For the purpose of Title VII, the Supreme Court first addressed the
issue of pregnancy discrimination in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.t° °
Because many circuit courts disagreed about whether sex discrimination
included discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, the Gilbert decision
promised to provide some clarification about whether pregnancy discrim-
ination was prohibited by Title VII.1° 1 While feminists involved in the
litigation operated under the presumption that sex discrimination in-
cluded pregnancy discrimination,'02 the majority endorsed a different
perspective. The case concerned the exclusion of pregnancy-related disa-
bilities from a private employer's disability insurance scheme.10 3 In the
decision, the future Chief Justice Rehnquist analogized the discrimination
prohibitions in Title VII with the discrimination prohibitions in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 4 Due to the factual
similarities between California's exclusion of pregnant women under its
disability insurance program and General Electric's exclusion of pregnant
women under its disability insurance program, Justice Rehnquist incorpo-
rated the discrimination analysis from the line of cases dealing with the
Equal Protection Clause into his reading of Title VII.10 5 The majority
determined that the insurance package was facially neutral, providing
male and female employees with the same coverage, including some risks
and excluding others.'0 6 Such exclusions were permissible and were not
discriminatory because "pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an addi-
tional risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this
risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men
and women alike, which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion of
risks."'1 7 In analyzing the meaning of discrimination under Title VII, Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion also argued that the Court should not "readily
infer that [Congress] meant something different from what the concept of
discrimination has traditionally meant.' 0 8 The Court's decision in Gilbert
determined that an employer could treat pregnant workers differently
than non-pregnant workers without running afoul of Title VII's prohibi-
tion against sex discrimination.'0 9 For the Gilbert Court, disparate treat-
ment on the basis of pregnancy did not, by itself, constitute sex
99. Id.
100. 429 U.S. 125, 127-33 (1976).
101. Barnard & Rapp, supra note 57, at 206-08.
102. For example, Justice Ginsburg's conceptual understanding of sex discrimination
included a presumption that pregnancy discrimination was an aspect of sex discrimination.
Siegel & Siegel, supra note 47, at 773.
103. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 127-29.
104. Id. at 133-34.
105. Id. at 134-36.
106. Id. at 138.
107. Id. at 139.
108. Id. at 145.




Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, argued that the
majority opinion ignored context by overlooking General Electric's his-
tory of limiting employment opportunities and presuming that female
employees ultimately would leave to have families."' Furthermore, Jus-
tice Brennan suggested that it was "purely fanciful" for the majority to
assume that General Electric's risk assessment was gender-neutral in its
analysis. 12 He opined that the majority's suggestion that pregnancy is not
minimally sex-related would "offend[] common sense.""13 Justice Ste-
vens also wrote a dissent, arguing that General Electric's policy placed
the risk of pregnancy-related absenteeism apart from the risk of other
forms of absenteeism." 4 For Justice Stevens, this type of exclusion defini-
tively constituted sex discrimination because "it is the capacity to become
pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from the male. '115
In General Electric, the Supreme Court's determination that pregnancy
discrimination was not necessarily sex discrimination contradicted the
rulings of six circuit courts of appeals, eighteen district courts, and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC's) legislative
guidelines for applying Title VII.116 Employment decisions distinguishing
between pregnant and non-pregnant persons, however, would not remain
permissible. In response to Gilbert and to inequality in the workplace,
Congress superseded the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII by
passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. In the next section, this article
will examine the passage of the Act, highlighting the contemporary juris-
prudence that has emerged from the federal circuit courts concerning
pregnancy.
C. THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT: ITS PASSAGE
In response to the Supreme Court's decision and the lobbying of a coa-
lition of labor unions, feminist groups, and church groups," 7 Congress
passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978. The PDA supersede
General Electric, defining sex discrimination to include discrimination
110. Id.
111. Id. at 149-50 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 148.
113. Id. at 149.
114. Id. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 162.
116. S. COMM. ON LA1BOR ANI) HUMAN Ri's., 96',i CONG., LIlS1_ATIvE HisTroRly OF
THIE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION Acr OF 1978, at 2 (Comm. Print 1980).
117. Kay, supra note 49, at 8 (citing J. GiiLn & M. PALLEY, WOMEN AND PUBI IC POI-
cns 159-60 (1982)). Some commentators have argued that the coalition of feminists, busi-
ness leaders, and reproductive rights activists advocated for the PDA from a framework of
"neomaternalism," which emphasized liberal individualism, in turn privatizing and individ-
ualizing the costs of pregnancy and the social roles mothers play to gain increased protec-
tions for pregnant workers. Deborah Dinner, Strange Bedfellows at Work: Neomaternalism
in the Making of Sex Discrimination Law, 91 WAsh . U.L. REv. 453,453-54 (2014) (arguing
that the liberal impetus to privatize the costs of childcare undermines anti-subordination
objectives of antidiscrimination law).
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"because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related med-
ical conditions." ' 1 8 Instead of providing a separate cause of action for
pregnancy discrimination, it incorporated pregnancy, childbirth, and med-
ically related conditions into the broader prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation in Title VII.119 The Act prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions for all employment-related purposes, including in the provi-
sion of fringe benefits.120
The Act is designed to protect women engaged in paid work from ste-
reotypes regarding the capacities of women in the workplace. Specifically,
the Act was designed to combat the stereotype that women who become
mothers are unable to participate in the workforce and ultimately belong
in the home. 12' According to the PDA's legislative history, Congress
passed the Act not only to prevent sex discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy, but also to ensure that the stereotypical assumptions about
women's reproductive roles were not used to deny women access to equal
opportunities in employment. 122
D. THE AFTERMATH: SUCCESSES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE PDA
This section examines the current state of the PDA's jurisprudence
with a focus on its successes and limitations. The PDA has been successful
in some important ways in part because the Act has shifted social pre-
sumptions about whether women belong in the workforce during preg-
nancy.' 23 There is empirical evidence that the Act has contributed to
significant increases in the numbers of pregnant women and mothers in
the workforce.1 24 Furthermore, in prohibiting the exclusion of pregnant
women from the workplace, the Act has undermined the deep cultural
norms that had dictated that a woman's place is in the home. 25 The PDA
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
119. Id.; Wright v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 4:03CV1843 (CDP), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42366, at *9-10 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2005).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
121. Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Animus
towards pregnant women may be inferred based on these comments; specifically, a belief
that pregnancy disqualifies women from effectively participating in the workforce.").
122. S. COMM. ON LABOR AN) HUMAN RES., 96Tii CONG., LEGISLATIVE HIsroRY Of
THE PREGNANCY DISCI.MINATION AcI OF 1978, at 61-62 (Comm. Print 1980); see also
Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., 824 F.2d 643, 646-47 (8th Cir. 1987) (describing how
the PDA's legislative history was designed in part to combat attitudes about pregnancy and
the role of women in the home and the workplace).
123. See Michelle A. Travis, The PDA 's Causation Effect: Observations of an Unreason-
able Woman, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINiSM 51, 51-64 (2009) (detailing how the PDA success-
fully "launched a quiet revolution" by shifting judges' causal attributions toward
explanations that normalize pregnancy in the workplace).
124. Sankar Mukhopadhyay, The Effects of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act on
Female Labor Supply, 53 INT'L ECON. REV. 1133 (2012), http://business.unr.edu/Faculty/
SankarM/lawpaper rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPH6-MYNX].
125. S. COMM. ON LABOR AN!) HUMAN RES., 96-ni CONG., LEGISLATIVE HisroRy OF
THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION Ac" or 1978, at 2-3 (Comm. Print 1980).
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has also radically changed the culture of work by ensuring that women
cannot be fired simply because they become pregnant. It also has ensured
that female workers receive insurance benefits and disability protections
that include pregnancy. 12 6 Furthermore, the PDA has been interpreted in
a way that does not limit the option for states, local governments, and
private employers to adopt more expansive protections for pregnant
workers. 127
Part of the PDA's success emerges from how its protections have been
interpreted broadly to protect women and men from pregnancy discrimi-
nation.1 28 For example, in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, the Supreme Court held that an employee benefit plan covering
employees' spouses could not discriminate by providing more compre-
hensive health insurance coverage for the husbands of female employees
than the wives of male employees. 129 The Court determined that the em-
ployer insurance plan, which provided more limited benefits for hospital
stays related to pregnancy, discriminated against employees on the basis
of pregnancy because it provided fewer health insurance benefits to mar-
ried male employees than to married female employees. 130 Another court
even determined that male plaintiffs could sue for negative employment
actions taken against them due to discrimination against the pregnant wo-
man to whom they are married.1 3'
In cases alleging sex discrimination under Title VII, plaintiffs have had
some success in persuading the federal courts to expand the definition of
pregnancy-related medical conditions. For example, following the
EEOC's guidelines, courts have been willing to expand the PDA's defini-
tion of pregnancy-related medical conditions to prohibit discrimination
arising from an employee's decision to have an abortion.' 32 An employee
is protected under the Act whether the employee actually terminates the
pregnancy or only considers terminating the pregnancy.' 33
The success of the PDA, however, has its limits. In spite of the PDA,
women frequently experience pregnancy discrimination in ways that may
126. E.g., Aubrey v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 886 F.2d 119, 122-23 (6th Cir. 1989) (affirming
a district court finding that pregnancy was not a preexisting injury or condition that would
bar coverage).
127. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285-88 (1987) (holding that
the PDA does not bar employers or the state from providing additional benefits to preg-
nant workers).
128. Wright v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 4:03CV1843 (CDP), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42366, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2005).
129. 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983).
130. Id.
131. See Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 802, 803-04 (E.D. Va. 1991) (finding a
husband alleging he was fired because he was married to a pregnant woman had standing
to bring an action claiming that he had been discriminated against in violation of Title VII).
132. Turic v. Holland Hosp., Inc., 85 F.3d 1211,1213-14 (6th Cir. 1996), affg in part and
rev'g in part 849 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (noting that Congress intended to ensure
that employees could not be penalized for exercising their right to have an abortion); see
also Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 364 (2008) (holding that the term "re-
lated medical conditions" includes abortion).
133. Turic, 849 F. Supp. at 549-50.
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not trigger Title VII protections.1 34 Pregnancy discrimination is such a
pervasive problem in the workplace that it has been found to have had a
negative psychosocial impact on women.' 35 Although the Act was forged
by a political coalition spanning both sides of the aisle, 136 it has been
interpreted by a judiciary that is increasingly hostile to antidiscrimination
law.137 Furthermore, pregnancy discrimination is costly for workers be-
cause it can result in "job loss, reduced hours, demotions, lost wages, un-
paid leave, and sometimes even costly health problems . . . and this in
turn can lead to difficulty paying the rent or to a need for public bene-
fits. '1 38 Additionally, efforts to expand the definition of pregnancy dis-
crimination through the use of the statute's provision for "related medical
conditions" have not been consistently effective. 139 For instance, the Su-
preme Court recently denied certiorari in a case where a district court
refused to expand the PDA's scope to include discrimination related to
lactation, breastfeeding, or breast milk expression.140
Plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in persuading the judiciary to expand
the scope of the PDA to discrimination related to care responsibilities,
even when these responsibilities arise in relation to pregnancy. Courts
have typically interpreted the Act narrowly so that its prohibitions do not
include discrimination based on the care of young infants. 141 Courts have
repeatedly rejected claims that an employer's denying new parents leave
to care for their young infants violated Title VII. 142 Although the EEOC
134. H.M. Salihu et al., Pregnancy in the Workplace, 62 OCCUPATIONAL. Mi-D. 88
(2012).
135. See id. at 88-97; see also infra Part II.B.
136. Kay, supra note 49, at 8.
137. Trina Jones, Response: Anti-Discrimination Law in Peril?, 75 Mo. L. RtEv. 423,
428-39 (2010) (discussing the increasing difficulty of establishing a successful discrimina-
tion claim).
138. Elizabeth M. Gedmark, Using Pregnancy Discrimination Claims to Fight Poverty,
46 CLEARINGHOUSE, REV. 390, 390 (2013).
139. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1996)
(interpreting the PDA's related medical conditions clause to exclude infertility).
140. Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.3d 763, 768-70 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. de-
nied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment to Nation-
wide in a constructive discharge case involving lactation discrimination).
141. See, e.g., Fleming v. Ayers & Assocs., 948 F.2d 993, 996-97 (6th Cir. 1991); Barrash
v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1988); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp.
1487, 1491-92 (D. Colo. 1997) (citing Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D.
Ky. 1990), affd, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991)) (stating that the needs or conditions of a
child that require the mother's presence are not within the purview of the PDA); Barnes v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 846 F. Supp. 442, 443-45 (D. Md. 1994).
142. Barnes, 846 F. Supp. at 443-45 (finding denial of leave request to care for infant is
not gender-based sex discrimination under the PDA); Record v. Mill Neck Manor Lu-
theran Sch. for the Deaf, 611 F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding Title VII's prohi-
bition against sex discrimination does not extend to parental leave for childrearing). But
see Roberts v. U.S. Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 288 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (recognizing
that a disparate impact claim could be established where women are forced to resign more
often than men because of their employers' denial of parental leave). Although the EEOC
has provided guidelines that may alter the way in which federal courts interpret the PDA,
courts may not follow this guidance. OFFICE OF LiGAL COUNSEL, EEOC, No. 915.002,
ENFORC1EMENT GuIIANCE: UNLAWFUI DISPARATI, TREATMENT OF WORKERS WIT-
CAREGIVING REsPONSmIrLITIES (May 23, 2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiv-
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guidelines specify that discrimination related to caregiving may be pro-
hibited by Title VII as amended by the PDA,143 courts have repeatedly
held that an employer's refusal to grant parental leave to an employee is
not sex discrimination. 144 Similarly, if an employer discriminates on the
basis of marital or parental status, such actions are not prohibited under
Title VII unless the discrimination is on the basis of sex.145
Deference to employer ideologies, particularly with regard to religious
affiliation and neoliberal adherence to cost-efficient, market-based ratio-
nales, further limits the effectiveness of the PDA. The PDA may be weak-
ened by an increasing deference to the religious proclivities of employers
that would permit the termination of women who become pregnant
under conditions that violate their employers' religious beliefs. 146 The
Act's prohibition against discrimination is also weakened by cases like
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,
where the Court found that employment discrimination law contains a
ministerial exemption.1 47 There is also some evidence that the current
antidiscrimination protections of Title VII prohibit irrational animus
while permitting employers to exercise cost-efficient forms of market-
based discrimination.1 48
Furthermore, the Act's protections do not require that pregnant em-
ployees be treated equally in all circumstances. For example, employers
ing.html [https://perma.cc/2F7L-23VT]; FINEMAN, supra note 34, at 14-20 (arguing that
firmly held societal notions of equality and gender roles inform the present state of the law
and thus make the law difficult to change).
143. There are limited circumstances in which the EEOC regards discrimination against
caretakers unlawful under Title VII, particularly when such discrimination is grounded in
stereotypes. Ori icE 0oi LEGAL COUNSEl., EEOC, supra note 142.
144. E.g., Record, 611 F. Supp. at 907 (finding that the prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation embodied in Title VII does not protect women that wish to take parental leave for
childrearing); Barnes, 846 F. Supp. at 443-45 (finding denial of leave request to care for
infant's medical issues is not gender-based sex discrimination under the PDA).
145. See Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Coils. & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311,
314-16 (10th Cir. 1987).
146. For example, although Title VII protects the right of an employee to be pregnant
in the workplace, it does not insulate them from negative consequences if such pregnancy
occurs as a result of premarital sex. If an employee becomes pregnant as the result of a
premarital sexual encounter, then the employee may be fired for this reason. Hamilton v.
Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1319-20 (11 th Cir. 2012) ("Title VII does not
protect any right to engage in premarital sex, but as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act of 1978, Title VII does protect the right to get pregnant.").
147. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
707-08 (2012). Some commentators speculate that the ministerial exemption adopted in
Hosanna-Tabor may permit employers to fire women because they became pregnant
under conditions that violate their employers' religious beliefs. See Jessica L. Waters, Test-
ing Hosanna-Tabor: The Implications for Pregnancy Discrimination Claims and Employees'
Reproductive Rights, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 47, 71-73 (2013) (arguing that Hosanna-Tabor
may enable religious institutions to terminate pregnant employees who become pregnant
before they are married or use reproductive technology to become pregnant). Some schol-
ars have argued that the deference and respect for deeply held religious beliefs should be
balanced with deference and respect for deeply held feminist principles. Mary Anne Case,
Feminist Fundamentalism as an Individual and Constitutional Commitment, 19 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. PoL'Y & L. 549, 550-56, 560-69 (2011).




can use customer safety to justify differential treatment for pregnant
workers. 1 49 Additionally, differences in benefit plans produced by bona
fide seniority systems may not constitute sex discrimination for the pur-
poses of Title VII unless there is intent to discriminate. 150 Title VII also
contains a personal staff exemption, which exempts individuals chosen to
be the personal staff of a person elected to political office from sex dis-
crimination protection, and ultimately pregnancy discrimination
protections.151
Scholars have criticized the inadequacies of the pregnancy discrimina-
tion protections in the United States from a variety of angles.152 Some
scholars have addressed the PDA's failures by focusing on emerging
trends in antidiscrimination law that the narrow contours of the Act, as
currently interpreted, do not address. For example, some commentators
have focused on the emergence of discrimination on the basis of family
responsibilities. 153 As the PDA is applied, the antidiscrimination policy
embodied by the PDA preserves the dominance of the ideal worker
149. See Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1980);
see also Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 997-1002 (5th Cir. 1984) (sanctioning
a blanket exclusion of pregnant flight attendants from duty because of the inability to pre-
dict which pregnant flight attendants might be overcome with fatigue, nausea, or spontane-
ous abortion); Burwell v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 371-73 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981) (permitting a mandatory grounding of flight attendants as a
business necessity). But see In re Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249, 261-64 (S.D. Fla.
1977) (finding no justification for grounding flight personnel during the first two trimesters
of pregnancy).
150. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 708-09 (2009) (finding that an employer
policy enacted prior to the PDA that gave less retirement credit for personal leave for
pregnancy after six weeks than it gave for other types of medical leave did not violate the
PDA because it constituted a bona fide seniority system).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). In one case, this personal staff exemption applied even when
the supervisor in question made blatantly discriminatory remarks. Upon discovering that
plaintiff was pregnant, Judge Ann M. Butchart told her "that a former law clerk took
medical leave due to pregnancy complications... and that she 'should hire only lesbians or
men."' Gupta v. First Judicial Dist., 759 F. Supp. 2d 564, 565, 573 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding
no violation of Title VII where pregnant employee was dismissed from her job as a state
court clerk because of the personal staff exemption). Yet, Congress intended for exceptions
like these to be construed narrowly to provide as much Title VII coverage for employees as
possible. Teneyuca v. Bexar Cty., 767 F.2d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Owens v. Rush,
654 F.2d 1370, 1375 (10th Cir. 1981)).
152. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 24, at 417-18; Grossman, supra note 50, at 610; Is-
sacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 55, at 2159-71, 2179-89 (arguing that the level "play-
ing field" created by the PDA does not adequately address the costs of pregnancy for
women in the workforce).
153. Family responsibility discrimination has been described as "discrimination at work
based on unexamined biases about how employees with family caregiving responsibilities
will or should act." Williams & Pinto, supra note 27, at 293-96 (describing a 400% increase
in Family Responsibility Discrimination claims). Although some commentators have also
argued for discrimination protections on the basis of parental status, it is unclear whether
this would merely mask discrimination behind a cloak of invisibility within the home or
revive the debates around accommodation and equality that emerge in PDA discussions.
See Peggie R. Smith, Parental-Status Employment Discrimination: A Wrong in Need of a
Right?, 35 U. Micii. J.L. REFORM 569, 569 (2002) (arguing that a focus on formal equality




norm. 54 The ideal worker norm1 55 is the normative presumption that in-
dividuals in the workplace should be free of care responsibilities for chil-
dren, elders, or spouses. It presumes that workers' home lives, including
pregnancy and childcare, should not impact their availability or their abil-
ity to work." 56 Furthermore, it prohibits pregnant employees from getting
sick and requires them to perform at their peak even during times of
physical, psychological, and emotional duress. 157 Other scholars have fo-
cused on expanding the PDA to encompass additional medically related
conditions like lactation, 158 infertility, 159 fertility,160 or a combination of
these conditions.161 The exclusion of these conditions has led many com-
mentators to argue that the best solution for expanding the PDA's pro-
tections is through additional legislation. 162
One of the major controversies surrounding the interpretation of the
PDA concerns whether it requires employers to provide accommodations
to pregnant employees. According to the second clause, the PDA re-
quires that employers treat "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions ... the same for all employment-related pur-
poses, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work[.]" 163 However, an employer is not required to treat pregnant em-
ployees better than other employees, and employers may treat pregnant
employees differently if a similarly situated individual, hypothetical or
real, would be treated the same.164 In analyzing the PDA, the federal
154. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBFENIING GINDER: WiiY FAMILY AND WORK CONFII-cr
ANt) WIHAT TO Do Auour 1' 61-72, 81-84 (2000).
155. The ideal worker is an individual who works forty-hour weeks throughout the year
and has no childbearing or caretaking responsibilities. Id. at 2. The ideal worker norm,
which presumes a highly individualized male body with socially male attributes and no ties
of dependency, shapes not only the workforce, but also the distribution of social welfare.
See FINIEMAN, supra note 34, at 20-24, 101-25, 161-66, 213-17. The ideal worker norm
even affects the architecture of the space we occupy. See Jessica L. Roberts, Accommodat-
ing the Female Body: A Disability Paradigm of Sex Discrimination, 79 U. Col.o. L. REv.
1297, 1297-1301 (2008).
156. WInLIAMS, supra note 154, at 2.
157. Id. at 1-9.
158. See, e.g., Maureen E. Eldredge, The Quest for a Lactating Male: Biology, Gender,
and Discrimination, 80 Ci.-KENT L. REv. 875, 875-76 (2005); Danielle M. Shelton, When
Private Goes Public: Legal Protection for Women who Breastfeed in Public and at Work, 14
LAW & INEQ. 179, 181 (1995).
159. E.g., Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility: Recognizing Coverage Exclu-
sions as Discrimination, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 293, 294-97 (2005).
160. This often appears in discussions of pre-Affordable Care Act contraception exclu-
sions in employer-provided health insurance plans. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimi-
nation and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WAstt. L. RE v. 363, 363-64 (1998).
161. Deardorff, supra note 59, at 52-53 (examining how district courts have defined
medically related conditions under the PDA).
162. See, e.g., Alison A. Reuter, Subtle but Pervasive: Discrimination Against Mothers
and Pregnant Women in the Workplace, 33 FORDt AM Umu. L.J. 1369, 1416-20 (2006) (ar-
guing for the passage of a Parental Discrimination Act to ensure accommodations and
protections for pregnant women, breastfeeding women, and caretakers).
163. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604, app.
(current through Mar. 3, 2016).
164. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736-39 (7th Cir. 1994).
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circuit courts have adopted an analysis that examines the treatment of
similarly situated male comparators to establish the actual floor below
which the treatment of pregnant workers may not fall. 165 For example, if
no similarly situated workers are granted sick leave or light duty, then an
employer need not grant a hypothetical pregnant worker sick leave or
light duty. 166 Violations of Title VII can be found in cases where the re-
cord has shown that similarly situated pregnant employees were treated
differently than similarly situated non-pregnant employees.
167
Some scholars have made the case that the Act should be read to re-
quire that employers make some reasonable accommodations for preg-
nant employees. 168 Some commentators argue that, in order for women
to realize equal opportunity in employment, there must be some accom-
modation or compensation to address the different cultural and physio-
logical roles that women play in relation to reproduction. 169 Although
many commentators have argued that accommodations for pregnancy
should be available to individual pregnant employees through the
ADA,170 pregnant plaintiffs seeking relief under the ADA generally have
been unsuccessful. 171
165. See id. at 738 (employing comparator approach).
166. See id. at 736.
167. See, e.g., Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 364 (3d Cir. 2008).
168. See Calloway, supra note 53, at 1-3 (arguing that the workplace should accommo-
date pregnancy); Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVis L. Rev.
961, 963-70 (2013) (arguing that the PDA creates a substantive accommodation right).
169. Kay, supra note 49, at 18. Many commentators maintain that antidiscrimination
law must adopt a more accommodationist model that accounts for the diversity of individ-
ual differences across groups. See KENJI YOSHIINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAUL T ON
ouiR CiviL RIGHTS 194-96 (2006) (arguing for a civil rights approach that forces conversa-
tion); see also Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE7 L.J. 891, 891-92
(2014) (arguing that difference is universal and discrimination law should protect the
unique differences in expressions of maleness and femaleness).
170. See Calloway, supra note 53, at 1-3; see also Widiss, supra note 168, at 963-70.
171. See, e.g., Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D. Conn. 1997)
(stating that "[p]regnancy and related medical conditions have been held not to be physical
impairments"); see also Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc'ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473-74
(D. Kan. 1996); Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex.
1995) (citing EEOC guidance in support of finding that pregnancy is not a disability under
the ADA); Byerly v. Herr Foods, Inc., No. CIV. A. 92-7382, 1993 WL 101196, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 6, 1993). The Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the ADA, consistently
ruling against plaintiffs. Samuel R. Bagenstos, US Airways v. Barnett and the Limits of
Disability Accommodation, in CivIL RIGHTrs STORIES (Myriam Gilles & Risa Goluboff
eds., 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=953759 [https://perma.cc/
BG84-C9X3] (discussing the "Disabilities Act Term" in which the Supreme Court ruled
against plaintiffs in four ADA cases). Although the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the
Sutton trilogy, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999), and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555
(1999), placed substantial limitations on the definition of disability, the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008 (ADAAA) may lead to a more expansive definition of disability under the
ADA. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). The
ADAAA provides that individuals with pregnancy-related impairments may receive dis-
crimination protections. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (defining disability as "a pregnancy-re-
lated impairment that substantially limits a major life activity").
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In the recent case Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Supreme
Court considered an employer policy that provided accommodations for
many, but not all, workers with non-pregnancy-related disabilities.172 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to Young 173 to determine whether the
ADA requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodations for
pregnant employees who are limited in their ability to work if the em-
ployer provides reasonable accommodations to other temporarily dis-
abled employees who are similarly limited in their ability to work.' 74
U.P.S. accommodated lifting restrictions for many of its drivers, including
those that became disabled on the job, those that sought disability accom-
modations under the ADA, and those who had lost driver certifications
necessary for work.175 This policy, however, did not include accommoda-
tions for pregnant female employees who were similarly situated in their
inability to work. 176 U.P.S. denied accommodations to Peggy Young after
her doctor told her that she could lift only a certain amount, but it pro-
vided accommodations to other, non-pregnant workers who had similar
lifting limitations. 177 The majority of the Court determined that the bur-
dens imposed upon women by this unequal treatment could be used to
show intentional sex discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas test.' 78
However, the Court rejected a literal reading of the PDA, which would
have required an employer to provide accommodations for pregnant em-
ployees whenever it grants any accommodations to other, similarly situ-
ated employees. 179
For this reason, courts examining employer accommodation policies
that include most disabilities but exclude disabilities arising from preg-
nancy should consider the extent of the burdens borne by pregnant wo-
men and determine whether the gender-neutral policy is a pretext for
discrimination. It is unclear how much impact Young will have on future
litigation or employer policymaking. Although the Supreme Court re-
jected a reading of the PDA that would require generous accommodation
for pregnant women, it reiterated the importance of pretext in Title VII
cases. 180 As the Supreme Court acknowledged in the majority opinion,
however,' 8' this case arose in 2006, both before Congress amended the
ADA in 2008 and before the EEOC suggested that employers should ac-
commodate temporary lifting restrictions for pregnant employees on the
same basis that they would accommodate temporary lifting restrictions
172. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015).
173. 707 F.3d 437 (2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2898 (2014).
174. SCOTUSinioo, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/young-v-united-parcel-service/ [https://perma
.cc/XL42-RJ66].
175. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
176. Id. at 1341.
177. Id. at 1344.
178. Id. at 1342-43.
179. Id. at 1352-54.
180. Id. at 1341.
181. Id. at 1348.
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for other disabled employees. 182
In light of the Supreme Court's decision, it is probable that courts will
continue to use the comparator approach to make determinations about
pregnancy discrimination, thereby requiring women seeking the protec-
tions of the Act for pregnancy-related absences and illnesses to compare
themselves to men or other employees who are not pregnant. 183 In dispa-
rate treatment PDA cases, courts have found that for an employee to be
similarly situated to another employee, he or she must be comparably
situated to the other employee in "relevant respects."' 184 This has been
interpreted by some courts to mean identical in terms of their circum-
stances and job duties. 185 For example, when Officer Sabrina Marie Frep-
pon sought a light duty assignment to accommodate her pregnancy, her
employer refused, telling her that there were no light duty assignments
for her.' 86 When Officer Freppon found out that other officers had re-
ceived light duty assignments, she was told that other officers who had
received light duty assignments only received them because they were
recovering from on-the-job injuries. 187 Even though other city employees,
specifically a paramedic in the fire department and a code officer, were
given light duty assignments to recover from off-the-job injuries, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in favor of the City of
Chandler. 188 It granted summary judgment in favor of the city, finding
that a jury could infer that the plaintiff's request was denied because she
"failed to put forth sufficient evidence" that she was similarly situated
either to the other policemen given leave for on-the-job injuries or to the
non-police officers, like the paramedic and code officer, who were given
light duty for off-the-job injuries. 189 Although a pregnant employee does
not necessarily need to find another similarly situated employee who has
been treated more favorably in order to prove her case,190 the require-
182. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (current through Mar. 3, 2016) ("Disabilities caused or con-
tributed to by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, for all job-related pur-
poses, shall be treated the same as disabilities caused or contributed to by other medical
conditions, under any health or disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connec-
tion with employment."); EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Pregnancy Discrimination and
Related Issues (June 25, 2015), http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy-guidance
.cfm [https://perma.cc/RAN5-KSF5].
183. See Jirak v. Fed. Express Corp., 805 F. Supp. 193, 195-96 (S.D. N.Y. 1992) (noting
that plaintiff did not produce evidence that the company's termination policy was applied
differently to males than to females).
184. See, e.g., Freppon v. City of Chandler, 528 F. App'x 892, 902 (10th Cir. 2013) (cit-
ing McGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 2006)).
185. See McGowan, 472 F.3d at 745.
186. Freppon, 528 F. App'x at 895.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 902-03.
189. Id.
190. EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184,1195 n.6 (10th Cir. 2000)
(noting that "[n]othing in the case law in this circuit requires a plaintiff to compare herself
to similarly-situated co-workers"). Even within circuits, courts disagree about the required
scope of comparator evidence. Compare Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680
F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff need
only show "enough non-comparison circumstantial evidence to raise a reasonable infer-
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ment for comparators represents a "formidable" hurdle for plaintiffs
seeking relief from pregnancy discrimination.' 91
Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination, as amended by the
Act, does not require preferential treatment for pregnant employees. 192
For this reason, employers may reject reasonable requests by pregnant
women for accommodations, requiring that employees be completely ca-
pable of performing all of the job duties of their position throughout their
pregnancy. The text of the Act makes this explicit, requiring that preg-
nant persons be treated no worse than other individuals "so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work.' 93 Employers often continue
to require heavy lifting, refusing to provide light duty assignments. 194 In
order to establish a prima facie case for disparate treatment, a plaintiff-
employee must establish that she is qualified for the job in question. 95
Courts have interpreted lifting restrictions to render a pregnant employee
unqualified for her job, effectively upending the plaintiff-employee's
prima facie case. 19 6 In other circumstances, employers have prohibited
the use of chairs for pregnant employees whose professions require them
to stand on their feet for long periods of time.1 97 This has led some com-
mentators to claim that the law of sex discrimination for pregnant work-
ers conforms to a capacity-based model in its application.' 98 Although
employers are free to provide additional benefits or accommodations on
their own initiative, 9 9 remedies for discrimination are available only to
those employees who are able to work at their full capacity.2 00 In the next
section, this article will build on the previous claims by revealing how
contemporary interpretations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as
ence of intentional discrimination"), with Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d
1249, 1256 (11 th Cir. 2012) (determining that the record contained enough non-comparator
based evidence for the jury reasonably to infer that the plaintiff's supervisor discriminated
against her because she was pregnant).
191. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738-39 (7th Cir. 1994); see also
Franklin, supra note 31, at 1367.
192. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
194. E.g., A BErIERi BALANCE: TiHL WORK & FAMILY LEGAL CENrER yr" AL., WHY
WE NEED TriE PREGNANT WORKERS FAIRNElss Actr: STrORiMS OF RFAL WOMEN (2015),
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/PWFAStories.pdf?docl D=1 1442
[https://perma.cc/GY3N-Q9KM].
195. Grace v. Adtran, Inc., 470 F. App'x 812, 814-15 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding a ten-
pound lifting restriction rendered plaintiff unqualified for her job).
196. Id. at 815.
197. See Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1223 (6th Cir. 1996).
198. See Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Over-
coming the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's Capacity-Based Model, 21 YAI E. J.L. & FI'MI-
NISM 15, 15 (2009).
199. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987) (finding that the
PDA provides a floor for the treatment of pregnant workers, not a ceiling).
200. Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1316 (1994) ("To the extent that a
pregnant employee is able and willing to work ... the PDA protects her right to remain in
the workplace. The language of the statute simply does not address the right of a pregnant
employee, fully able to work, to receive benefits that are different from, and arguably
superior to, the benefits available to other employees.").
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amended by the PDA, fail to provide clear, consistent pregnancy discrimi-
nation jurisprudence.
II. EXPANDING THE PDA'S MEANING BEYOND
GESTATION DISCRIMINATION
In Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., Justice Alito introduced his
concurrence with the statement that the first clause of the PDA, which
defines discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, and related medi-
cal conditions in the realm of sex discrimination, is "straightforward." ' 20 '
In spite of Justice Alito's comment, efforts to elucidate the meaning of
pregnancy discrimination have been anything but. Instead, the courts
have created a jurisprudence of pregnancy discrimination that is contra-
dictory in its articulations and inconsistent in its outcomes: the seemingly
clear prohibition against discrimination for pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions in actuality lacks clarity and consistency across
the federal courts.20 2 It is not clear what pregnancy discrimination in-
cludes, what it excludes, and why.
Current disagreements about the interpretation of the PDA's prohibi-
tion of pregnancy discrimination reveal the profound ways in which the
meaning and scope of pregnancy discrimination protections remain un-
certain. This section argues that many of the disagreements about the
scope and meaning of pregnancy discrimination arise in part because the
courts struggle to define the nature and scope of pregnancy itself.
Through an examination of court disagreement about the meaning and
scope of pregnancy discrimination, this section argues that the conven-
tional framework for statutory interpretation fails to capture the com-
plex, dynamic nature of pregnancy and the experience of being pregnant.
This section also shows how current interpretations of the Act fail to pro-
vide an appropriate level of protection for pregnant workers, ensures that
pregnant persons need not choose between their families' health and
well-being and their jobs, and provides clarity and consistency in the stat-
ute's application.
A. INTERPRETING PREGNANCY
The Supreme Court's PDA jurisprudence embraces the notion that
there are "biological facts" about the nature of women's reproductive
roles.20 3 The federal courts, following the Supreme Court, often operate
under the presumption that "[n]ormal pregnancy is an objectively identi-
201. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1356 (2015).
202. See infra Part 111.B; see, e.g., Berrios v. Univ. of Miami, 920 F. Supp. 2d 1274,
1276-77 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing opposite conclusions reached by federal courts in Florida
and the Florida courts of appeals).
203. Bachiochi, supra note 70, at 905 (claiming that the Supreme Court has determined
that "a legislature does not engage in sex-role stereotyping when it passes a law that is
based upon the biological facts of childbearing (for example, that women, and not men,
gestate and bear children)"). But see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the employer's discriminatory actions are "not crea-
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fiable physical condition with unique characteristics. '20 4 And in analyzing
PDA claims, the federal courts consistently reduce the relational, social,
and cultural processes of pregnancy to its biomedical facets. Like the Su-
preme Court, courts distinguish between pregnancy and gender, treating
pregnancy like "a physical condition that some people get and some peo-
ple don't. '20 5 This has not gone unnoticed by commentators. For exam-
ple, Reva Siegel has teased apart the complex relationship in
jurisprudence between the so-called "real" biological sex differences and
the social ramifications of gender difference. 20 6 According to Siegel,
when it comes to reproduction and sex differences, the Supreme Court
has adopted a jurisprudence of physiological naturalism that regards the
social arrangements of reproduction as biological and actual sexual
differences. 207
Even when courts adopt a more expansive conception of pregnancy
that takes its social aspects into consideration, courts still focus on the
biological aspects of pregnancy when evaluating discrimination claims. 208
In many ways, the current protections against pregnancy discrimination
were forged from a theory of equality that allowed for the existence of
biological differences, even while arguing against their relevance. 20 9 This
section will argue that the current efforts to interpret the PDA using tex-
tual plain meaning or legislative intent fail to capture the nature and
scope of pregnancy.
Judges have used the methods of statutory interpretation to define
pregnancy and delineate the boundaries of pregnancy discrimination. In
making their determinations, federal judges rely on the rules of statutory
construction to interpret the meaning and scope of the PDA and to deter-
mine which conditions, illnesses, and injuries are medically related to
pregnancy and childbirth for the purposes of the statute.2 10 When judges
define the scope and meaning of pregnancy for the purposes of the PDA,
they often do so by relying on plain meaning textualism, using the dic-
tionary definition of the word in question, legislative intent, or some com-
bination of the two.211
Plain meaning interpretation has been called the simplest approach to
textualism.2 12 Courts applying the plain meaning approach to statutory
tures of a social or cultural vacuum devoid of stereotypes and signals concerning"
pregnancy).
204. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974).
205. Danielsen, supra note 23, at 1458.
206. Siegel, supra note 23, at 817.
207. Id. at 836-37.
208. Greenberg, supra note 21, at 231-32.
209. Kathryn Abrams, Social Construction, Roving Biologism, and Reasonable Women:
A Response to Professor Epstein, 41 DEPAuL L. REV. 1021, 1029 (1992) ("[E]quality the-
ory ... did not deny all biological differences, but denied their relevance to a number of
institutional settings.").
210. Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 364 (3d Cir. 2008).
211. Id.
212. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGiE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38 (1994) (argu-
ing for a dynamic theory of interpretation).
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interpretation adopt a reasonable person's interpretation of the "ordinary
meaning[ ]" of the word, given accepted precepts of grammar and syn-
tax.2 13 In determining the plain meaning of part of a statute, the plain
meaning of the text can be understood by examining its relationship to
the statutory scheme as a whole.2 14 If the words of the statute have a
clear and unambiguous meaning, then the "plain meaning" of the statute
will be given effect. 215 Plain meaning can be determined using a diction-
ary that the judge may have in his or her chambers. 2 16 It is also informed
by the cultural worldviews of the judge and judicial clerks. 2 17 But plain
meaning, importantly, arises from an individual's personal perception of
the "shared cultural meaning" of the term.2 18 This personal perception
inevitably is informed by personal experiences and the individual's soci-
ocultural paradigm. 21 9 Thus, plain meaning may be a more uncertain tool
than it seems. This is a site in which the personal may become, for a par-
ticular purpose, the juridical. Judges making determinations about the
meaning and definition of pregnancy do not necessarily call in outside
experts. The plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation, whether
due to differences in personal perspectives, differences arising from the
process of legislative drafting, or differences emerging from shifting
meanings over time, guarantees that the meaning of statutes like the PDA
will be ambiguous. 220 This ambiguity, and the resulting indeterminacy,
will only compound over time.
221
Courts frequently interpret PDA cases from a perspective animated by
the underlying presumption that pregnancy has a plain meaning. They
interpret the PDA by relying on a "plain meaning" of pregnancy that is
universally accessible regardless of cultural, historical, and personal con-
tingencies.2 22 Pregnancy, from that perspective, is a biological "reality"
that is naturalized apart from social, political, legal, and cultural
frameworks. 223 This adherence to plain meaning endorses a form of bi-
omedical essentialism that limits the scope of pregnancy by presuming
that pregnancy is an ahistorical, universally applicable, strictly biological
event that begins with conception and ends with the birth of the child.
While the plain meaning approach need not adopt a perspective that ad-
heres to biomedical essentialism, its tendency to do so not only creates
uncertainty and indeterminacy for the statute, but also falls short of pro-
viding discrimination protections for pregnant women. Like the Supreme
213. Id.
214. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2002).
215. ESKIDGE, supra note 212, at 38.
216. Id. at 42.
217. Id. at 43.
218. Id. at 58.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 38-41.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., United States v. Bd. of Educ. of Consol. High Sch. Dist. 230, 983 F.2d 790,
795 (7th Cir. 1993).
223. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act at 35, 21 DUKE J. GENDEiR L. & Pory 67 (2013).
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Court, many courts of appeals operate under the presumption that
"[n]ormal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with
unique characteristics. 22 4
Judges, the majority of whom are male, may lack a complex under-
standing of the scope and meaning of pregnancy, not only as biological
and physiological phenomenon, but also as a psychological, cultural, so-
cial, and economic phenomenon. 225 This is not to say that judges should
be disqualified from making determinations about pregnancy because
they are male, but that there should be a sense of humility and robust
inquiry. By taking a perspective that often excludes the experiences of
women who have been pregnant or of those who have cared for pregnant
women, judges adjudicating these cases adopt the wrong approach. In-
stead of recognizing, in line with congressional intent2 26 and Supreme
Court precedent,227 that the definition of pregnancy already entails both
biological and social aspects and should be understood to prohibit a
broader range of discrimination, courts adopt a plain meaning approach
that flattens the experiences of pregnancy and obscures how sociocultural
meaning construct not only our understanding of work and the work-
place, but also the limits and contours of pregnancy itself.
Part of the appeal of plain meaning, however, is its supposed clarity
and consistency. Some argue that a textual approach to meaning will lead
to less indeterminacy in the application of the law. 228 They argue that if
courts can adhere to an analysis that draws upon the clear and unambigu-
ous meaning of the word, then it is less likely that they will reach different
results in similar circumstances. However, a plain meaning, biologically-
based approach has not lead to clarity and consistency in applying the
PDA.
When courts adhere to a strict, biological-essentialist view of preg-
nancy, which restricts pregnancy to the forty-week period between con-
ception and childbirth, it permits employers to discriminate against
women based on pregnancy-related conditions and social circumstances.
This undermines the PDA's explicit, textual prohibition against discrimi-
nation on the basis of pregnancy-related medical conditions. It also un-
dermines a pervasively shared intuition among feminists, caretakers for
224. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974).
225. Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1704-10 (1991) (discussing the reality that a majority of
judges are male); see also Fact Sheet, National Women's Law Center, Women in the Fed-
eral Judiciary: Still a Long Way to Go (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/wo-
men-federal-j udiciary-still-long-way-go-1 [https://perma.cc/TX23-A54Z].
226. See Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., 824 F.2d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1987).
227. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 190, 211 (1991) (finding
that "an employer's gender-based fetal-protection policy" relating to lead exposure was
"discrimination on the basis of woman's ability to become pregnant" and thus violated the
law); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 669 (1983)
(The "[employer]'s plan is unlawful, because the protection it affords male employees is
less comprehensive than [that] afforded ... female employees.").
228. ESKR x;ID, supra note 212, at 38.
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pregnant women, and those giving birth229 that pregnancy, for the pur-
poses of pregnancy discrimination, should include more than just the pe-
riod between conception and birth.230 Finally, such a myopic perspective
of the nature of pregnancy and pregnancy discrimination fails to recog-
nize how workplace norms continue to be defined, socially constructed,
and culturally understood to exclude women, pregnancy, and care. 231
In the alternative, some courts have relied on legislative intent to shed
light on the purpose and scope of pregnancy discrimination prohibited by
the Act. For example, drawing on legislative intent, courts have deter-
mined that the PDA was designed to combat the stereotype that women
who become mothers are unable to participate in the workforce and that
they ultimately belong in the home.232 Like the textual approach to plain
meaning, deference to legislative intent has its own challenges; the use of
legislative intent by courts has not led to an expansion of the understand-
ing of the Act.
Many have argued that the PDA defines pregnancy broadly so that a
large range of potential discrimination related to pregnancy and repro-
duction will be prohibited. 233 The legislative history indicates that it was
intended to provide Title VII's protections to a "whole range of matters
concerning the childbearing process"2 34 and a variety of conditions and
circumstances related to childbearing. 235 The PDA's legislative history in-
dicates that it was designed not only to combat discrimination based on
gestational pregnancy, but also to encompass a broader range of discrimi-
natory treatment and exclusionary policies that would limit workforce
participation.236 Furthermore, the legislative history explicitly states that
the Act was passed with the intention to protect not only individual fe-
male workers, but also their families.2 37 However, as the previous section
229. Matambanadzo, supra note 13, at 119-20.
230. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 64, at 436-38.
231. Id. at 437 (citing WI.IAMS, supra note 154, at 82); Zatz, supra note 64, at 45-46.
232. Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Animus
towards pregnant women may be inferred based on these comments; specifically, a belief
that pregnancy disqualifies women from effectively participating in the workforce.").
233. Sarah E. Wald, Judicial Construction of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination
Amendment to Title VII: Ignoring Congressional Intent, 31 AM. U. L. Rv. 591, 599-600
(1982) (arguing that a broad range of pregnancy-related conditions such as a miscarriage
should be included under the PDA).
234. H.R. RELI. No. 95-948, at 5 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753.
235. Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., 824 F.2d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1987) (analyzing
legislative history to show how the PDA "will also prohibit discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy or conditions arising out of pregnancy for all employment-related purposes" and
arguing that Congress clearly intended to extend protections beyond simple pregnancy to
include nausea, potential miscarriage, and many other conditions); Magid, supra note 17, at
822 (offering a critique of the PDA's evidentiary standards).
236. See Carney, 824 F.2d at 648.
237. This intent is made apparent in Senator Hiram William's introduction of the Act,
in which he noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert that pregnancy discrimina-
tion is not necessarily sex discrimination for the purposes of an employer's disability insur-
ance scheme, represented a setback for individual women and their families. See S. COMM.
ON LA1OR AND HUMAN RES., 96TII CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF T1IE PREGNANCY




reveals, lower courts have applied the PDA in ways that have limited its
textual potential, recreating the conditions of discrimination that moti-
vated Congress to pass the Act over thirty-five years ago.2 38 This has led
some to argue that when courts narrowly construe the Act, they are oper-
ating from presumptions that do not mirror the expectations of the legis-
lators who wrote the Act and the coalition that lobbied for its passage. 239
Furthermore, one of the main challenges in determining meaning from
legislative intent lies in the difficulty of interpreting a collective group of
differentially motivated persons' intentions.240 Legislative intent can be
used to limit 24 1 or to expand the scope of the PDA.242
The next section examines how the current interpretive approach to
the PDA, with its reliance on plain meaning and legislative intent, fails
not only to provide consistency and clarity jurisprudentially, but also to
protect pregnant workers in reality.
B. INDETERMINACY AND THE PDA
The Supreme Court has rarely addressed the scope and nature of preg-
nancy under the Act. And on the rare occasion that the Justices seem to
do so, the meaning of pregnancy is treated as obvious or uncontroversial
and thus remains unaddressed. 2 43 Some commentators have even noted
238. There is some evidence that the PDA, passed during an historical period of rapidly
expanding employee benefits, required employers to provide more robust protections for
pregnancy. Brake & Grossman, supra note 223, at 73-74. As Deborah A. Widiss argues,
the intention of the PDA was not to use comparisons between pregnant and non-pregnant
persons to limit the rights of pregnant women but instead to provide a foundation for
substantive accommodations to pregnant and non-pregnant workers alike. Widiss, supra
note 168, at 975-77.
239. There is historical evidence that feminist activists regarded redistribution as an
essential aspect of sex discrimination and made significant efforts to ensure that women
did not shoulder the costs of reproduction and childcare alone as an important aspect of
antidiscrimination law. Dinner, supra note 24, at 442. According to Dinner's historical find-
ings, "[fleminists sought to redefine childrearing as a collective, public responsibility rather
than a private responsibility of individual women." Id. at 457.
240. See Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguis-
tics as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 Cot UM. Sci. & TiEci. L. RF'v. 156, 173
(2012) (noting that the collective members of the legislature produce a shared outcome
without necessarily signaling a shared intent).
241. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1996) (drawing
on legislative intent to exclude discrimination on the basis of fertility treatments from the
scope of the PDA's protections because Congress made no reference to infertility
treatments).
242. Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., 824 F.2d 643, 647-48 (8th Cir. 1987) (drawing
on the legislative history and the house report to determine that "the bill makes clear that
its protection extends to the whole range of matters concerning the child-bearing pro-
cess"); see also Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (N.D. III. 1994)
(drawing on legislative intent to find that discrimination because of esphofical reflux, a
medical condition that prevented plaintiff from becoming pregnant naturally, is prohibited
by the PDA because discrimination on the basis of potential or intended pregnancy is
prohibited).
243. For example, in Justice Alito's concurrence in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
he does not define pregnancy but claims that the first clause of the PDA, which expands
sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions," is not ambiguous. 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1356-57 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (claiming that the first clause of the PDA is "straightforward").
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that the members of the Supreme Court seem "baffled" by the nature of
pregnancy. 244 As one pair of commentators note, the interpretations of
the PDA have been "tortured and inharmonious," while the PDA's lan-
guage and legislative history are remarkably clear.245
The question as to which particular pregnancy-related conditions are
included within the purview of the PDA remains contested and indeter-
minate. For the purposes of Title VII, circuit and district courts disagree
about the meaning and scope of pregnancy discrimination because they
dispute the very nature of pregnancy itself.246 Ultimately, this means that
courts deny relief to numerous individuals who are discriminated against
because of pregnancy-related medical conditions.
In some circumstances, the lack of clarity concerning the PDA's scope
and meaning derives from interpretive disputes about the PDA's second
clause.247 In the interpretations of judges248 and the EEOC,2 4 9 disputes
arise regarding the question of whether employers are required to pro-
vide accommodations to pregnant employees on the same grounds that
they provide accommodations to other employees. This failure to provide
reasonable accommodations has been one of the most intractable
problems associated with the PDA.25 0 Although the PDA does not re-
quire that employers provide special accommodations only to pregnant
employees, it does require that pregnant employees be treated no worse
than other employees similarly situated in their capacity to work.25 1 This
requirement has become more complex, particularly in circumstances
where the PDA interacts with the ADA.2 52 In the wake of the ADA,
courts have been inconsistent in determining whether employers are re-
244. Brake, supra note 52, at 995-96 (discussing oral argument in Young).
245. Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 55, at 2179-80 (arguing that the PDA does
not adequately address the costs of pregnancy for women in the workforce).
246. See id. at 2187-88.
247. Id.
248. Compare Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 446 (4th Cir. 2013)
(determining that a "pregnancy blind" policy that treated pregnant employees suffering
from lifting restrictions differently than employees whose lifting restrictions arose from on
the job injuries did not constitute pregnancy discrimination), with Latowski v. Northwoods
Nursing Ctr., 549 F. App'x 478, 483 (6th Cir. 2013) ("Although these employees differed
from Latowski because their medical conditions were work-related, they were similarly
situated in their ability to work because they were placed under lifting restrictions of up to
fifty pounds.").
249. The EEOC's guidelines state that "[d]isabilities caused or contributed to by preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, for all job-related purposes, shall be
treated the same as disabilities caused or contributed to by other medical conditions, under
any health or disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employ-
ment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (2014). This guideline applies to policies and practices that
are both written and unwritten, formal and informal. Id.
250. See generally Grossman & Thomas, supra note 198, at 15 (examining how the
PDA's requirement that pregnant workers be "similarly situated" to other workers in or-
der to receive accommodations creates a choice for workers between following medical
advice and forgoing the benefits of work during pregnancy).
251. Id.
252. Brief for Law Professors and Women's Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at *11-12, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir.
2013) (No. 12-1226), 2013 WL 2103656.
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quired to grant pregnant employees accommodations to address tempo-
rary limitations on their ability to work.253
In other circumstances, these disputes concern the way circuit courts
define the scope of pregnancy and medically related conditions.254 To il-
lustrate this claim, the next section examines four interpretive areas
where federal courts disagree on the scope and meaning of what preg-
nancy discrimination includes and excludes. Specifically, the section fo-
cuses on interpretive disagreements as to the inclusion of infertility,
lactation, contraception, and menstruation discrimination under the
PDA. Many courts have refused to recognize the full scope and nature of
pregnancy discrimination, and instead adopt an approach that provides
relief only for gestation discrimination. 255
1. The PDA and Infertility
Although the Supreme Court has held that reproduction is a major life
activity under the ADA, 256 employer insurance coverage for infertility
treatments has not been widely adopted.2 57 U.S. courts of appeals are
split as to whether discrimination against women undergoing fertility
treatments constitutes pregnancy discrimination under Title VII.258
The Supreme Court has not determined whether fertility falls within
the scope of Title VII's prohibition against pregnancy discrimination as
pregnancy, or a condition that is medically related to pregnancy. Other
courts remain agnostic about whether discrimination because of fertility
constitutes pregnancy discrimination. For example, in its most recent de-
cision concerning fertility discrimination, the Second Circuit did not
reach the question of whether fertility discrimination qualified as preg-
nancy discrimination. 259 When courts have weighed in on the question of
whether discrimination because of fertility treatments constitutes preg-
nancy discrimination, they have reached contradictory conclusions about
whether it is sex discrimination.
253. Id. at 12 (arguing that the ADA Amendments expanded the pool of employees
entitled to reasonable accommodations to include pregnant workers who are temporarily
limited in their ability to work).
254. Deardorff, supra note 59, at 52-53 (analyzing disagreements between district
courts as to whether the PDA prohibits discrimination because of contraception, preg-
nancy, and infertility).
255. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 640 (1998).
256. Id. at 638.
257. Pendo, supra note 159, at 295.
258. See Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Krauel v. Iowa Meth-
odist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
259. Govori v. Goat Fifty, L.L.C., 519 F. App'x 732, 736 (2d Cir. 2013) (failing to reach
the question of whether the PDA would cover a claim related to infertility because plaintiff
failed to show employers legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an adverse employment
action was a pretext for discrimination). The court held that the defendant offered a non-
discriminatory reason and defendant fired plaintiff "because of her subpar customer ser-
vice that included ignoring her tables, her quarrelsome relations with other employees, and
her refusal to complete menial tasks required of servers." Id. at 734.
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In the Eighth Circuit, the courts defined pregnancy discrimination to
exclude fertility-related discrimination. Judge Longstaff of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Iowa determined that infertility is
not included in the scope of pregnancy-related medical conditions be-
cause unlike pregnancy or childbirth, both men and women can "be infer-
tile."'260 Drawing on the rules of statutory construction, the court also
noted that infertility "occurs prior to" conception and pregnancy. 261 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Longstaff's opinion, not-
ing that the plain language of the PDA "does not suggest that 'related
medical conditions' should be extended to apply outside the context of
'pregnancy' and 'childbirth.' '262 The court distinguished infertility from
pregnancy and childbirth by noting that pregnancy and childbirth are con-
ditions that occur after conception, while infertility is categorically de-
fined as an inability to conceive. 263 Further, the court noted that
employer policies related to infertility are gender neutral because infertil-
ity is a condition that impacts both men and women.264 Unlike potential
pregnancy, which only impacts women, infertility is not sex-related.
26 5
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion with
a similar analysis. In Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., the benefits plan cov-
ered a variety of surgical and non-surgical fertility treatments, including
remedies related to varicose veins in the testicles, blockages of the vas
deferens, endometriosis, tubal occlusions, ovulation kits, oral fertility
drugs, and penile prosthetic implants.2 66 It excluded "surgical impregna-
tion procedures," including artificial insemination, in-vitro fertilization,
or embryo and fetal implants.2 67 Rochelle Saks, an employee of Franklin
Covey, sought reimbursement for a variety of fertility treatments includ-
ing the use of ovulation kits, Clomid to regulate and induce ovulation,
intrauterine insemination, in-vitro fertilization hormones, injectable fer-
tility drugs, and a set of ultrasounds and blood tests to monitor the poten-
tially harmful effects of the drugs.2 68 Although she sought reimbursement
for all of her fertility-related expenses, the insurance company refused to
reimburse her for the intrauterine inseminations, the in-vitro fertilization,
the injectable fertility drugs, and the monitoring tests. 2 69 Saks brought
suit, claiming that the plan's benefits for insurance coverage of fertility
related treatments were inferior to its coverage of non-pregnancy-related
illnesses and because the plan provided differential coverage for male
and female fertility issues.270 The plan, according to Saks, violated the
260. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 112 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
261. Id.
262. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996).
263. Id. at 680.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co. 316 F.3d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 2003).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 341-42.




PDA because it provided complete coverage for surgical procedures re-
lated to male infertility, while providing inferior coverage for surgical
procedures related to female infertility.2 71
The Second Circuit found that the exclusion of the surgical infertility
treatments did not violate Title VII. 272 In interpreting the scope of the
PDA's protections for fertility related discrimination, the Second Circuit
focused on infertility in relation to the broader objective of Title VII.273
Title VII, according to the court, was designed to prohibit discrimination
on the basis of sex. 274 Pregnancy and related medical conditions are rec-
ognized within the scope of Title VII's protections against discrimination
because they are sex-based characteristics of women.275 According to the
Second Circuit, infertility is a medical condition that is gender neutral.27 6
It impacts women as well as men. In examining the statute, it determined
that related medical conditions within the PDA were not intended to "in-
troduc[e] a completely new classification of prohibited discrimination
based solely on reproductive capacity. '27 7 Furthermore, an insurance
plan excluding surgical procedures for infertility equally disadvantages
men and women because men and women are both subject to the difficul-
ties of infertility. 278 As such, infertility is not a pregnancy "related medi-
cal condition" for the purposes of Title VII, as amended by the PDA.27 9
Commentators have been critical of these decisions, in part because
they obscure the cultural and social meaning of infertility. Although the
medical condition of infertility can impact both men and women, there is
empirical evidence that in the U.S. cultural context women bear a dispro-
portionate burden of the physical and emotional burden of infertility.280
As Elizabeth Pendo notes, even medical reference texts, like the Merck
Manual, categorize infertility as a women's health issue. 281
The Seventh Circuit has included infertility within the scope of the
PDA specifically by not defining it as infertility but as "childbearing ca-
pacity. '282 In 2008, the Seventh Circuit reached this result in Hall v.
Nalco.283 In 2003, Cheryl Hall, one of two sales secretaries employed by
Nalco Co., requested a leave of absence to undergo in-vitro fertilization
("IVF") treatments. 284 The treatments-which consist of weeks of fertil-
271. Id.
272. Id. at 343.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 345.




280. Pendo, supra note 159, at 320-22.
281. Id. at 336-37 n.218 (noting that after the Supreme Court's decision, many com-
mentators believed that employer medical coverage for infertility treatments would
expand).
282. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 644 (7th Cir. 2008).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 645.
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ity drugs, followed by the extraction and fertilization of viable eggs, and
then the implantation of embryos within a woman's womb-were unsuc-
cessful the first time.285 In July of 2003, Hall requested an additional
leave of absence to try the procedure again in August.286 During late July,
Hall was terminated from her position when the company began the pro-
cess of consolidating two Chicago-area offices. 287 The company decided
to terminate Hall and retain the other secretary. When the company ter-
minated Hall, her supervisor told her that it "was in [Hall's] best interest
due to her health condition. '288 Hall's personal files concerning the ter-
mination discuss how she missed work for health related reasons and spe-
cifically mention the link between her absenteeism and her infertility.289
While the district court granted summary judgment for the employer, de-
termining that infertility was a gender-neutral condition that did not con-
stitute sex discrimination under the PDA,2 90 the Seventh Circuit reached
a different result. According to the circuit court, the district court made
the mistake of focusing on infertility without acknowledging that that de-
cision to terminate Hall for undergoing IVF treatments is really based on
her capacity or potential (or lack thereof) to become pregnant and bear a
child.2 91 Nalco terminated Hall not for a gender-neutral reason, but for
the sex quality of childbearing capacity.2 92 The Seventh Circuit redefined
the employer's action related to infertility, noting that Nalco "terminated
[Hall] for taking time off to undergo IVF-just like those terminated for
taking time off to give birth or receive other pregnancy-related care-
[such individuals] will always be women .... Hall was terminated not for
the gender-neutral condition of infertility, but rather for the gender-spe-
cific quality of childbearing capacity. '293
2. The PDA and Lactation
Many state and federal government offices have adopted a positive
public policy that attempts to encourage new mothers to breastfeed their
infants for at least six months and ideally, a year.2 94 However, it is not
285. Id.




290. Hall v. Nalco Co., No. 04 C 7294, 2006 WL 2699337, at *3 (N.D. I11. Sept. 12, 2006),
rev'd, 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008).
291. Hall, 534 F.3d at 648.
292. Id. at 649.
293. Id. at 648-49.
294. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010). Before the passage of the Affordable Care Act, there were no federal or state
statutes that required employers to provide support for women choosing to breastfeed af-
ter they return to work. In some ways, the federal government has adopted a pro-
breastfeeding stance. Breastfeeding mothers received protection when the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act amended the Fair Labor Standards Act, requiring that em-
ployers make provisions to support breastfeeding mothers at work. U.S. Di vI,. o LA3OR,
WAGE & HOUR Div., Section 7(r) of the Fair Labor Standards Act - Break Time for Nurs-
ing Mothers Provision, http://www.dol.gov/whd/nursingmothers/Sec7rFLSAbtnm.htm
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clear whether this positive policy of promoting breastfeeding includes a
prohibition against lactation discrimination. The federal courts of appeals
that have addressed the question of whether lactation or breastfeeding
discrimination is prohibited by the PDA do not agree. 295 According to
the contradictory decisions by the federal circuits, lactation, like infertility
and menstruation, is and is not a condition that is medically related to
pregnancy. 2 96
There is some evidence that Congress intended to include lactation
within the scope of the PDA.297 Despite this evidence, some federal
courts have refused to recognize that discrimination on the basis of lacta-
tion and breastfeeding falls within the scope of Title VII's prohibition
against sex discrimination. 298 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
chosen to narrowly interpret the scope of the Act to exclude lactation
discrimination. 299 According to the court, the incapacitation and preg-
nancy-related medical conditions is not similar in kind to the limitations
placed upon mothers nursing infants.300 Similarly, Judge Simpson of the
United States District Court of the Western District of Kentucky rejected
a breastfeeding plaintiff's claim that an employer's refusal to grant per-
sonal leave because the employee's six-week old infant refused to wean
or take a bottle constituted impermissible discrimination based upon
pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition.301 According to
Judge Simpson, while "breast-feeding and weaning are natural concomi-
tants of pregnancy and childbirth, they are not 'medical conditions' re-
lated thereto. '302
Other judges, like Judge Pratt of the Southern District Court of Iowa,
have taken a different route. Judge Pratt granted summary judgment to
[https://perma.cc/744X-U7GC]. Employers must provide reasonable breaks for mothers
expressing milk for one year after the child's birth and a place to express milk "other than
a bathroom" that is shielded from view and intrusion. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) (2012).
States have also passed an array of other laws designed to take breastfeeding into consider-
ation. Matambanadzo, supra note 13, at 139-40.
295. In some cases, courts do not reach the substance of this question of law and make
determinations on other grounds. See, e.g., Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 747 F.3d
509, 513-14 (8th Cir. 2014) (determining that because the company treated all nursing
mothers the same and all employees in that position the same, there was no pregnancy
discrimination in violation of the PDA), withdrawn on reh'g, 760 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (Jan. 15, 2015).
296. Compare Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 932 (4th Cir. 1988), and Wallace v. Pyro
Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 868 (W.D. Ky. 1990), affd, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991), with
EEOC v. Hous. Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425, 425 (5th Cir. 2013).
297. For example, the Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 2011, S. 1463, 112th Cong. § 101
(2011), would amend Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include breastfeeding.
It explicitly states that "Congress intended to include breastfeeding and expressing breast
milk as protected conduct" when it passed the PDA in 1978. Id. § 101(a)(8).
298. Barrash, 846 F.2d at 932; Wallace, 989 F. Supp. at 868.
299. Barrash, 846 F.2d at 932.
300. Id. The Fourth Circuit's opinion characterizes breastfeeding as a purely volitional
act. The court distinguished recovering pregnant persons from "young mothers wishing to
nurse little babies." Id. (emphasis added). In this way, the court regards breastfeeding not
as an imperative aspect of childbirth and pregnancy, but as a lifestyle choice.
301. Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 868.
302. Id. at 869.
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Nationwide Insurance Company over a plaintiff seeking protection from
nursing related discrimination on the grounds that she had not produced
sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence to ground her claim.30 3 In
making this determination, however, Judge Pratt noted that Ames, as a
lactating mother, may not even be a member of the class of persons pro-
tected under Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination and preg-
nancy discrimination.3°4 In a footnote, Judge Pratt distinguished
breastfeeding from the medical condition of lactation and, in what may
have been an accidental post-structural feminist twist, even decoupled
lactation and breastfeeding from gender and the female sex.30 5
By contrast, in EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Limited the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that terminating a female employee because she
is lactating or expressing milk constitutes impermissible sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII.3°6 Although the Fifth Circuit stopped short of re-
quiring employers to accommodate lactation, the court rejected the
argument that Title VII did not cover "breast pump" discrimination and
that terminating an individual's employment because of lactation or
breast-pumping is not actionable discrimination under Title VII. 30 7 The
court found that negative employment actions on the basis of lactation or
expressing milk can give rise to an actionable claim of sex discrimination
under Title VII and that lactation is a medical condition related to preg-
nancy under the PDA.30 8 Noting that the PDA's expansion of sex discrim-
ination to include "pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions"
does not explicitly define "medical conditions," the Fifth Circuit drew on
the "plain meaning" of the words in the statute. 30 9 In analyzing the no-
tion of a medical condition, the court reasoned that it included any physi-
ological condition, a broadly defined designation that would not on its
face tend to exclude breastfeeding. 310 The court held that "[i]t is undis-
puted in this appeal that lactation is a physiological result of being preg-
nant and bearing a child. 311 As such, discrimination because of lactation,
like menstruation discrimination, would be included in the scope of the
Act within the "reasonable definition of 'pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.'"312 It may be the case that the Act, however, still
does not mandate special accommodations for pregnant employees who
are nursing. 313
303. Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 4:11-cv-00359 RP-RAW, at *42 (S.D. Iowa
Oct. 16, 2012) (mem. op.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015).
304. Id. at *20 n.31.
305. Id. at *12 n.28 (Judge Pratt writes, "Ames has not presented sufficient evidence
that lactation is a medical condition related to pregnancy .... Furthermore, it is a scientific
fact that even men have milk ducts and the hormones responsible for milk production.").
306. EEOC v. Hous. Funding 1I, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425, 425 (5th Cir. 2013).
307. Id. at 428-30.
308. Id. at 428.
309. Id. at 429-30.
310. Id. at 428-29.
311. Id. at 428.
312. Id. at 430.
313. See supra Part I.D.
2016]
SMU LAW REVIEW
3. The PDA and Contraception
In the United States, circuit courts have produced contradictory deter-
minations as to whether discrimination in contraceptive health coverage
by employers violates the PDA. In some cases, when an employer's
health insurance plan excludes coverage for contraceptives, courts have
found that such exclusions constitute sex-based discrimination. 314 Even
''seemingly neutral classifications that in fact burden women constitute
facial sex discrimination" for the purposes of Title VII.315 For example,
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that such a plan consti-
tutes sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.316 The court determined
that, "regardless of whether the prevention of pregnancy falls within the
phrase 'pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,"' employer
plans providing comprehensive coverage for men but, excluding contra-
ception for women, were operating from a logic that mirrors the Supreme
Court's Gilbert decision.317 However, the Eight Circuit came to a differ-
ent conclusion.318 In analyzing a railroad employer's plan, which ex-
cluded comprehensive coverage for contraception, the court determined
that the PDA did not prohibit disparate treatment in terms of contracep-
tive coverage. 319 Comparing contraception to fertility, and drawing on
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, the court noted that,
"[c]ontraception is not a medical treatment that occurs when or if a wo-
man becomes pregnant; instead, contraception prevents pregnancy from
even occurring.320 While such circuit court splits many be rendered moot
by the Affordable Care Act, which requires employer health plans to
cover contraception and other preventative medical treatments,32 ' these
decisions reveal how the scope of the discrimination arising from preg-
nancy-related medical conditions has been conceptualized by courts in
contradictory ways that fail to offer real protection from pregnancy
discrimination.
314. Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979, 985 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (find-
ing the exclusion of prescription contraceptives facially sufficient to state a claim for dispa-
rate treatment and disparate impact under Title VII). Although the policy was facially
neutral, Judge E. Richard Webber of the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of
Missouri noted that because prescription contraceptives are available only to women, the
exclusion of prescription contraceptives from health insurance plans burden female em-
ployees. Id. at 984. For this reason, the court determined that the exclusion of prescription
contraception from the employer's health insurance plan was not gender neutral. Id. But
see Wright v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 4:03CV1843 (CDP), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42366, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2005) (finding that the PDA creates no separate cause of
action for pregnancy discrimination, but that such claims may be brought under Title VII).
315. Cooley, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 984.
316. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1274 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
317. Id.
318. See In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp't Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2007).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. 29 C.F.R § 2590.715-2713 (2015).
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4. The PDA and Menstruation
Discrimination by employers on the basis of menstruation both is and
is not prohibited discrimination under Title VII, as amended by the
PDA.322 Policies requiring that women have a regular menstrual cycle
before returning to work have been viewed by some courts as violating
Title VII's prohibitions against pregnancy discrimination. 323 However, in
other cases, courts have held that menstrual cramps are not a medical
condition related to childbirth or pregnancy for the purpose of the PDA
and therefore disparate treatment on the basis of menstrual cramps is not
sex discrimination. 324
C. THE FRONTIERS OF PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
The real life contradictions of the PDA, as exemplified by the circuit
court disagreements about fertility, lactation, contraception, and men-
struation, do not represent the full diversity of pregnancy discrimination
that may occur in society. Pregnancy, like other forms of reproduction,
has been subject to profound shifts in its possibilities through scientific
and cultural changes. 325 In the twenty-first century, pregnancy has be-
come untethered from the binary patriarchal heterosexual family unit in
important ways. The increasing use of assisted reproductive technologies
and other interventions has had a significant impact on how pregnancy
takes place, who becomes pregnant, and the reasons people do so.326 Fur-
ther, the changing nature of family and the diversity of ways in which
families are formed 327 also creates complications. These changes in social
circumstances create the conditions that make it possible for employers
to engage in pregnancy-related discrimination and reproduction-related
discrimination that should be prohibited by the PDA on grounds of fair-
ness and justice.
The following hypotheticals illustrate possibilities that may emerge in
future challenges for pregnancy discrimination protections. These scena-
rios concern pregnancy-related discrimination that is experienced either
by those who have not been pregnant or by those individuals who have
been pregnant, but whose pregnancy flouts conventional social norms in
some way:
322. Compare Harper v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 619 F.2d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1980), with
Jirak v. Fed. Express Corp., 805 F. Supp. 193, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
323. Harper, 619 F.2d at 489 (finding a company policy that required women to have a
regular menstrual cycle before returning to work after pregnancy lacked a business neces-
sity and imposed a burden on women that it did not impose on men).
324. Jirak, 805 F. Supp. at 195.
325. Multiple births, for example, have become more common. DEBRAN ROWLAND,
TiHE BOUNIAI.IES OF HER Bony: THim TROUBLING HISTOR.Y OF WOMEN's RiGrrs IN
AMERICA 405-06 (2004).
326. Id.
327. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AN) GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING
A.L FAMILIES UNDER Trm LAW (2008) (examining the diversity of family configurations
and needs beyond the monogamous married family).
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Ling is a single woman who works as a mid-level manager at a tech
company. Happily unmarried, Ling seeks out a sperm donor in order
to have a child. As the rumors trickle in, Ling is treated differently.
She is denied access to interesting projects, left home when her peers
are traveling, and considered "unserious" about her work even
though her performance has not changed. During her fertility treat-
ments, Ling does not become pregnant and receives a diagnosis of
unspecified female infertility. Ling was never pregnant and was not a
caregiver. Has Ling experienced pregnancy discrimination?
Loretta is social worker at a nonprofit organization that serves chil-
dren. She is also a woman of size. At five foot, four inches tall her
weight fluctuates between 180 pounds and 220 pounds. After injur-
ing herself in a 5K run, she gradually shifts from 184 pounds, to
closer to 200 pounds. Her supervisor assumes she is pregnant and
removes her from the most challenging and, admittedly upsetting,
cases. Her supervisor also starts to indicate that Loretta is not seri-
ous about her job. In Loretta's annual review, her supervisor also
jokes that any promotion in title is unlikely because she is just going
to be consumed by the baby anyway. Loretta is not pregnant. Has
she suffered from pregnancy discrimination?
Jackie and Maria are a lesbian couple. Although Maria is giving birth
to their daughter, Jackie is the egg mother and intends to induce lac-
tation in order to breastfeed. Jackie is a nurse at a local private hos-
pital. Her employer is a big supporter of breastfeeding and infant
bonding. It provides six weeks of paid leave for mothers who have
given birth. When Jackie asks for the paid time off, she is told that
although they support her efforts to breastfeed her infant son, she is
ineligible for the paid leave because she has not given birth. She was
not pregnant, after all. Should discrimination against a breastfeeding
mother who did not carry the child constitute pregnancy
discrimination?
Samantha is a surrogate for James and Louise. She is Louise's sister.
James and Louise decided to conceive through a surrogate because
Louise is a survivor of breast cancer. As part of her treatment, Lou-
ise underwent a double mastectomy. She is very keen to breastfeed-
ing, but is unable to do so. Samantha is willing to pump breast milk
for a year after the birth to provide for her nephew. Samantha is a
teacher and plans to give birth in the summer to accommodate her
employer. When she returns to work in August, her employer refuses
to accommodate her need to express breast milk. Her employer
claims that as a surrogate, she is not entitled to the protections that
other women at her workplace receive. Providing breast milk for her
infant nephew is a lifestyle choice. Is this a form of pregnancy
discrimination? 328
328. This factual pattern shares some elements with the case of Gonzalez v. Marriott
International, Inc., in which an employee who had performed surrogacy services took
breaks to express milk for the infant. No. CV15-03301MMM(PJWx), 2015 WL 6821303, at
*16 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2015) (denying motion for summary judgment).
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These scenarios differ in many respects. In some situations, the individ-
uals have been denied accommodations typically granted by an employer
to other employees because they do not fit the ideal image of persons
protected from pregnancy discrimination by the PDA. In other cases, em-
ployers have made presumptions about the employees' work ethic or
work ability because of their perceptions about pregnancy. However, the
employees all bear the costs of cultural presumptions about appropriately
pregnant persons, even if they do not conform to the biomedical defini-
tion of pregnancy. While many of these workers may find relief in the
patchwork of caretaker protections emerging for employees at the state
level,329 it is not clear that Title VII as amended by the PDA would pro-
vide them with similar, appropriate protections. 330 If we reduce preg-
nancy to its biomedical definition and require gestation as a necessary
precondition, then no pregnancy discrimination occurs as a matter of law.
However, perhaps there has been some form of sex-related caregiver dis-
crimination or sex-based sexual orientation discrimination.
329. Although plaintiffs have often not been successful in obtaining relief, new state
legislation protecting individuals from discrimination on the basis of family responsibilities
might provide women and men caring for children some level of protection from employ-
ment discrimination. In response, many state legislatures have expanded the antidis-
crimination protections that Title VII provides beyond pregnancy to encompass family
responsibilities like infant care within the scope of their antidiscrimination regime.
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1996) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or
parenthood); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(9) (2011) (preventing employers from
requiring information related to an individual's "child-bearing age or plans, pregnancy,
function of the individual's reproductive system, use of birth control methods, or the indi-
vidual's familial responsibilities, unless such information is directly related to a bona fide
occupational qualification or need .... "); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2006); N.J. ADMIN.
CoDI, § 4A:7-3.1 (2015). Sixty-three cities or counties currently have laws that "explicitly
prohibit employment discrimination based on parental status, familial status, or family re-
sponsibilities." Stephanie Bornstein & Robert J. Rathmell, Caregivers as a Protected
Class?: The Growth of State and Local Laws Prohibiting Family Responsibilities Discrimi-
nation, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, UNIV. OF CALl, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW
(2009), http://www.worklifelaw.orglpubs/LocalFRDLawsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8NW8-A93C]; see also Exec. Order No. 13,152, 65 Fed. Reg. 26,115 (May 4, 2000) (order-
ing that federal employees cannot be discriminated against on the basis of their parental
status).
330. Discrimination against caregivers seems to persist in the workplace. Press Release,
EEOC, Unlawful Discrimination Based on Pregnancy and Caregiving Responsibilities
Widespread Problem, Panelists Tell EEOC (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.eeoc.govleeoc/
newsroom/release/2-15-12.cfm [https:/lperma.cc/4JSH-TMTM]; Written Testimony of Joan
C. Williams, EEOC (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoclmeetings2-15-12/wil-
liams.cfm [https://perma.cc/4JSH-TMTMI. Increasingly, employees are seeking protection
from discrimination on the basis of care responsibilities, but they have not been entirely
successful in their efforts. See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the
Courtroom: The Growing Trend of Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L.
REV. 171, 171 (2006) (examining the "rapidly expanding" field of family responsibility dis-
crimination). Many commentators regard discrimination against caretakers and caretaking
in the workplace as among the most important contemporary crises in the United States.
See, e.g., Noreen Farrell & Genevieve Guertin, Old Problem, New Tactic: Making a Case
for Legislation to Combat Employment Discrimination Based on Family Caregiver Status,
59 HASTING L.J. 1463, 1464 (2008); Kessler, supra note 64, at 436 (examining the ways in
which women's cultural caregiving is often beyond the reach of antidiscrimination); Zatz,
supra note 64, at 46.
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Each of these individuals is similarly situated to pregnant employees in
important ways. In each of these scenarios, individuals experience preg-
nancy-related discrimination, or the lack of a socially and culturally main-
stream pregnancy, in the workplace. They are all on the receiving end of
harm because of pregnancy-related stereotypes and cultural presump-
tions about women and work. They also bear the same social and cultural
costs of care that often emerge from pregnancy. Each of them, however,
does not conform to the biomedical definition about what a culturally
appropriate pregnancy should look like. However, each of them will suf-
fer discrimination because of stereotypes about the limitations on women
who have been pregnant. Even if they are similarly situated in terms of
responsibilities, bodily fatigue, emotional bonding, and social stigma, they
will not receive the same benefits accorded to other pregnant women. In
each of the cases, they and their loved ones could be considered to be
"expecting" to expand their families.
Furthermore, employer policies that provide additional benefits and
privileges to persons who fit the biomedical model of pregnancy, while
excluding those that are socially and emotionally engaged in the work of
reproduction, have a pernicious discriminatory impact. The Supreme
Court's determination that the PDA constitutes a floor but not a ceiling
for employers permits employers to provide additional benefits to em-
ployees who are carrying a child, while denying such benefits to other
employees. 331 There are some circumstances where it is unlikely that
some types of pregnancy-favoring employer policies survive scrutiny
under Title VII;332 nonetheless, many policies that are similar to those
exemplified by the hypotheticals are permissible under the PDA.
However, policies that privilege gestational pregnancy and refuse to
recognize the diversity of family formations and the work of reproductive
labor beyond gestation may frustrate the purpose of the Act. First, they
fail to value similarly situated employees with similar social circumstances
equally. If a parent adopting a child is denied maternity leave, while other
parents gestating a child are provided with leave, the employer has failed
331. Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987). If one takes
seriously the Supreme Court's "floor . . . but not a ceiling" characterization of the PDA,
the Act allows employers to provide accommodations and even additional benefits to preg-
nant employees without providing them to other employees, in part because such policies
serve the larger purposes of the statute. Id.
332. As Noah Zatz argues,
Were the Court serious about the 'floor ... not ceiling' principle, then these
policies should be permissible under Title VII so long as they were triggered
by pregnancy; indeed, men should simply never have standing to bring a 're-
verse' pregnancy discrimination claim. Such an understanding would make
pregnancy-favoring decisions permissible entirely without any anchor in a re-
medial framework .... Instead, [the PDA as interpreted in Cal. Fed.] re-
quires that employers provide a remedy to a group of employees, each of
whom otherwise would suffer workplace harm because of her sex. In other
words, the principle of distribution is not pregnancy, but rather pregnancy-
based harm.




to treat adopting parents fairly. Many of the costs and challenges of incor-
porating an infant into a family emerge from social and emotional aspects
of the endeavor.333 And while the recovery from pregnancy entails physi-
ological changes and costs, some of the physical demands of caring for the
infant during the first three to six month are similar whether one has
gestated the infant or not.334 For this reason, the provision of maternity
leave and other benefits that manage to exclude adoptive parents or par-
ents who have opted for a surrogate has the potential to create resent-
ment among those excluded from the ameliorative protections and a
perception of an "undeserved" favored status. Reconstructing pregnancy
may also provide a strategy for dealing with the future challenges to preg-
nancy discrimination law that will map onto the changing way in which
families are formed.
D. CONCLUSION
When courts adjudicate the contours of pregnancy discrimination in
reference to the "plain meaning" of pregnancy or the legislative history of
the PDA, this gives rise to contradictory interpretations of the Act, creat-
ing significant circuit court splits that the Supreme Court has yet to weigh
in on. Despite claims that pregnancy has a "plain meaning," the preg-
nancy discrimination jurisprudence reveals how the simplicity of certain
definitions can obscure complex disagreements about pregnancy's mean-
ing.335 Pregnancy, as defined for the purposes of sex discrimination law,
has an indeterminate meaning. Often, courts adjudicating matters related
to pregnancy fail to define the term at all, assuming that the nature of the
condition is clear and needs no explanation. The meaning of "pregnancy
discrimination" has not been sufficiently clear so as to ensure that judges,
who are mostly male,336 apply the PDA's protections in a fair and consis-
tent fashion. The lack of consistency and fairness creates a type of circuit
court lottery for plaintiffs seeking protection from pregnancy discrimina-
tion. In relying on a biomedical model of what pregnancy discrimination
means, courts have failed to produce a clear, consistent definition of preg-
nancy and have failed to consistently determine which conditions, ill-
333. Matambanadzo, supra note 13.
334. Id. (discussing the demands of feeding, bonding, and care for infants).
335. See supra Part lI.B. It is unsurprising that pregnancy discrimination law is charac-
terized by its inconsistency and indeterminacy because it is a subset of sex discrimination
law. The law of sex discrimination has been characterized by its inconsistency and ambigu-
ity. Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation
of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL.
L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1995) (showing how the law of sex discrimination contains a loophole
that permits sexual orientation discrimination). As Cary Franklin has argued, examining
the legislative history of Title VII, the "traditional conception" of sex discrimination is an
invented one that has been subject to malleability and multiple interpretations. Franklin,
supra note 31, at 1312.
336. Fact Sheet, National Women's Law Center, supra note 225. While this represents
significant progress, there are certain circuits that have far lower percentages of female
judges, including the Third Circuit (17%) and the Eighth Circuit (20%). Id. Moreover, six
district courts have never had a female judge on the bench. Id.
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nesses, or injuries are medically related to pregnancy. The next part of
this article offers an alternative to biomedical understandings of preg-
nancy. Such understanding involves a "thick" conception of pregnancy,
which demonstrates the importance of the social and cultural aspects of
pregnancy.
III. RECONSTRUCTING PREGNANCY
[I]n a dynamic model, law is always becoming. And the judge has a
legitimate role in determining what it is that the law will become.3 37
In order to give effect to the scope of pregnancy discrimination, in all
its ambiguity and complexity, the current understanding of pregnancy
must be replaced with a legal perspective that regards pregnancy, and its
material effects, as a culturally-contingent, socially constructed process.
This section provides perspectives on pregnancy that challenge the bi-
omedical model of pregnancy that is often employed by the judiciary. It
provides theoretical, historical, scientific, and experiential examples of
the ways in which pregnancy is constructed through social and cultural
forces. Then the article begins reconceiving pregnancy by articulating a
more responsive, multi-faceted conception of pregnancy for the purposes
of the PDA. It argues for expanding the legal conception of pregnancy
beyond the presumptions of biological essentialism that currently charac-
terize the current PDA jurisprudence and moving towards a more respon-
sive conception of pregnancy discrimination.
The meaning of pregnancy is dependent upon a variety of variable fac-
tors, situated in a particular social moment. This meaning is constructed
not only by the actions of the state, but also by a variety of institutional
and individual actors. 338 The meaning of pregnancy is responsive to these
particularities and also to the practices of various actors. As policies,
laws, and community attributes change, so does the meaning of preg-
nancy. 339 Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary sources, this part of
the article highlights how social and cultural forces have the power to
construct and shape the nature of pregnancy, our understanding of preg-
nancy, our experiences with pregnancy, and, ultimately, the medical, bio-
logical "realities" of pregnancy. This part reconstructs pregnancy to
transform it into a product of culture, social relations, and historical
forces.
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO BIOMEDICAL ESSENTIALISM
In the realm of federal antidiscrimination law, the social, cultural, and
relational aspects of pregnancy and physiological aspects of pregnancy,
which can encompass the period of fertility before conception through
337. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICF ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY ANI) TIE JU!ICIA[ PRO-
CESS 6 (1975).
338. RICKIE SOLINGER, PREGNANCY ANI) Powir.: A Siiowr HIsToiRY oF Ri-PROI)UC-
riVE POLITICS IN AMERICA 10-13 (2005).
339. Id. at 17.
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gestation and into the period during the fourth trimester, have often not
been recognized as pregnancy-based discrimination. 340 Instead, courts
have adopted a perspective that considers pregnancy through the lens of
biomedical essentialism. 341 This section undercuts biomedical essential-
ism as a lens for understanding the pregnant body and begins to recon-
struct the definition of pregnancy in ways that reveal the socially-
contingent, culturally-mediated nature of pregnant bodies.
Biomedical essentialism is an ideological perspective that privileges
medical and biological explanations and understandings of social phe-
nomenon.342 In privileging these perspectives, it naturalizes and univer-
salizes historically-contingent, cultural understandings of physical
processes, like pregnancy. It is a species of essentialism. 343 In its broadest
philosophical articulation, philosophers could describe essentialism as
"the belief that things have essential properties, properties that are neces-
sary to those things being what they are."'344 Biomedical essentialism (1)
reduces the process of pregnancy merely to physiological and biological
aspects, as defined by the medical community, (2) privileges the biologi-
cal and physiological aspects of pregnancy over its social and cultural as-
pects, and (3) treats biological and physiological aspects of pregnancy as
"natural," pre-cultural "facts" of universal human existence that exist
separately and apart from the social and cultural forces that give them
meaning. 345
Biomedical essentialism is embedded within the "common sense" ap-
proach to pregnancy, which presumes that pregnancy can be reduced to a
biological event that is limited to the approximately forty-week period
between conception and birth. From biological essentialism perspective,
pregnancy is a natural aspect of what happens to women and women
alone. It presumes that pregnancy is a trans-historical phenomenon that is
unchanging, asocial, and universal for all women across cultures and his-
torical periods. Like other forms of essentialist thinking,346 biological es-
340. See supra Part l.B.
341. See supra Part Il.B.
342. This notion of essentialism emerges from feminist theory literature and women's
studies, and does not necessarily address the philosophy of biology debates between Aris-
totelians and Logical Positivists as to whether species have essential attributes due to their
biological composition. E.g., Michael Devitt, Resurrecting Biological Essentialism, 75 PHIL.
Sci. 344, 346 (2008) (arguing for intrinsic essentialism, i.e., that "taxa have essences that
are, at least partly, intrinsic underlying properties"). Contra Marc Ereshefsky, What's
Wrong with the New Biological Essentialism, 77 Pini. Sci. 674, 674 (2010) (introducing a
variety of types of biological essentialism, yet arguing that there is no reason to adopt the
perspective of biological essentialism).
343. See Devitt, supra note 342, at 346.
344. Allison Stone, Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy, I J.
MORAL PHnI. 135, 138 (2004). Biomedical essentialism could be considered a species of
biological foundationalism-the idea that the material nature of the bodies, i.e. that wo-
men have vaginas and men have penises, reveals "some 'deeper' level of biological com-
monality ...." Linda Nicholson, Interpreting Gender, 20 J. WOMEN IN CULTURZE & SOC'Y
79, 79-82 (1994).
345. See Devitt, supra note 342, at 346; see also Ereshefsky, supra note 342, at 674.
346. For example, sexual essentialism presumes the natural, ahistorical, inevitably bio-
logical basis for sexuality. Rubin, supra note 16, at 267-92.
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sentialism entails the elision of the fact that pregnancy, as it is understood
and experienced by women in a particular context, entails important so-
cial practices and cultural norms that could be otherwise constructed. 347
B. PREGNANCY IN THEORY: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS
WITH PREGNANCY
This section problematizes the current legal practice of reducing preg-
nancy to its biological and physiological aspects by arguing that the bio-
logical and physiological aspects of pregnancy are not pre-cultural or
natural, and that even the materiality of the body and its biology cannot
be understood separately and apart from the cultural meanings and social
relations that construct them. Its analysis focuses on perspectives of preg-
nancy that emerge from feminist theory. Feminist theory aids in this ef-
fort by highlighting how pregnancy, even in its biological and medical
aspects, must be understood as social and relational in nature. This sec-
tion uses feminist theoretical frameworks, particularly feminist embodi-
ment theory, to provide one potential reconstruction of pregnancy as a
foundational framework for thinking about reforming our antidiscrimina-
tion law.
The importance of social, cultural, and economic constraints on struc-
turing pregnancy has been highlighted throughout feminist legal theory
literature. Authors engaging in this analysis may argue for a legal concep-
tion of pregnancy that addresses both the social or cultural aspects of
pregnancy and the physiological or biological aspects of pregnancy. What
has not typically been addressed in legal scholarship, with a few excep-
tions,348 is the ways in which the pregnant body is constructed by discur-
sive cultural frameworks and social relations, and how it is produced as a
material effect of power.
Drawing from various scholars in continental philosophy, anthropol-
ogy, political economy, and the feminist tradition, feminist embodiment
theory is a distinct branch of feminist theory349 that has the potential to
provide a productive analytical lens to define the scope and meaning of
pregnancy in the law. Embodiment theory has been utilized by some legal
347. The critique of relying on biomedical essentialism is not designed to discount the
experience of physiological or biological aspects of sex. After all, some feminists have ar-
gued that the examination of women's physiology and biology is not in itself essentialist.
CoLKI-1k, supra note 58, at 173-84. Anti-essentialist critiques can employ discussions of
physiology and biology in nuanced ways that highlight how so-called biological differences
exacerbate inequalities between men and women. Id. at 182 ("The meaning that society
ascribes to . . . biological differences may not be inevitable .... ").
348. Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood: A Consideration
of Abortion, 94 Micii. L. Riv. 371, 389-90 n.83 (1995) (claiming that the law constructs
bodies).
349. Saru M. Matambanadzo, Engendering Sex: Birth Certificates, Biology and the Body
in Anglo American Law, 13 CARDOZO WOMEN's L.J. 101, 120 (2006).
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scholars to discuss a variety of topics including disability, 350 gender, 35 1
biological sex,352 legal personhood, 3 53 corporations, 3 54 property the-
ory,3 55 and animal rights.356 With a few exceptions, 357 legal scholars have
yet to use the fresh perspectives provided by the embodiment theory to
interrogate the nature of pregnancy and the pregnant body.
Part of the objective of embodiment theory lies in critiquing the formu-
lation of philosophical questions about rights, subjectivity, personhood,
and citizenship, and revealing how the underlying presumptions and nor-
mative frameworks, which discursively produce bodies, persons, and
identities, are different in their effects. 358 In this effort, embodiment the-
ory takes on the underlying cultural commitment to the binary concep-
tion of the self. This binary conception of the self is often traced to
enlightenment thinking and attributed to Cartesian dualism, 359 which
persistently separates the self into the body, the material "real" aspect of
the person, and the mind or soul-the "true" self that is often conceptual-
ized as having an eternal existence. 360 In law, as in other Enlightenment
discourses, dualism is a paradigmatic framework for understanding not
only persons, subjectivities, desires, and identities, but also the larger
mechanisms of the universe, nature, and science.36 1 Dualism constitutes
"the assumption that there are two distinct, mutually exclusive, and mu-
tually exhaustive substances, mind and body, each of which inhabits its
350. Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn't "Just Right": The Entrenchment of the
Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181 (2008).
351. Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenome-
nology and Feminist Theory, 40 THE-ATRE J. 519 (1988).
352. Matambanadzo, supra note 37.
353. Jessica W. Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for Legal
Personhood, 59 HASTINis L.J. 369 (2008); Saru M. Matambanadzo, Embodying Vulnera-
bility: A Feminist Theory of the Person, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & Poi'y 45 (2012).
354. Anna Grear, Challenging Corporate 'Humanity': Legal Disembodiment, Embodi-
ment and Human Rights, 7 HuM. R-rs. L. REV. 511 (2007); Saru M. Matambanadzo, The
Body, Incorporated, 87 Tui. L. REV. 457 (2013).
355. HYDE, supra note 30; Halewood, supra note 30, at 1332-41 (arguing that
postmodern conceptions of embodiment provide a conceptual way to resist the commodifi-
cation of persons inherent in property based theories of the liberal subject); Meredith
Render, The Law of the Body, 62 EMORY L.J. 549 (2013).
356. Matambanadzo, supra note 37.
357. Hanigsberg, supra note 348; Siegel, supra note 59.
358. Matambanadzo, supra note 37.
359. Dualism can also be seen in the Greek Platonic tradition. See Elizabeth Spelman,
Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views, 8 FEMINIST STUr. 109, 123-28 (1982).
And in the Judeo Christian religious tradition, as well. See Matambanadzo, supra note 37
(manuscript at 63-64) (describing dualism as a common framework held by many philoso-
phers, including Kant, Aristotle and Plato and an aspect of Judeo Christianity).
360. Matambanadzo, supra note 37 (manuscript at 64).
361. ELIZABETi GROSZ, VOLATILE BoonES: TOWARD A CORPOREAL FEMINISM 13-14
(1994). Dualist perspectives often adopt a hierarchical way of thinking about bodies and
persons, which associates male persons with the mind and soul and female persons with the
body and its materiality. As Grosz argues, dualism that privileges the mind over the body is
often associated with patriarchal forms of dualism that privilege men over women. Id. Due
to their reproductive capacity and their sexuality, women are "presumed to be incapable of
men's achievements, being weaker, more prone to hormonal irregularities, intrusions and
unpredictabilities." Id. at 14; see also Matambanadzo, supra note 37 (manuscript at 123).
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own self-contained sphere. '362 As part of this adherence, the body is
often conceptualized as natural and "real"-existing in a pre-cultural state
that is not influenced by social aspects. 3 63 Embodiment theory, or femi-
nist theory of the body, challenges the notion that bodies, even in all their
physical materiality and biological "reality," exist apart from the dis-
course that creates them, the culture that gives them meaning, and the
social interactions that engender them. 364
From the perspective of feminist embodiment theory, the biological as-
pects of "sex" are socially constructed and mediated through culture. The
body and its materiality, like gender, is constructed through the same
types of acts and reiterations that construct gender.365 The biological na-
ture of sex is a type of regulatory ideal, one that defines the intelligibility
of individual subjects and signals belonging in the social order.366 For this
reason, "[t]he materiality of the body is a product of construction .. .
there is no Eden when it comes to the body. There is no going back to the
'pre-constructed' state of the body," outside of language and culture, for
the "body is only possible through construction. '36 7 Instead, the way we
conceptualize the body is a product of varied cultural understandings, in-
formed by the larger meaning of what it is to be a man or a woman and
shaped by gender norms. 368 Feminist embodiment theory, in its construc-
tion of theoretical conceptions of the body, has been influenced by the
work of Michel Foucault. For Foucault, the body, even in the realness of
its materiality, is an effect of the materiality of power.369 He notes that,
"nothing is more material, physical, corporal than the exercise of power"
upon the body.370 Judith Butler builds on Foucault's insight, explaining
the complex way in which culture and the social (through discourse) ma-
terializes the body as an effect of power:
For discourse to materialize a set of effects, "discourse" itself must be
understood as complex and convergent chains in which "effects" are
vectors of power. In this sense, what is constituted by discourse is not
fixed in or by discourse, but becomes the condition and occasion for
further action. 371
It is important to note, however, that the materialization of a set of
effects, i.e. the body and our understanding of it, does not constitute an
unbound process where any possibility is open.372 Not all discursive itera-
362. GROSZ, supra note 361, at 6.
363. Id.
364. Matambanadzo, supra note 37.
365. JuIri BUTLiR, BoDIEs THAT MArIFER: ON Ilu DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "Sjx"
146 (1993).
366. Id. at 1.
367. Matambanadzo, supra note 37 (manuscript at 125).
368. Nicholson, supra note 344, at 83.
369. MICIIFiE FOUCAULT, POWER1KNOW!I.IEx: SELECTD INTIERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 1972-77 (1980).
370. Id. at 57-58.




tions can be materialized and not all discourse has the power to engender
materialized effects. 373 Instead, the materialization of discourse is circum-
scribed, simultaneously, by the power of discourse to constrain what can
be recognized and understood through the domain of intelligibility.
374
What is intelligible, i.e., what can be materialized, is effectively circum-
scribed by the same discourse that is materialized as an effect of
power.375 For this reason, the effects produced in the materialization of
discourse are unstable and are never complete in their reiteration of the
discursive norm.376
Embodiment theory provides a unique perspective on pregnancy that
bridges the gaps between various feminist theories, including feminist
phenomenology and clinical perspectives from midwifery and maternal
nursing and law, and reveals how discursive forces shape even the materi-
ality of biology as we understand it. The insight that pregnancy is socially
constructed emerges, in part, from the perspective of queer theory and
embodiment theory, which highlights how the body has been constructed
through discursive acts and interventions. 377 The tradition of embodiment
theory, drawn from the work of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler,
reveals how the material realness of bodies is not attributable to nature
and does not emerge from a pre-discursive space. 378 It does not exist sep-
arately and apart from cultural and social relations, and its current articu-
lation is dependent upon legal, cultural, and social powers and
expectations. Instead, the material realness of the body itself is a product
of culture and discourse. 379
Embodiment theory reveals how the materiality of the pregnant body,
similar to the materiality of other bodies, is rendered real and intelligible
by the discursive processes and practices that produce it. Discursive
processes, which entail social and cultural factors, emerge from continual
interactions and iterations. Pregnancy is a profoundly cultural and social
process, one that is constructed, in part, by often unspoken ideological
commitments. It is produced as a material effect of power. The pregnant
body, as experienced by individuals, studied by researchers, regulated by
the state, and managed by the medical establishment, is a product of
these institutional forces.
1. Performatively Pregnant: Constructing the Pregnant Body
The pregnant body can be constructed or concealed through communi-




376. Id. at 187-88.
377. Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in LANGUAGE, COUNTIR-MM-
ORY, PRAcrICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 139, 145 (Donald F. Bouchard &
Sherry Simon, trans., 1977); GAYLE SALAMON, ASSUMING A BoDY: TRANSGENDIER AND
RiHTORICS OF MATERIALITY (2010); BuTi'uit, supra note 365.




ous in the first trimester, is known through the communications shared
with friends, family, partners, employers, and strangers. When one de-
clares, "I am eight weeks pregnant" to an employer, friend, or partner,
the relational understanding of the body shifts. The pregnant body begins
to take shape and form. As the pregnancy continues, clothing and posture
might contribute to the iterations, as one alters his or her physicality to
demonstrate pregnancy. Similarly, the body is not necessarily intelligible
as a pregnant body at the moment of conception, or upon the first day of
the missed period, or upon the moment when the early pregnancy test
(EPT) reveals a plus or a minus. The body becomes a pregnant body
through the iteration and reiteration of communication. Over weeks,
months, and trimesters, individuals often communicate their pregnancy to
others through social, cultural, and physical interaction, increasing the
recognition and understanding of the body as a pregnant body. The way
one walks, dresses, talks, sits, and stands communicates the status of a
pregnant person.
The pregnant body and its materiality cannot simply be reduced to bio-
logical aspects of pregnancy because the pregnant body can be concealed,
obscured, or ignored. The pregnant body can be concealed, by accident or
intention, through silence or omission.380 The pregnant body can be fur-
ther obscured by the refusal of others to regard one as appropriately
pregnant. This normative force can be seen in viewing how discursive
practices define and delineate the realm of intelligibly pregnant bodies.
Even if an individual's body might be pregnant according to biological
standards, the cultural and social forces shape who we regard as appropri-
ately pregnant for the purposes of recognition and protection. 381 Individ-
uals may be too young or too old to be regarded as intelligibly pregnant.
They might be too butch or too masculine to be regarded as being intelli-
gibly pregnant. Furthermore, as many women of size and disabled women
realize, they may be too disabled or overweight to be regarded as intelli-
gibly pregnant. In contrast, some non-pregnant women, due to cultural
norms about what a women's body should look like and how it should
appear to others, may face the problem of constantly being regarded as
pregnant even when they are not. Women of size who are not pregnant
often drolly (and not so drolly) recount narratives where they are asked
about the status of their pregnancy, how far along they are, or what gen-
380. An entire reality television genre has been built around stories of individuals who
did not know they were pregnant. See, e.g., I Didn't Know I Was Pregnant (TLC television
broadcast 2009-2011).
381. Pregnancy, like reproduction more generally, is constructed through ideologically
laden notions of who is appropriately or inappropriately engaged in the process. See Lisa
C. lkemoto, The In/Fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1007,
1008-09 (1995) [hereinafter lkemoto, The InFertile] (examining how reproductive technol-
ogy functions differently for women and men on the basis of race, class, and sexual orienta-
tion); see also Lisa C. lkemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the
Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mind-
set of Law, 53 01to ST. L.J. 1205 (1992) [hereinafter lkemoto, Perfect Pregnancy] (discuss-
ing the idea and practice of controlling women with regard to conception, gestation, and
childbirth in a manner which reflects dominant cultural notions of motherhood).
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der child they are having. Some women, in response, may brashly declare,
"I'm not pregnant thanks. Just fat."
Like gender, pregnancy is often constituted by discourse and is commu-
nicated through a set of iterations, repetitions, and gestures. Acts, ges-
tures, and words communicate one's status as pregnant or not pregnant to
other individuals. A woman pensively stroking her out-thrust belly on the
bus with an "Eating for Two" shirt on proud display communicates a very
different message than her seat mate, a younger woman (who conceived
on the same day) slouching behind a sweatshirt and oversized sweater,
concealing her "condition" from prying eyes. How a pregnancy is dis-
closed, when it is disclosed, and continued signals around pregnancy dis-
closure, create the meaning of pregnancy through communication.
Pregnancy may even have an important performative dimension, as the
ways in which people communicate the status of being pregnant or not
pregnant has an impact on its meaning, salience, and visibility. Someone
who has become pregnant after a long period of fertility counseling and
intervention may prominently display her pregnancy, signaling it with
clothing or gestures, physically taking up more room, and broadcasts ges-
tation and pregnancy clearly in conversations. Another individual who,
even at a later stage, is trying to hide the pregnancy from an employer
may attempt to conceal physical changes, may take up less physical space,
and engage in efforts to minimize the appearance of pregnancy. When
asked, such an individual may disavow pregnancy, signaling that any per-
ceived physical changes are the result of weight gain, water retention,
stress, or some other cause.
The pregnant body's reality, however, may also be precarious in nature.
In order to stay pregnant and maintain the pregnancy in the United
States, the pregnant body is subject to constant supervision by medical
health professionals and the constant monitoring of bio-technologies that
continue to affirm the existence of a pregnancy and one's status as preg-
nant. Fetal ultrasounds, which capture and display the sound of fetal
heart beats and images of a viable fetus, are one example of such technol-
ogies. The necessity of this monitoring is perceived as essential in the U.S.
Even when health insurance is rationed to exclude many low-wage work-
ers, poor adults, and poor children, states have adopted free medical care
and monitoring for pregnant persons.38
2
While the physiological effects of pregnancy are often experienced by
pregnant persons as being "natural" or as connecting them to some pre-
cultural state, often this experience is mediated through social interac-
tions with peers, medical authorities, family members, and even perfect
382. Health Coverage if You're Pregnant or Plan to Get Pregnant, HEALT (CARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/what-if-im-pregnant-or-plan-to-get-pregnant [https://perma.cc/
AQP9-MTH5]. This health care, however, is often used to regulate poor women and wo-
men of color. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women
of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HAiRv. L. Riv. 1419, 1430-32, 1445
(1991); see also Priscilla A. Ocen, Punishing Pregnancy: Race, Incarceration, and the Shack-
ling of Pregnant Prisoners, 100 CAL. L. Rav. 1239, 1254-55 (2012).
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strangers. Often, pregnancy is characterized as the natural result of heter-
osexual unions, a natural and essential state of being a woman, and as a
natural necessity for the continuation of human life and the architecture
of society. After all, human beings must reproduce, and it is human fe-
males, i.e. women or mothers, who "have babies." This perspective
presumes that pregnancy, and its cultural, social, and biological meaning,
remains the result of an ahistorical, universal "fact" of the world and can-
not be changed. In spite of those who urge the judiciary to structure its
determinations about pregnancy with deference to biology, 38 3 there is no
indication that notions of what is perceived to be "natural" at a particular
time and in a particular context should drive public policy.3 4 Although
pregnancy is generally characterized as a natural event existing apart
from social relations, pregnancy should be understood as culturally con-
structed and historically situated. Given historical contingencies and tech-
nological realities, there may be some aspects of pregnancy that cannot
currently be changed. At this time, pregnancy has physiological and bio-
logical aspects that are experienced by an individual with a uterus, be it a
man or a woman, in order for the reproduction of the species to occur.
Technology has not advanced to the point where artificial wombs remove
the role of humans from reproduction. 385
For this reason, pregnancy should not be understood merely as a "natu-
ral" condition existing separately and apart from sociocultural forces.
Further, defining pregnancy in law from a perspective that starts with bio-
logical essentialism is misguided because it fails to properly account for
the relationship between the "sex" aspects of pregnancy (i.e., biological,
physiological aspects) and "gender" aspects of pregnancy (i.e., the social,
cultural, discursive, psychological aspects). However, the way in which
pregnancy is mediated through medical discourse, cultural norms, and so-
cial relations demonstrates that the meaning of pregnancy, its scope, du-
ration, and consequences are a product of sociocultural customs and
engagements. The notion that pregnancy is natural also reduces its scope
and meaning to the biological period of pregnancy, which spans the pe-
riod from conception to gestation and birth. This limited perspective on
pregnancy disregards the experiences of many women and the expertise
of those who care for pregnant women and their infants. 386
383. BROWNF, supra note 68, at 68 (arguing biology explains differences in wages and
employment outcomes); Browne, supra note 71; Epstein, supra note 68, at 998 (arguing
biological sex differences can explain patterns in the labor market); Purvis, supra note 35
(manuscript at 3-5, 14, 48) (discussing how criminal law, family law, and other legal sys-
tems interlock to regulate motherhood and the experience of pregnancy).
384. Mary Anne Case, Of Richard Epstein and Other Radical Feminists, 18 HARV. J.L.
& Pun. Poi'Y 369, 375-78 (1995); Hendricks, supra note 23, at 365 (noting that legal signif-
icance does not necessarily arise from nature and that "[m]uch of our legal and social
structure is devoted to suppressing what appear to be natural impulses").
385. See Hendricks, supra note 23, at 330 n.2 (arguing "that men are free to develop
technology to become mothers"); see also Jennifer S. Hendricks, Not of Woman Born: A
Scientific Fantasy, 62 CASE W. RES. L. Rj~v. 399 (2012).
386. Matambanadzo, supra note 13.
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2. Pregnant with Social and Cultural Meaning
Our understanding of pregnancy is a product of what theorists like
Deleuze and Guitarri call territorial assemblages. 38 7 The unified concept
of pregnancy emerges from an amalgam of discourse, practices, and be-
haviors stemming from legitimated and non-legitimated actors. As such,
pregnancy, as a product of discourse, practice, and behavior, entails so-
cial, psychological, and physiological aspects. This shifting meaning of
pregnancy can be revealed by engaging in a cursory inquiry into the an-
thropology and history of pregnancy. Such an inquiry reveals how at dif-
ferent times and in different cultural contexts pregnancy has been
constructed in different ways. Pregnancy has been presented as a histori-
cal, pre-cultural phenomenon-something that female human beings
have always done and will always do. It is a process with social, psycho-
logical, and physiological components. Its meaning and its limits are
shaped by social forces. Medical discourse is one social force that shapes
the meaning of pregnancy. For example, in the mid-twentieth century, the
medical establishment treated pregnancy as an illness or a state of being
unwell.388 The sick pregnant body has been routinely categorized as a
medical problem requiring extensive intervention and healing. 38 9 In the
1970s, this paradigm shifted, partly through the work of midwives, mater-
nal nurses, and feminist activists, and this concept of pregnancy as an ill-
ness was replaced by a notion that pregnancy was a "natural" state for
women that required facilitation in many cases, not heavy-handed
intervention.
Although the law perceives pregnancy primarily in its biological and
physiological aspects, pregnancy should be understood as a socially con-
structed phenomenon. Social and cultural perceptions-drawn not only
from the law, but also from popular culture-shape how the material ef-
fects of pregnancy, i.e. biology and physiology, are understood and exper-
ienced. When one argues that pregnancy, like gender, is performative,
one is not arguing that pregnancy is neither real, nor powerful, nor mate-
rial. Pregnancy is not a condition created by the human will, responsive to
the volition of individuals, nor is pregnancy merely linguistic in nature.
Instead, as an interdisciplinary engagement with pregnancy reveals, it is
a complex product of social and cultural aspects as well as biological and
physiological aspects that are mediated through social and cultural
frameworks. The biological and social aspects of pregnancy are co-consti-
tuting in a foundational way. Social and cultural aspects of pregnancy
shape individual experience and mediate the biological and physiological
387. George E. Marcus & Erkan Saka, Assemblage, 23 TiHEORY, CULTURE & Soc'Y
101, 101-04 (2006).
388. The medical model of pregnancy presumes a technological understanding of the
body in which the male body is the default standard. BARBARA K. ROriHMAN, IN LAB3OR;:
WOMEN AND POWER IN TFHE BIRTHIPLACE 36-39 (1982). This means that often normal or
even healthy aspects of the female reproductive process are treated as deviant illnesses to
be managed and treated. Id.
389. GEORGE RII-ZEiF., THE McDONALDIZATION OF SOCIETY 134-40 (2010).
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"reality" of pregnancy. Furthermore, the cultural presumptions around
pregnancy assert a powerful force in law, creating a normative notion of
pregnancy as a biological or physiological phenomenon experienced only
by people with female reproductive organs. 390 These cultural presump-
tions dictate not only how pregnancy is broadly understood within preg-
nancy discrimination cases, but also how individuals filing pregnancy
discrimination suits should intimately experience pregnancy.
Pregnancy, for this reason, can be considered pregnant with meaning.
The ways in which the physical symptoms and so-called biological reali-
ties of pregnancy are shaped, experienced, and given meaning happens
through discourse and social practice-they are socially situated. The
meaning and experience of pregnancy is contingent on being pregnant
during a particular time (e.g., the early twenty-first century or late nine-
teenth century),391 in a particular place (e.g., rural northern Louisiana,
East Los Angles, Southfields, London, etc.), 392 and while occupying a
particular social and economic position (e.g., race, gender, tribal affilia-
tion, socioeconomic class, sexual orientation, disability status). 393 Further,
one's familial status (being pregnant as a minor daughter as compared to
being pregnant as a married wife, or being pregnant as a single woman)
and one's professional position (being a pregnant stay at home mother
compared to being a pregnant woman working in a warehouse compared
to being a pregnant woman working as a lawyer) significantly shape the
context and experience of pregnancy and its meaning. The ways in which
women discover their pregnancies (for example, through an early test in a
doctor's office during the first weeks, after months of spotty periods
through an at home pregnancy test, or at the last minute when going into
labor) and monitor their pregnancies (for example, pregnancy with a sig-
nificant degree of medical intervention will be experienced differently
than pregnancy under the supervision of a midwife in a traditional soci-
ety, or a pregnancy that goes undiscovered until shortly before delivery)
also contribute to the communication of a pregnancy.
While pregnant persons undergo a physiological process of reproduc-
tion that has biological elements, pregnancy cannot be accounted for in
law by reducing it to the elements emerging from its "real physiological"
or "real biological" elements. The "reality" of pregnancy is constructed
and mediated through the discursive construction of pregnant persons,
390. Not all of these individuals are women. See Beatie v. Beatie, 333 P.3d 754, 755-56
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (providing legal recognition of a particular pregnant man's male sex
after giving birth to three children).
391. RICHARD W. WFrTZ & DoiI-iy C. WIrrz, LYING-IN: A HISTIORY OF' CI-iiu
BIRTH IN AMERICA 109, 127 (Expanded ed., Yale Univ. Press 1989) (1977).
392. Frances E. Korbin, The American Midwife Controversy: A Crisis of Professional-
ization, in CHILDBIR II: CHANGING IDEAS AND PRAC-I'ICIS IN BRITAIN AND AMIE RICA 1600
-10 T111 PRZSENT 96-109 (Philip K. Wilson ed., 1996) (demonstrating that women in rural
areas utilized midwives more frequently than those in the cities).
393. Marcia P. Harrigan & Suzanne M. Baldwin, Conception, Pregnancy, and Child-
birth, in DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR: TijIz CHANGING LIFE COURSE 39, 51-52
(Elizabeth D. Hutchison ed., 2008).
[Vol. 69
Reconstructing Pregnancy
and pregnant bodies, as possessing a particular set of vulnerabilities and
capabilities. This construction means that pregnancy does not exist sepa-
rately and apart from social interactions. It is mediated through cultural
processes that construct individuals as pregnant and accord value to some
pregnancies while denigrating and devaluing others.
394
C. BIOMEDICAL PARADOXES AND PREGNANCY
Even in the realm of medical and scientific discourse, pregnancy is un-
derstood in contradictory ways with shifting meanings. It is not an objec-
tive event with a clear beginning, middle, and end that is identical from
pregnancy to pregnancy. Instead, it is a uniquely experienced process
whereby an individual pregnant woman undergoes physical, emotional
and psychological growth and change. Although conception could be con-
ceptualized as the beginning of pregnancy, for many individuals who are
undergoing infertility treatments, the experience of becoming and being
pregnant begin long before that moment. For others who might not con-
sciously choose to become pregnant, the beginning of the pregnancy may
start with a missed period, a positive pregnancy result or even an ultra-
sound image of the fetus. The beginning of pregnancy from an experien-
tial perspective is not the moment of conception, but instead for the
individual who actually is pregnant can occur before conception or after
conception.
The beginning of pregnancy is not a clear-cut event that can be easily
reduced to a particular starting point. The social beginning of pregnancy
emerges as a combination of a woman's individual discovery of her preg-
nancy and her subsequent disclosure of her condition to others. Even the
physiological aspects of pregnancy, grounded in biology, have an amor-
phous starting point that makes it difficult to pinpoint when a pregnancy
begins. As two commentators reveal, examining the scientific literature,
the beginning of pregnancy can be hard to define:
Depending, therefore, on how each of these terms is defined, "the
moment of conception" will vary in duration. If we define conception
as if it were fertilization of the egg, it involves a minimum of seven-
teen to eighteen hours after male ejaculation. If we use the biologi-
cally accurate definition of conception as our guide, the "moment" of
conception (implantation) is a week-long process. 395
The medical definition of pregnancy is also contested. 396 Although the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) dictate
that "[p]regnancy is established when a fertilized egg has been implanted
394. See Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, supra note 381, at 1008-09 (discussing how reproduc-
tion by poor women of color-the "too fertile"-and gays and lesbians-the "dysfertile"-
is accorded a different social value than those regarded as appropriately fertile).
395. Elizabeth Spahn & Barbara Andrade, Mis-conceptions: The Moment of Concep-
tion in Religion, Science, and Law, 32 U.S.F. L. Ri-v. 261, 265 (1998).
396. Rachel Benson Gold, The Implications of Defining When a Woman is Pregnant, 8




in the wall of a woman's uterus[,]" states define pregnancy in diverse
ways.397 Some state laws adopt the definition of pregnancy that requires
fertilization and implantation, while other states define the beginning of
pregnancy with the fertilization of the egg.398
The amorphous temporal nature of pregnancy is documented by wo-
men's experiences with their pregnancies. 399 The beginning of pregnancy
is experienced and perceived differently by individual women undergoing
the process. 40° While fertilization, implantation, or quickening might
mark significant medical milestones, the beginning of the pregnancy as a
social, emotional, or physiological experience might come before or after
these events.40 1 As Helen Marshall claims in her discussion of feminist
phenomenology and pregnancy, when one becomes pregnant easily and
unintentionally, the starting point for the pregnancy as an experience
might vary:
My own pregnancy began biologically at some time... but began for
me at a different time .... I had a positive test on a DIY kit, and I
said doubtfully "I think I'm pregnant?" My partner had no trouble
with this statement-as far as he was concerned it was instantly a
fact .... I (in relation to/opposition to my body) knew I was pregnant
when I wrote that fact to my closest female friend. As far as other
members of my network were concerned, my pregnancy seems to
have started at the time they first heard about it .... 402
In another example, Amy Klein, who writes a blog chronicling her
struggles with infertility for the New York Times, discusses how precari-
ous the beginning of a pregnancy can be, even after the fertilization of the
embryo. 40 3 In one blog, entitled, A Little Bit Pregnant: The Numbers
Game, Klein notes that even after the egg has been fertilized and the
embryo placed inside of one's womb, there is still another step that must
occur in order for an individual to be considered pregnant: implanta-
tion.40 4 Implantation is necessary for the pregnancy to be viable.40 5 As
Klein notes, "getting those two pink lines on the pregnancy test stick is
not the same as actually having a 'viable' pregnancy. '406 As Klein waits to
become pregnant after conception, submitting herself to numerous blood
tests measuring her Human Chorionic Gonadotropin (HCG) hormone
397. Id. at 7.
398. Id. at 7-8.
399. Helen Marshall, Our Bodies Ourselves: Why We Should Add Old Fashioned Em-









405. 45 C.F.R § 46.202(f) (2015) (recognizing pregnancy as "the period of time from
implantation to delivery").
406. Klein, supra note 403.
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levels, she details her experience with being a "little bit pregnant," and
then losing that pregnancy before the ninth week after fertilization. 40 7
The process of pregnancy, similarly, does not necessarily end with birth
at the end of gestation.40 8 The process of pregnancy, which can involve
the process of infertility treatments and more than forty weeks of gesta-
tion, often unwinds after the birth of an infant from a period that lasts
between eight weeks to six months. 40 9 Women who have been pregnant
do not cease to be physically and hormonally affected by pregnancy
merely because they have given birth.410 The physical aspects of preg-
nancy continue after the birth of the child.411 Like the end of a partner-
ship organization, the end of gestation requires a winding up period
where many of the physical aspects of pregnancy continue slowly to re-
cede, like the low tide.412
Pregnancy is often treated in antidiscrimination law like a biological
event with a clear end point.4 13 In my previous work, I have highlighted
how the boundaries of pregnancy, particularly at its end point, are less
than rigid.4 14 Drawing on the work of midwives and maternal nurses-
individuals who devote their working lives to caring for pregnant wo-
men-I introduced the concept of the fourth trimester to antidiscrimina-
tion law. 415 The fourth trimester is the three to six month period after the
birth during which the pregnancy unwinds. 416 It centers on the social,
emotional, relational, and psychological aspects of pregnancy and recog-
nizes that the end of pregnancy is not defined by labor and birth, but by
the winding up of the pregnancy process.41 7 Even the physiological as-
pects of pregnancy require a period slowly winding up during this time
after birth.41 8 The concept of the fourth trimester highlights how preg-
nancy is less of an event and more of a process where the beginning,
middle, and end of the pregnancy is highly individualized and more amor-
phous than common lay wisdom dictates. 41 9 Pregnancy, for the purposes
of discrimination law, should be understood to include not only the pe-
riod of gestation but, depending upon the circumstances, preconception,
gestation, and even the "fourth trimester" period after the birth of the
baby.
The fourth trimester concept also highlights the reality that pregnancy
must be characterized by its multiplicity-i.e., its social, psychological,
407. Id.
408. Matambanadzo, supra note 37 (manuscript at 117).
409. Id. (manuscript at 128-29).
410. Id. (manuscript at 128-29).
411. Id. (manuscript at 128-29 n.42).
412. Id. (manuscript at 180) (discussing how pregnancy unwinds through a process of
recovery and restoration).
413. Matambanadzo, supra note 13, at 138-39.
414. Id. at 128-29.
415. Id. at 117, 124-25.
416. Id. at 124-25.
417. Id. at 128-29.
418. Id. at 131.
419. Id. at 166-70.
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and relational aspects. 420 It cannot merely be reduced to biology and tem-
porally located within the forty weeks between conception and the end of
gestation.42 ' The process of pregnancy entails social, emotional, psycho-
logical, physical, and biological aspects that often begin before gestation
and end sometime after the birth of the child. 422 An antidiscrimination
regime which reduces pregnancy and pregnancy discrimination to its bio-
logical and physiological elements without regard for how discourse, so-
cial relations, and cultural norms shape pregnancy will obscure
discrimination by employers that should be actionable under law, and fail
to protect pregnant workers from discriminatory treatment.42 3
Feminist philosophy, particularly the experience-oriented specialty of
phenomenology, provides an account of pregnancy that does not conform
to the rigid notion that pregnancy is a forty-week temporal "event. '424
Like Adrienne Rich, many feminists do not regard the emergence of the
fetus from the mother's body and the subsequent "separation" of the
mother and child as abrupt events that end at birth.425 Instead, mothers
and children emerge as separate, autonomous beings in a gradual process
where independence unfolds slowly between two beings that had been
intimately interdependent before. 426
Another space in which the biomedical realities of pregnancy remain
contested and complex lies in the realm of viability. The concept of fetal
viability, which is the cornerstone of the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade
jurisprudence, has come under increased scrutiny. 427 Although character-
ized as a biological "fact" by some,428 the viability standard has come
under criticism by commentators429 and attack from state legislatures.430
420. Id. at 166-70, 181.
421. Id. at 167.
422. Id. at 166-70.
423. Id. at 169-70.
424. Lisa Guenther, The Birth of Sexual Difference: A Feminist Response to Merleau-
Ponty, in COMING TO Lin: PiL-osomI-ilES OF PREGNANCY, CIIIIIRTH AND MOTHEIRING
88, 103 (Sarah LaChance Adams & Caroline R. Lundquist eds., 2013).
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (affirming the
viability standard as the point where the balance of the state's interests outweigh that of
the mother's); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (determining that the state's interest
in preserving fetal life reaches its "compelling" point at viability).
428. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 553-54 (1989) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) (stating that viability "reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal
development").
429. Critiques of the viability standard and its presumptions have come from feminist
scholars who question its underlying presumption of fetal separateness. See, e.g., Hen-
dricks, supra note 385, at 444 (revealing how the artificial womb fantasy fails to recognize
the interconnectedness of mother and fetus); Rona K. Kitchen, Holistic Pregnancy: Re-
jecting the Theory of the Adversarial Mother, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN's L.J. 207, 241-250
(2015). Critiques have come from the right as well. Randy Beck, The Essential Holding of
Casey: Rethinking Viability, 75 UMKC L. REV. 713, 735-40 (2007) (arguing that the viabil-
ity standard should be abandoned).
430. A number of states have already tried to bypass the problem of viability by focus-
ing legislative efforts on preventing fetal pain. See I. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal
Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the Constitution, 39 J.L. Mi-D. & E-rincs 235, 235 (2011).
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The concept of fetal viability was of little concern to legal scholars or
advocates of reproductive justice, in part, because it began as a technical
term used by scientists and obstetricians.43 1 After viability was adopted as
a legal threshold for the state's emerging interests in fetal life, activists
concerned with reproductive choice began to use it as a rallying cry.
4 32
However, as technology has improved, the line where viability begins for
a fetus has shifted.433 According to Solinger:
Fifty years ago, embryologists and neo-natalists were in general
agreement that viability - the capacity of the fetus to live outside of
the womb - was reached after approximately thirty-four weeks of
gestation. Over the decades, scientific advances have pushed the date
of fetal viability back, so that today . . . a fetus of twenty-seven or
twenty-eight weeks gestation can be rendered viable.
434
In the United States, biomedical models of pregnancy have undergone
various changes in relationships, to social and scientific changes in cul-
ture. For example, the medical treatment of pregnancy has undergone
various historically located shifts that changed the meaning of "good
care" and the standards for how women experience pregnancy and give
birth. In the United States, during the colonial period, the process of giv-
ing birth was social, and women depended on the care and assistance of
other women during pregnancy and childbirth.435 This process included
not only immediate family members and the midwife, but also women
from the community who were not related to the family and who received
no monetary compensation for their help.436 In the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, many upper class women began to utilize the services of
male doctors in delivery and childbirth. 437 At the dawn of the twentieth
century, midwives attended roughly half of the births in the United
States. 438 For African American women, or women in rural communities,
the use of midwives was even higher.4 39 During the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, professionals in the fields of obstetrics and nurs-
ing engaged in a campaign to eliminate midwifery as the dominant form
medical care for women during pregnancy and childbirth.440 During this
time, birth moved from the home to hospitals and many women under-




435. Richard and Dorothy Wertz call this "social childbirth." WiRW17 & WrRTZ, supra
note 391, at 2.
436. Id. at 4.
437. Id. 29-30.
438. Katy Dawley, The Campaign to Eliminate the Midwife, 100 AM. J. NURSING 50, 50
(2000).
439. Korbin, supra note 392, at 96-109.
440. Id. These campaigns often linked midwives with the provision of incompetent and
inadequate care or associated them primarily with abortions. Leslie J. Reagan, Linking




went "twilight sleep," avoiding the experience of labor.441
At the dawn of the twentieth century, medical discourse, according to
many feminists, has constructed a conceptual regime in which pregnancy
is understood through the lens of risk management and mediated through
the consumption of health care services.442 Pregnancy is no longer "natu-
ral" but becomes "medical. ' 443 As sociologist Barabara Katz Rothman
has revealed in her examination of the process and experience of birth in
the United States, the modern conception of childbirth, located outside of
the home and in the hospital, is mediated by medical intervention.444 The
medical model of pregnancy, which can be credited with ensuring the
health and well-being of many women after their pregnancies, often
treats pregnancy like an illness that should be cured through the medical
intervention of drugs to alleviate symptoms, the introduction of technolo-
gies to regulate progress, and the use of drugs and surgery to efficiently
bring pregnancy to an end.445 And many sought an increasingly medical-
ized birth, scheduling planned inductions or cesarean sections in hospi-
tals.446 Then in the mid-twentieth century, women, both inside the
feminist community and defiantly outside of it,447 began to seek a variety
of options, including the ability to choose a midwife to provide care dur-
ing pregnancy. Many women sought what they defined as a "natural"
childbirth, an experience free (in varying degrees) from drugs, epidurals,
episiotomy cuts, and other interventions.448 Some women sought such an
441. By 1960, 96% of births occurred in hospitals. Neal Devitt, The Transition from
Home to Hospital Birth in the United States, 1930-1960, 4 BIRTH & FAMILY J. 47, 47, 57
(1977) (arguing that based upon the evidence, home birth was not less safe than hospital
birth during this time period); Nancy S. Dye, History of Childbirth in America, 6 SIGNS 97,
107-08 (1980).
442. Laura Purdy, Medicalization, Medical Necessity, and Feminist Medicine, 15
BIoErTInAcs 248, 248-49 (2001).
443. Id. at 251.
444. Rothman argues that this intervention removes the mother from the medical pro-
cess in important and profound ways. Rothman, supra note 447, at 156-57.
445. IRIS MARION YOUNG, THjROWING LIKE A GIRL AND OTHI-niz ESSAYS IN FEMINIST
PILosOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY 169 (1990); Dianna C. Parry, "We Wanted a Birth Expe-
rience, Not a Medical Experience": Exploring Canadian Women's Use of Midwifery, 29
HEAUTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT'L, 784, 784-86 (2008).
446. BARBARA KATZ RonIMAN, RECRE'ATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AN]) TECHi-
NOLOGY IN PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 40-41 (1989). At the dawn of the twenty-first century,
elective cesarean section births have increased by 43.6%. Susan F. Meikle et al., A National
Estimate of the Elective Primary Cesarean Delivery Rate, 105 Ons-nTriicS & GYNECOLOGY
751, 751, 753 (2005) (estimating that primary, elective cesarean section births rose from
19.7% of all deliveries in 1994 to 28.3% in 2001).
447. The home birth movement is extremely diverse, encompassing women who adopt
various political, religious, and cultural perspectives. See Pamela E. Klassen, Sacred Mater-
nities and Postbiomedical Bodies: Religion and Nature in Contemporary Home Birth, 26
SIGNS 775, 776-77 (2001) (defining the "home birth movement" as a "loose coalition of
birthing women, midwives .... childbirth instructors, doulas .... activists in the women's
health movement, and some doctors").
448. WERTZ & WERrz, supra note 391, at 178, 181, 195. Although the origins of this
movement can be placed before the 1960s, the alternative birth movement was boosted by
activism and information produced during the "second wave" of feminism in the United
States. Katherine Beckett, Choosing Cesarean: Feminism and the Politics of Childbirth in
the United States, 6 FEMINISTI TinLORY 251, 253-54 (2005). It is important to understand
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experience outside of hospitals, seeking instead to give birth at birthing
centers or at home.449 Many women and health workers adopt a different
model of pregnancy that conceptualizes the process as a "natural" state of
wellness, which requires only the assistance of partners, family members,
and a midwife. 450 This is often done outside of a hospital with minimal
technological and medical intervention and no painkillers.
D. EXPERIENTIAL ASPECTS OF PREGNANCY
This section analyzes the process of pregnancy, deploying embodiment
theory to reveal one way to resolve the intractable tensions that often
render both the biological or physiological aspects of pregnancy and the
social or cultural aspects of pregnancy resistant to legal remedies. The
adoption of a "plain meaning" conception of pregnancy, which reduces
the process of pregnancy to its physiological and biological aspects, ob-
scures pregnancy as something other than a pre-cultural phenomenon.
Pregnancy, even in our understanding of its materiality (i.e. biological
and physiological aspects), cannot be understood separately and apart
from its social and historical contingencies. While pregnant persons un-
dergo the physiological and biological processes of pregnancy, these
processes are shaped, understood, and made intelligible through the dis-
course and technologies of power deployed by both individuals and insti-
tutions. The very experience of pregnancy itself reveals how the pregnant
body does not exist in a biological realm, close to nature and apart from
legal, political, social, and cultural forces. After all, biological information
is the product of a process of data collection and meaning that is shaped
by cultural values and perspectives. Pregnancy generally, like individual
experiences of pregnancy, is an experiential and cultural process shaped
by various social interactions and cultural institutions. 451
1. Pregnancy is Both Individual and Relational in Nature
In the United States, pregnancy has been culturally characterized as an
that the notion of a "natural" childbirth experience or pregnancy encompasses a variety of
methods for giving birth and a variety of stances on intervention. Chris Cosans, The Mean-
ing of Natural Childbirth, 47 PERSP. Btoi-oOy & MtED. 266, 268-69 (2004) (discussing vari-
ous "natural" childbirth methods that attempt to work with the body's processes and
rhythms). Also, the notion of "natural child" birth stems from culturally contingent social
notions of how the process of pregnancy and birth should be managed. See Becky Mans-
field, The Social Nature of Natural Childbirth, 66 Soc. Sci. & MiD. 1084, 1086 (2008) (ar-
guing that natural childbirth has a social dimension).
449. Bonnie B. O'Connor, The Home Birth Movement in the United States, 18 J. MED.
& PIL. 147, 147-50 (1993) (describing the home birth movement). About 1% of women
choose to give birth at home, believing that home birth may be safer, lacks unnecessary
intervention, and provides more control over the childbirth process. Deborah Boucher et
al., Staying Home to Give Birth: Why Women in the United States Choose Home Birth, 54 J.
MHDW1FIERY & WOMEN'S HEALTHI- 119, 123-24 (2009).
450. Parry, supra note 445, at 788-90.
451. Abrams, supra note 209, at 1023 (noting that many theorists of social construction
interrogate the construction of biology).
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individual process. 452 The individual nature of this process has been un-
dermined, in part, by broader cultural understandings of pregnancy and
childbirth outside of the twenty-first century United States.453 In the
twenty-first century, the individual process of pregnancy has been compli-
cated by the technologies of reproduction that involve multiple bodies
and numerous technological procedures to ensure the success of repro-
duction.454 However, the meaning of pregnancy is made even more com-
plex in the experiential realm because it is both relational and
individualistic in nature.
Typically, pregnancy is conceptualized for much of gestation as an indi-
vidual process that need not involve partners or other family members.
Pregnancy is individual for the majority of the duration because we con-
ceptualize it as an individual process.
In many U.S. communities, pregnancy for most individuals is character-
ized by a significant degree of private, individually-determined choices.
Typically, individuals who are pregnant can make a set of socially and
medically sanctioned choices, often with limited regulatory interven-
tion.45 5 While these choices are often made in consultation with partners,
family members, or friends as a matter of practice, choices about preg-
nancy are often left to individual pregnant women. Although states exer-
cise a significant degree of regulatory oversight in relationship to medical
facilities, medical licensing for health care, and the regulation of certain
health care processes in terms of providing services, many women enjoy
some measure of "choice" about (a) whether to have the child (i.e.,
whether to terminate the pregnancy) and (b) how to give birth to the
child. 456 In contrast to historical conditions faced by women, where wo-
men's reproductive choices concerning pregnancy were limited by the
criminalization of abortion and contraception, and a lack of informa-
tion,457 the current amount of "choice" represents a significant departure
from the previous status quo. In other cultural or historical contexts, in
452. Leticia Glocer Fiorini notes that "historically, motherhood has always involved the
body of only one woman." Leticia Glocer Fiorini, The Bodies of Present-day Maternity, in
MOTHERHOOID IN THm TwFNTY-FIRS- CENTURY 135, 136 (Alcira Mariam Alizade ed.,
2006).
453. Ruth Colker, Pregnancy, Parenting, and Capitalism, 58 Omo S-r. L.J. 61, 64 (1998).
454. Hendricks, supra note 385, at 403-05, 413-14.
455. Purvis, supra note 35 (manuscript at 3-5, 14, 48) (discussing how criminal law,
family law, and other legal systems interlock to regulate motherhood and the experience of
pregnancy).
456. Of course, some women experience less freedom, but more oversight and interven-
tion. For example, women in prison and women who are perceived to be "drug addicts"
often experience the process of childbirth as cruel, punitive, and devoid of robust choice.
See Roberts, supra note 382, at 1430-32, 1445; see also Ocen, supra note 382, at 1254-55.
Furthermore, lacking recourse or access to social support networks significantly limits the
choice of whether and how to have a child.
457. LisLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINI., AND
LAW IN TI11 UNITED STATES, 1867-1973 224-25 (1996) (discussing how social networks




contrast, many aspects of the pregnancy may be tied to communally dic-
tated norms and practices.
The experiences of pregnancy are uniquely individual; however, those
individuals who carry the fetus during gestation often experience changes
in their sense of individuality.458 While pregnant persons may have exper-
ienced their previous sense of individual self as fairly impermeable and
isolated, women often simultaneously experience themselves in preg-
nancy as both an individual and a member of a community of two. 459
Perhaps this sense that a pregnant person is simultaneously self and
other, simultaneously an individual and a community, stems from the em-
bodied experience of gestation.460 As Iris Marion Young illustrates in her
classic essay on feminist phenomenology, pregnancy challenges the bodily
distinction between the inner and outer body, finding that "[p]regnancy
challenges the integration of my body experience by rendering fluid the
boundary between what is within, myself, and what is outside, separate. I
experience my insides as the space of another, yet my own body."'461
In law, the current conception of pregnancy operating beneath the
PDA and other statutory schemes assumes that pregnant women conform
to the classical model of the person. This model assumes that persons are
"autonomous, rational," ungendered (or gendered male), able-bodied
and capable or work, unified, "discrete" individuals.4 62 The life of a fetus
in utero, however, is neither autonomous nor individual.463 Pregnancy
dissolves the distinction between self and other, and the mother's preg-
nant body simultaneously contains herself and the possibility of another
separate individual that for a time she experiences as herself.464
For a pregnant woman, the sense of self that others experience is al-
tered by an embodied experience where the unity of self is decentered
through a series of physical, emotional, and psychological changes, and
also confounds the boundaries between subject and object.4 65 For Young,
the experience of pregnancy for a woman is a circumstance where her
subjectivity as a separate, individual person is decentered and the usual
nature of her physicality is in flux. 4 66 The pregnant woman's relation to
458. YOUNG, supra note 445, at 163.
459. Id.
460. This embodied experience is not necessarily positive. Women who experience
pregnancy unwillingly or without adequate emotional and social acceptance may character-
ize themselves as being "invaded" by a hostile foreign enemy or attacked by a hostile
parasite.
461. YOUNG, supra note 445, at 163.
462. Talia Welsh, The Order of Life: How Phenomenologies of Pregnancy Revise and
Reject Theories of the Subject, in COMING TO LIFE: PHILOSOPHIES OF PREGNANCY, CIILD-
IRTl, AND MOTH'RING 283, 283 (Sarah LaChance Adams & Caroline R. Lundquist eds.,
2013).
463. Id. at 289.
464. Id. at 293.
465. "For the pregnant subject ... pregnancy has a temporality of movement, growth,
and change." YOUNG, supra note 445, at 167. The change is one that a pregnant woman
experiences simultaneously as something she causes and creates as well as something she
passively experiences. Id.
466. Id. at 162.
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the fetus she is carrying enhances this experience. During gestation and
birth, the fetus is simultaneously subject and object, self and other,467 dis-
rupting the cohesive impermeable individual self.
Pregnancy-related ideologies grounded in individualism are not natural
or even inevitable, but represent social and political decisions. While the
U.S. federal antidiscrimination regime treats pregnancy as an individual
choice468 and forces the majority of women to internalize the bulk of the
employment-related costs of pregnancy,469 the European Community
adopts a different ideology.470 Like the United States, the European
Community's law reflects a commitment to women's workforce participa-
tion.471 However, the ideology of the European Community "starts from
the premise that childbearing is a societal good. ' 472 Furthermore, the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice has interpreted its directives to permit women to
enjoy special treatment in contexts related to pregnancy and childbirth.473
As a society, and in our legal system, those who make and interpret the
law could choose to conceptualize pregnancy not as merely an individual
responsibility, but as a community responsibility. Instead of saying, easily,
that a woman has a baby, we could say that couples have babies, or fami-
lies have babies, or villages, or blocks, or even law school faculties have
babies.474 While this claim that pregnancy is individual elides some of the
embodied, lived experiences of pregnancy that uniquely belong to the
467. Iris M. Young describes this aspect of pregnancy in further detail,
As the months and weeks progress, increasingly I feel my insides, strained
and pressed, and increasingly feel the movement of a body inside me.
Through pain and blood and water this inside thing emerges between my
legs, for a short while both inside and outside me. Later I look with wonder
at my mush middle and at my child, amazed that this yowling, flailing thing,
so completely different from me, was there inside, part of me.
Id. at 163.
468. West, supra note 73, at 1409-10.
469. Dinner, supra note 24, at 446-47.
470. Id. at 492-93.
471. Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 55, at 2201.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 2206-09, 2211-12.
474. This community-based, relationally oriented understanding of pregnancy is con-
tested by a powerful cultural perception, grounded in actual experience, that women as
individuals bear the costs and burdens of pregnancy. Vivian M. Gutierrez and Berta E.
Hernandez-Truyol illustrate this point in their "Unsexing Pregnancy?" discussion. Accord-
ing to Gutierrez and Hernandez-Truyol: "A woman is pregnant. A person/parent with a
female reproductive system is pregnant, regardless of how that person presents socially or
legally." Darren Rosenblum & Noa Ben-Asher, Pregnant Man?: A Conversation, 22 YALE
J.L. & FEMINisM 207, 233 (2010); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 446, at 23 (arguing that
aspects of pregnancy-related to conception, gestation, and birth are individual). Pregnancy,
in its biological, physical, social, and economic dimensions, has not been understood as
having the potential to be a relational, multi-general process with costs and burdens that
can be internalized not only by the woman gestating the pregnancy, but also by others in
the community. This article argues that, perhaps, it should be understood beyond these
individualistic paradigms. See Barbara Rothman, Spoiling the pregnancy: Prenatal Diagno-
sis in the Netherlands, in BuITH uY DESIGN: PREGNANCY, MATERNITY CARE, AN) MID-
WlFERY IN NoTrII AMERICA AN) EUROPE 185 (Raymond De Vries ed., 2001) (arguing




pregnant woman in question, a claim that pregnancy is not merely indi-
vidual, but a collective community endeavor, has the potential to make
real the ethical claims that the child and the woman have on the commu-
nity. My claim that "we, the family" or "we, the law school" are pregnant
would likely be met with a furtive glance away or an uncomfortable
cough. Yes, "it's all fine and good to be a feminist," the glance says, but
your partner, he is not pregnant, we the faculty are not pregnant, and all
of us in the village are not pregnant. And when we do refuse to individu-
alize pregnancy, typically we do not expand its scope to create ethical
duties for third parties like partners, friends, or coworkers. Instead, we
create more ethical duties for the mother by making claims for the rights
of the mother and fetus. But pregnancy need not be conceptualized as
individual. In many places in the law, we already recognize that people
other than the mother have an interest in the pregnancy in question. 475
One person or one family need not internalize a pregnancy's costs and
burdens (and its benefits) alone. And, we could understand pregnancy as
being a more collective communal experience and individuals could rec-
ognize that even when they are not actually gestating, that there are so-
cial and economic costs and benefits to the carrying and birth of a child.
Furthermore, these costs and benefits are distributed in ways that push
many individuals to be part of the pregnancy and play a role in the care of
the particular pregnant woman or child in question.
2. Paradoxes of Pregnancy: Pregnancy is Both Universal and
Particular
Pregnancy is both universal and highly particular. Pregnancy is univer-
sal because, until technological innovation creates other possibilities, all
individual human beings alive today owe their existence to a pregnancy
carried by a person with a uterus who has, at one time in life, been con-
sidered female.476 This universal aspect of pregnancy has led some schol-
ars to argue for an ethical or political order starting from the realities of
reproduction, pregnancy, motherhood and care. Pregnancy is, however, at
the same time, decidedly not universal because the experience is fore-
closed to men and is not part of many women's lives. 477 Pregnancy is also
profoundly individual in that each woman experiences it in unique ways.
This upends a universal conception of the legal person, in part, by making
it difficult to convey the experience. 478
475. Daniel R. Levy, The Maternal-Fetal Conflict: The Right of a Woman to Refuse a
Cesarean Section Versus the State's Interest in Saving the Life of the Fetus, 108 W. VA. L.
Rirv. 97, 97 (2005).
476. This is meant to be inclusive of trans men who have retained their reproductive
capacity. Supra notes 56 & 390.
477. Welsh, supra note 462, at 292.
478. Id. at 292-93 (discussing the idea of limit-experience, a concept derived from Fou-




While some women who are pregnant sometimes manifest similar
symptoms and share similar experiences, pregnancy is often a highly indi-
vidualized process. 4 79 For example, some women experience severe nau-
sea throughout the pregnancy, some women experience no nausea, and
some women experience nausea only for a brief time period.480 While
some pregnant women have constipation, diarrhea, or other digestive
problems, other women remain regular and do not have issues with their
digestion system. For some women, high blood pressure is a problem,
while other women experience the dangers of low blood pressure, and
still others experience no blood pressure changes. Some women have se-
vere joint and muscle aches during their pregnancies, while others remain
pain free and continue a high degree of activity. From efforts to conceive,
to gestation, to childbirth, each woman has a unique experience with
pregnancy that is often hard to describe.
While pregnancy is highly individualized and unique in some ways, it is
also universal in some important ways. All pregnant persons, at this time,
have used, through purchase or some other method of procurement, ge-
netic material from a male (sperm) and genetic material from a female
(egg). While the egg may or may not have been produced by the woman
gestating the pregnancy to term, each pregnancy is the product of an egg
and a sperm. Pregnancy is also universal in nature because, until techno-
logical innovation creates other possibilities, all individual human beings
alive today owe their existence to gestation in a uterus. This universal
aspect of pregnancy has led some scholars to argue for an ethical or polit-
ical order starting from the reality of reproduction, pregnancy, mother-
hood and care. 481
E. ON PRAGMATIC CONCERNS AND POSSIBILITIES
In the previous sections, it was shown how a naive perspective on preg-
nancy grounded in the plain meaning approach fails to capture the nature
and scope of pregnancy discrimination because it reduces pregnancy dis-
crimination to gestation discrimination. The complexities highlighted by
an interdisciplinary engagement with the nature of pregnancy provide a
starting point to challenge the fundamental notion that pregnancy is a
material, biological "reality" and a manifestation of "essential" sex differ-
ence. This notion, that pregnancy represents a "real" sex difference, re-
flects a larger "common sense" consensus inside and outside of the legal
community. Pushing against this cohesive common sense conception of
pregnancy opens the possibility for reconstructing the legal understanding
of pregnancy to better reflect the diversity of ways in which pregnancy is
experienced and understood. Even if one acknowledges the insights
479. See, e.g., Nastaran Mohammad Ali Beigi et al., Women's Experience of Pain Dur-
ing Childbirth, 15 IRAN J. NURSING & MIDWIFERY RES. 77 (2010) (discussing how labor
pain is in many ways unique to the individual).
480. See Heather Wood et al., Nausea and Vomiting in Pregnancy: Blooming or
Bloomin' Awful? A Review of the Literature, 26 WOMEN & BjrTH 100, 101, 103 (2013).
481. See RoBIN WEST, CARING i-oii JUSTICE 18-21 (1997).
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gleaned from embodiment theory-that social and cultural understand-
ings of pregnancy shape biological and physiological experiences and re-
alities-it might be difficult to determine how to proceed in interpreting
the PDA. In this section, the article presents some tentative possibilities
for expanding the way in which courts might interpret sex discrimination,
as inspired by the ways in which courts conceptualize legal sex.
One solution to the challenges presented lies in the passage of addi-
tional legislation that clarifies and expands the scope of pregnancy dis-
crimination to make explicit the scope of antidiscrimination protections.
The perspective on pregnancy as a historical process that is culturally em-
bedded may also reveal the necessity for additional legislation. If the bio-
logical and physiological aspects of pregnancy are contingent upon and
indebted to the social, cultural, and historical contexts of pregnancy for
their meaning and intelligibility, then perhaps a statutory prohibition
against pregnancy discrimination should be amended in ways that are
more inclusive of such factors. This is a popular recommendation among
commentators,4 82 and has been promoted by members of Congress who
support more expansive antidiscrimination protections. 483 For example,
Congress could explicitly pass legislation that clarifies that the prohibition
against sex discrimination embodied by Title VII includes reproductive
choice discrimination broadly, whether it is related to fertility treatments,
care taking, expecting a child, fourth trimester concerns, infant care or
child care, or breastfeeding. Broadly drafted legislation that prohibits re-
productive choice based discrimination, however, has its limits. The cur-
rent political climate makes the passage of such protections almost
impossible. Congressional efforts to expand the scope of antidiscrimina-
tion protections to include specific kinds of sex discrimination that relate
to reproductive choice have not been successful. Since 1999, Congress has
introduced and failed to pass legislation protecting the right to
breastfeed. 484 Congress has also introduced and failed to pass legislation
designed to protect breastfeeding mothers from discrimination in the
workplace and provide tax credits for employers who support breastfeed-
ing.485 Furthermore, even with the passage of expanded protections for
482. Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 55, at 2214-15 (arguing that additional legis-
lation is needed); Mary Ziegler, Choice at Work: Young v. United States Parcel Service,
Pregnancy Discrimination, and Reproductive Liberty (Fla. St. Pub. Law and Legal Theory,
Res. Paper Series, Nov. 13, 2014) (drawing on historical sources to argue that the PDA
embodied a limited principle of meaningful reproductive choice and that the best solution
to the PDA's failings is additional legislation), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tractid=2524142 [https://perma.cc/5S7G-LAWW].
483. See supra notes 237-39.
484. See The Right to Breastfeed Act, H.R. 1848, 106th Cong. (1999).
485. Congress has tried to introduce amendments to the PDA and tax credits sepa-
rately, see, e.g., Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 1999, H.R. 1478, 106th
Cong. (1999); Breastfeeding Promotion and Employers' Tax Incentive Act, H.R. 1163,
106th Cong. (1999), and together, see, e.g., Breastfeeding Promotion Act, H.R. 285, 107th
Cong. (2001); Breastfeeding Promotion Act, H.R. 2790, 107th Cong. (2003); Pregnancy
Discrimination Act Amendments of 2005, H.R. 2122, 109th Cong. (2005); Breastfeeding
Promotion Act of 2007, H.R. 2236, 110th Cong. (2007); Breastfeeding Promotion Act of
2009, H.R. 2819, 111th Cong. (2009).
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reproductive choice there is always the potential for legal actors to inter-
pret the changes in law narrowly in line with the status quo.
Another potential solution to the current interpretative failings of the
PDA, which does not require Congressional action, would be for federal
courts to simply recognize how pregnancy is pregnant with a meaning
that already includes not only social and cultural aspects of pregnancy but
also discrimination arising from medical conditions that occur before and
after pregnancy. Courts should remember that pregnancy, as written in
the PDA, should be conceptualized broadly with an understanding that it
entails social and cultural aspects of pregnancy and cannot be reduced
merely to gestation based discrimination. Commentators have frequently
suggested this as a solution to the PDA's current interpretative chal-
lenges. 486 This solution emerges, first, from the text of the statute. The
statute explicitly covers pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical condi-
tions without limiting the scope of which pregnancy-related conditions
would be covered. 4 87 Second, this solution also emerges from Congress's
legislative intent. In passing the Act, Congress explicitly discussed its goal
to combat stereotypical cultural notions that a woman's place is in the
home. 488 Congressional actors also explicitly noted that pregnancy dis-
crimination harms not only individual women, but also their families.
Recognizing that the harms of pregnancy discrimination have collective
costs beyond those born by the individual woman who is "actually" ges-
tating a fetus reveals how the impact of pregnancy discrimination entails
social, cultural, and, in particular, economic aspects that cannot be re-
duced to individual physiological gestation. Finally, the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the PDA to cover men and women489 reveals how preg-
nancy discrimination cannot be reduced merely to gestation discrimina-
tion. After all, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on pregnancy
discrimination, informed by the work of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
has long been concerned with combatting stereotypes and societal per-
ceptions about the abilities of women in the workplace. 490 Instead, preg-
nancy has relational aspects that are mediated through culture, social, and
economic costs that are born both by the partner who is gestating and the
partner who is not. This is not meant to obscure the importance of the
psychic and physiological costs of pregnancy. Instead, it is intended to
highlight how the scope of pregnancy discrimination coverage has already
been expanded beyond the limits of biology and to recognize how social
factors of pregnancy might impact individuals even when they are not
gestating.
486. Julie Manning Magid, Contraception and Contractions: A Divergent Decade Fol-
lowing Johnson Controls, 41 AM. Bus. L.J. 115 (2003).
487. See id.
488. H.R. Rui'. No. 95-948, at 6-7 (1978).
489. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 669-70, 684
(1983).
490. Siegel & Siegel, supra note 47, at 775, 779, 783, 789.
[Vol. 69
Reconstructing Pregnancy
Courts should adopt mechanisms to de-center biomedical aspects of
pregnancy to limit the scope of pregnancy discrimination. To this end, this
section proposes one possible approach that might alleviate the problems
of scope and meaning in the PDA. Although many courts currently re-
duce pregnancy discrimination to gestation-based discrimination, obscur-
ing not only social and cultural aspects of pregnancy discrimination, but
also a host of medical conditions that are explicitly related to pregnancy
and childbirth, there are other options. Although there are many pos-
sibilities for making this interpretation of the PDA functional for imple-
mentation and faithful to the statute, one potential way to implement it
could be found in adopting a multifactor checklist that explicitly includes
discrimination on the basis of the social, economic, and cultural aspects of
pregnancy under the umbrella of prohibited types of disparate treatment.
This explicit prohibition would ensure that, before determining that a
form of discrimination is not covered by the PDA, courts would consider
whether it implicates a variety of pregnancy-related factors. Pregnancy
discrimination could be found if the discriminatory treatment arises from
attitudes or stereotypes that implicate:
-Gamete related aspects of pregnancy;
-Hormonal aspects of pregnancy;
-Perceived or actual physical aspects of pregnancy;
-Perceived or actual physiological limitations of pregnancy;
-Perceived or actual psychological aspects of pregnancy;
-Perceived or actual cultural aspects of pregnancy;
-Perceived or actual caring aspects of pregnancy;
-Perceived or actual economic aspects of pregnancy; or
-Intention or action taken to become pregnant.
A number of benefits would flow from a multifactor test. Such a mea-
sure would also ensure that sex-based discrimination accurately and re-
sponsively encompasses aspects of pregnancy discrimination and the
related medical conditions. It would aid courts in their efforts to under-
stand the scope of pregnancy and pregnancy discrimination in a way that
is more responsive to the realities of how pregnancy is lived and exper-
ienced. Furthermore, inspired by the insights of individuals who focus on
the legal definition of sex, this eight-factor checklist simultaneously de-
centers the physiological and biological aspects of pregnancy, while rec-
ognizing the experiential reality of the physiological and biological as-
pects of pregnancy.
While such a list of factors may not alleviate the controversies and con-
cerns arising from the Supreme Court's engagement with the second
clause of the PDA and whether the Act requires employers to make ac-
commodations for pregnant employees,491 it may assist courts in making
determinations about the scope and meaning of the first clause of the
Act. Such a test has the potential to remap the definitional scope of the
491. See supra discussion Part II.A.
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Act in ways that are more responsive to how pregnancy is shaped by cul-
ture and social relations, and to provide more protection for pregnancy-
related discrimination that courts currently ignore.
The practical results of a multifactor test, which suggests a wide variety
of ways in which pregnancy can be figured and configured in discrimina-
tion against women and men, is the potential for employers to be able to
address many stereotypes. For example, an employee may be shifted from
prime assignments because she is undergoing hormonal fertility treat-
ments, prior to conception. Because the discrimination concerning fertil-
ity treatments involves both gamete and hormonal aspects of pregnancy,
such discrimination should be covered by the Act. Furthermore, discrimi-
nation against pregnant women concerning personal appearance, which
arises from a male standard of professional appearance and embraces the
presumption that pregnant women do not "look professional," could be
considered to arise from perceived or actual physical aspects of preg-
nancy. Such discrimination would have the potential to be considered
pregnancy discrimination for the purposes of the PDA.
A factor-based analysis for pregnancy discrimination that explicitly en-
tails social, cultural, and economic aspects of pregnancy, would help
courts resist the pull of biological essentialism. The dominance of a plain
meaning presumption that pregnancy can be reduced only to its biological
and physiological aspects may recede if courts are cognizant of the com-
plexity of pregnancy. Courts that reckon with the various complex aspects
of pregnancy will find it increasingly difficult to reduce the broad protec-
tions of pregnancy discrimination to a scope that only includes gestation
based discrimination.
How would this impact individuals on the ground seeking protections
for pregnancy discrimination? Some may argue that expanding pregnancy
discrimination in this way is not necessary or might lead to inefficiencies.
They may argue that current protections are adequate for answering
many of the challenges of pregnancy discrimination. For this, one might
consider how it would expand antidiscrimination protections. For plain-
tiffs like Ling and Loretta,492 who have not been pregnant but who have
been discriminated against because of social perceptions about what
motherhood means, expanding pregnancy discrimination protections may
fill a useful gaps in protection. To some, this may be a clear case where
actionable sex discrimination has occurred. These hypothetical plaintiffs
may be able to recover now under a "sex plus" theory of discrimina-
tion 493 or under a "sex-stereotyping" theory of discrimination. Although
there has been some success for such plaintiffs, 494 these theories have
provided only limited recovery for employees who are subject to care
492. See supra text accompanying note 328.
493. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1971).
494. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family




related discrimination.495 There are also other limited possibilities.
Maybe Ling would be able to recover for fertility-related discrimination,
or Loretta might be able to argue, if a state or local regime is available,
that she has faced appearance-based discrimination on the basis of her
weight. However, understanding that cultural conceptions about preg-
nancy and women's social responsibilities related to pregnancy are driv-
ing this type of discrimination may provide another avenue beyond
caregiver discrimination to make this claim. A PDA that accounts for
such cultural stereotypes explicitly and expands to protect individuals
(whether they have actually gestated an infant or not) would provide
more certain protections against this type of discrimination. It would also
provide employers with more certainty about how to treat their pregnant
employees.
The other hypotheticals, featuring Jackie and Samantha,496 provide
even more complications. However, these complications may be allevi-
ated by denaturalizing pregnancy and understanding how its social and
cultural dimensions produce discrimination on the basis of sex stereo-
types. In a lesbian couple where one mother is gestating and the other is
not, if the non-gestating mother intends to induce lactation, should her
employer be required to provide her with breaks? In 2010, Congress
amended the FLSA with provisions in the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (ACA).4 97 The ACA amendments require employers to
support nursing mothers in the workplace.498 For one year after the birth
of a child, employers must provide employees who are nursing with rea-
sonable break time 499 and a private place other than a bathroom in order
to pump breast milk.500 If Jackie is an employee and she is asking for
breaks to nurse her child, this seems like an easy case where the employer
must comply under the law.50 1 However, Samantha might not be permit-
ted to take breaks to provide milk to the child she gave birth to as a
surrogate. The FLSA amendments provide that, "[a]n employer shall pro-
vide ... a reasonable break time for an employee to express breast milk
for her nursing child for 1 year after the child's birth each time such em-
ployee has need to express the milk."'50 2 If Jackie has given the child up
for adoption, arguably she is no longer expressing milk for her child. The
495. See Kessler, supra note 64, at 375.
496. See supra text accompanying note 328.
497. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010); Elder Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 782 (2010).
498. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (2012). While the United States government has a tacitly "pro-
breastfeeding" agenda, failures in regulation and social support lead to low rates of
breastfeeding among minorities generally and significant disparities for African American
women specifically. See generally Andrea Freeman, "First Food" Justice: Racial Disparities
in Infant Feeding and Food Oppression, 83 FoRDIu lAM L. REv. 3053, 3060, 3063-64 (2015).
499. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(A) (2012).
500. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(B) (2012).
501. Legal relief might be limited to petitioning the Department of Labor for an injunc-
tion. Salz v. Casey's Mktg. Co., No. 11-CV-3055-DEO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100399, at *4
(N.D. Iowa 2012).
502. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(A) (2012).
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reality is that Samantha, as a surrogate, has been inappropriately preg-
nant, at least according to social norms. Employers are willing to accom-
modate those who have given birth and kept their child, but not those
who seek to provide the child they have given up for adoption with
healthy breastmilk.5 0 3 This is a form of discrimination.
Beyond these hypotheticals, one could imagine other scenarios where
those who are not pregnant seek protections from pregnancy discrimina-
tion so that they can stand on equal footing with other employees who
have similar familial responsibilities, and who face similar cultural and
social challenges related to pregnancy. 50 4 In spite of what some may cau-
tion, these various hypotheticals constitute a kind of pregnancy discrimi-
nation with social, cultural, and economic costs that may be tacitly
permitted under our current PDA regime. People face discrimination for
not being appropriately pregnant, or for being perceived as potentially
pregnant. They are denied benefits, excluded from promotions, and
treated differently than others because they have not been pregnant, thus
not conforming to the social norms and expectations of those around
them. An expanded conception of pregnancy may not be the answer to
every challenge, but it provides a starting point for alleviating some of
this inequality through interpretation by courts. It also provides an alter-
native lens toward an understanding of pregnancy that moves beyond the
biomedical models that privileges gestation.
And while some may claim that such a test is unrealistic, similar kinds
503. In circumstances where the mother is supported, breast milk is arguably the
healthiest option for infants during the first year of life. See Freeman, supra note 498, at
3061-63. But see Linda C. Fentiman, Marketing Mothers' Milk: The Commodification of
Breastfeeding and the New Markets for Breast Milk and Infant Formula, 10 Ni-v. L.J. 29,
46-49 (2009) (arguing that the benefits of breastfeeding may have been oversold).
504. Two hypotheticals may involve employers that provide some form of paid mater-
nity leave. If an employer offers paid leave to mothers who give birth in order to recover,
should non-gestational mothers, fathers, parents who have adopted, or others have access
to this leave? Often, employers do not include parents who have adopted a child or pro-
vide leave for those who have not given birth to a child. Although all employees are simi-
larly situated in dealing with the challenging tasks of a family adjusting to a new infant,
only gestating mothers have given birth. Perhaps such a limited policy, due to the remedial
nature of the PDA can survive scrutiny. See Zatz, supra note 332, at 1177. However, if the
employer expands the leave to include fathers, which many do in order to promote a type
of formal equality in parental leave, then this rationale is more difficult to bear. Although
employers are certainly permitted to provide additional benefits to pregnant employees,
surely they should not be permitted do so in a way that promotes inequity or unfairness.
Furthermore, it is more difficult to justify the discriminatory exclusion of non-gestational
mothers or parents who have adopted merely because they themselves have not been preg-
nant and no one in their family has been pregnant.
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of tests have been proposed by scholars 505 and adopted by courts5°6 for
making determinations about legal sex. Legal sex, which was historically
reduced to its biological and physiological aspects,50 7 has come to be un-
derstood in a more complex fashion. The expansive reconceptualization
of legal sex as complex and multifaceted reveals how "simple" determina-
tions about whether an individual should be treated as male or female for
the purposes of law must not be reduced purely to biological and physio-
logical aspects.508 Many judges proceed humbly in their determinations,
acknowledging the complexity of what they do not know by seeking out
the testimony of expert witnesses in genetics, psychology, and history.509
The proposed multifactor test suggests adopting a similar posture to-
ward the complexity of pregnancy. Instead of regarding pregnancy as
"natural," easy to understand, and not worthy of the sort of probing ex-
pert testimony designed to inform judges and jury members about the
meaning of pregnancy, courts may consider how complex aspects of preg-
nancy-from social, cultural, economic, as well as biological and physio-
logical factors related to gestation-might be used to justify
discriminatory treatment. Courts may wish to look to the expertise of
professionals in a variety of disciplines that study the process of preg-
nancy and its social meaning. In making determinations about the nature
and scope of the PDA, judges may draw on the practices of courts that
have struggled to define the meaning of male or female. Judges seeking to
define the nature and scope of pregnancy, like those making determina-
tions about the legal sex of transgender persons, should look beyond bio-
logical essentialism. To begin to work of providing more expansive
pregnancy discrimination protections, we need a more expansive recon-
struction of pregnancy and social relations: one that takes into considera-
tion the ways in which culture shapes pregnancy's meaning and that does
not limit our determinations about who is or is not appropriately preg-
nant. Perhaps in this way, courts can begin to provide plaintiffs with
meaningful protection, not only for gestation discrimination but also for
pregnancy discrimination.
There are, of course, limits to the efficacy of this move. Moving from a
supposed bright-line rule grounded in text to a more complex and respon-
505. Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision
Between Law and Biology, 41 Amz. L. Riv. 265, 278-79 (1992) (arguing for an eight-
prong notion of biological sex that includes genetic or chromosomal sex (XY, XX, XXX,
XYY ... ); gonadal sex (reproductive organs like testes and ovaries); internal morphologi-
cal sex (seminal vesicles/prostrate or vagina/uterus/fallopian tubes); external sex (genita-
lia); hormonal sex; secondary sex characteristics (body hair, facial hair, breasts); assigned
sex of rearing, and gender identity).
506. This has been adopted not only by courts abroad, see In re Kevin, (2001) 28 Fam
LR 158 (Austl.), but also by courts in the United States, see In re Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086,
1089 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001), affd in part, rev'd in part In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (2002).
507. Matambanadzo, supra note 349, at 213-14.
508. Id. Some courts have even relied on "psychological sex" to make determinations
about legal sex that have binding consequences. See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77
(1976).
509. See, e.g., Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
20161
SMU LAW REVIEW
sive understanding of pregnancy may create costs. From an efficiency
standpoint, engaging with experts on pregnancy may seem costly and un-
wieldy for a federal judiciary already burdened by the weight of antidis-
crimination claims before it. However, the demands of efficiency should
not outweigh the importance of preventing actionable discrimination in
the workplace and carrying out the will of Congress to protect pregnant
workers and their families. Furthermore, this conceptual move may not
answer all of the challenges currently inherent in the PDA. Such a list of
factors may not alleviate the controversies and concerns arising from the
Supreme Court's engagement with the second clause of the PDA and the
question of whether the Act requires employers to make accommoda-
tions for pregnant employees, 5 10 but it may assist courts in making deter-
minations about the scope and meaning of the first clause of the Act.
Such a test has the potential to remap the definitional scope of the Act in
ways that are more responsive to how pregnancy is shaped by culture and
social relations, and to provide more protection for pregnancy-related
discrimination that courts currently ignore.
CONCLUSION
This article explores how the law has defined and should define preg-
nancy for the purposes of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It argues
that the meaning of pregnancy in the jurisprudence related to Title VII
for the purposes of the PDA should be untethered from the biomedical
essentialism that currently characterizes it. For the purposes of defining
pregnancy in relation to the PDA, and perhaps beyond, courts should
reject biomedical essentialism by expanding their understanding of what
pregnancy means. In response to the changing nature of family formation
and basic fairness, reproduction cannot be reduced to its biomedical ele-
ments, and pregnancy discrimination should not be reduced to gestation
discrimination. Reproduction is not only a biomedical process-it is also
a social and cultural process that is experienced through relations with
others. This reality should influence the way legal actors understand preg-
nancy discrimination and apply the law. This article reveals not only the
justifications for recognizing this, but also provides a few potential paths
for moving forward. From this starting point, it may be possible to more
fully realize the promise of the PDA and to reimagine new possibilities
for expanding its protections to meet the needs of employees and their
families.
510. See supra discussion Part II.A.
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